Macroeconomics › Section M · The neoclassical perspective › Topic M.2

Neoclassical policy implications

If the economy returns to potential GDP on its own, what should policy do? Neoclassical economists answer: avoid fine-tuning, keep inflation low and stable, and concentrate on the natural rate of unemployment and long-run growth.

Scepticism about fine-tuning

Suppose a recession has begun. A Keynesian would stimulate demand to close the gap. Neoclassical economists accept that the economy can be below potential for a while, but since they expect it to recover anyway, stimulus helps only if it speeds that recovery. They doubt it reliably does. Official statistics take months to show a recession, and early GDP estimates are often revised. Passing a tax or spending law takes more months, and the money takes longer still to reach the economy. US recessions since 1945 have lasted about 10 months on average, according to business-cycle dates from the National Bureau of Economic Research. Stimulus that arrives after recovery has begun may simply overheat the economy and amplify the cycle.

Why expectations of inflation matter

Expected inflation shapes many decisions. Lenders want compensation for the fall in money's value, so a nominal interest rate is roughly the real interest rate plus expected inflation. Workers bargaining for pay and firms setting prices also look ahead. Economists measure expectations in several ways. The Livingston Survey of economists, begun in 1946 and run by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia since 1990, is the oldest continuous survey of its kind. The University of Michigan asks households about expected price changes, and bond markets reveal expectations through the gap between ordinary and inflation-protected government bond yields.

The Friedman-Phelps critique

In the late 1960s Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps independently challenged the idea of a stable Phillips curve menu. Their argument centred on expectations. If policy pushes unemployment below its natural rate, inflation rises. At first workers may not notice, so the trade-off seems to work. But once people come to expect the higher inflation, they build it into wage claims and prices, and the short-run Phillips curve shifts up. Unemployment drifts back to the natural rate, now with higher inflation. Friedman, in his 1967 presidential address to the American Economic Association, summed up the conclusion: the trade-off is only temporary, never permanent.

The long-run Phillips curve

The neoclassical model draws the long-run aggregate supply curve as vertical at potential GDP, so any shift in aggregate demand changes only the price level in the long run. Output stays at potential, and unemployment stays at its natural rate, whatever the inflation rate. Plotted with unemployment on the horizontal axis and inflation on the vertical axis, that gives a long-run Phillips curve that is a vertical line at the natural rate. Each short-run Phillips curve still slopes down, but each one is drawn for a particular expected inflation rate, and they all cross the vertical long-run curve at the natural rate.

Worked example: chasing low unemployment

An economy has a natural rate of 4.5% and steady 2% inflation. The government stimulates demand to hold unemployment at 3%. 1. Short run: moving up the current short-run curve, unemployment falls to 3% and inflation rises to 4%. 2. Workers and firms come to expect 4% and build it into contracts, so the short-run curve shifts up. 3. Without more stimulus, unemployment drifts back to 4.5%, now with 4% inflation. 4. To hold 3% again, policy must push inflation higher still, perhaps to 6%, and expectations follow. 5. Check: holding unemployment below the natural rate means accelerating inflation, while unemployment ends up where it started.

NAIRU and the 1970s

That logic gives rise to NAIRU, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment: the unemployment rate at which inflation stays stable. Below it, inflation tends to rise; above it, inflation tends to fall. NAIRU is closely related to the natural rate, and central banks estimate it to judge how much slack the economy has, although estimates are uncertain and change over time. The stagflation of the 1970s, when inflation and unemployment rose together, appeared to confirm the Friedman-Phelps view: years of expansionary policy, together with oil-price shocks, had pushed up inflation expectations, so the old menu no longer applied.

Bringing inflation down

If expectations drive inflation, reducing entrenched inflation usually means a period of higher unemployment until expectations fall. The US example is the disinflation under Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker. Consumer price inflation peaked at about 14.8% in March 1980. The Fed tightened sharply, and by 1983 inflation was below 4%, but unemployment reached 10.8% in late 1982, a post-war high at the time. Economists summarise such costs with the sacrifice ratio: the cumulative percentage of a year's GDP lost for each percentage point by which inflation is reduced. Neoclassical economists argue that a credible central bank can lower this cost, because expectations adjust faster.

Worked example: a sacrifice ratio

A country cuts inflation from 10% to 4% over three years. During that time output runs below potential by 6%, 5% and 4% of GDP. 1. Cumulative output loss: \(6 + 5 + 4 = 15\) percent of a year's GDP. 2. Reduction in inflation: \(10 - 4 = 6\) percentage points. 3. Sacrifice ratio: \(\frac{15}{6} = 2.5\). 4. Interpretation: each point of disinflation cost 2.5% of a year's output. 5. Check: if the central bank were more credible and expectations fell faster, the losses, and so the ratio, would be smaller.

Targeting the natural rate

Because aggregate demand cannot keep unemployment below the natural rate for long, neoclassical economists focus on lowering the natural rate itself. Policies might include unemployment and welfare programmes that support people while still encouraging job search; rules that do not unintentionally discourage hiring; better information about vacancies and help for workers to move; and retraining for the structurally unemployed whose skills are no longer in demand. They argue aggregate demand should grow only in step with the gradual rightward shifts of long-run aggregate supply, keeping inflation low.

Policy for long-run growth

The neoclassical policy programme follows from these ideas. Rather than fine-tuning the business cycle, government should create a stable environment: low and predictable inflation, and tax rates that are low and do not keep changing. In such conditions, households and firms can plan, and markets reward investment in physical capital, human capital, and research and development. Those investments raise productivity, the ultimate source of higher living standards. In this view, aggregate demand remains a useful tool for controlling inflation, but at best a temporary tool for ending recessions.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, saying neoclassical economists deny any short-run trade-off; they accept a temporary one but deny a permanent one. Second, placing the long-run Phillips curve at zero unemployment; it is vertical at the natural rate. Third, confusing a falling inflation rate with falling prices: disinflation means prices rise more slowly. Fourth, computing the sacrifice ratio upside down; it is output lost divided by points of inflation reduced. Fifth, assuming neoclassical economists ignore unemployment; they target the natural rate through labour-market policy rather than through demand.

Key takeaways

Neoclassical economists doubt that stabilisation policy can be timed well, because of data, legislative and implementation lags. Friedman and Phelps argued that expectations make any unemployment-inflation trade-off temporary, so the long-run Phillips curve is vertical at the natural rate, and holding unemployment below NAIRU brings accelerating inflation. Disinflation, as under Volcker, has costs measured by the sacrifice ratio. Policy should keep inflation low, taxes stable and predictable, lower the natural rate through labour-market reform, and promote long-run growth.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Fine-tuning

Frequent adjustment of policy to smooth the business cycle

Neoclassical economists doubt it works.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

According to the Friedman-Phelps view, what happens if policy holds unemployment below the natural rate year after year?

Question 2 of 5

Where is the long-run Phillips curve in the neoclassical model?

Question 3 of 5

A country lowers inflation from 9% to 3%. Over the period, output falls below potential by a cumulative 12% of a year's GDP. What is the sacrifice ratio?

Question 4 of 5

Which policy would a neoclassical economist favour for reducing unemployment in the long run?

Question 5 of 5

Why do neoclassical economists worry that a stimulus package may make the business cycle worse?

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