Macroeconomics › Section J · International trade and capital flows › Topic J.2
Trade balances in historical context
A single year's trade deficit says little on its own. Set against six decades of US data and the experience of other countries, the numbers start to tell a story about booms, recessions, budgets and saving.
Why look at the long record
The previous topic, "Measuring trade balances", showed how one year's balance is built. History adds two questions: is this year's figure unusual, and what tends to move it? To answer them you need a long, consistent series. The Census Bureau and the BEA publish US trade in goods and services on a balance of payments basis from 1960 onwards. The figures in this topic, in billions of current dollars, come from that series as published in February 2026; later revisions changed recent years slightly. Dollar figures grow with prices and output, so long comparisons are best made as shares of GDP or of total trade.
An old argument about surpluses
The belief that a surplus is a sign of strength is centuries old. Mercantilist writers of the 1600s and 1700s argued that a nation grew rich by exporting more than it imported and piling up gold and silver in return. In 1752 the Scottish philosopher David Hume answered with what is now called the price-specie-flow mechanism. A country with a surplus takes in gold, its money supply and prices rise, its goods become dearer abroad, and its surplus shrinks. Hume's point, that imbalances set off forces of their own, still shapes how economists think, even though gold no longer settles trade.
The United States before 1980
For much of the 1800s the young United States imported more than it exported, borrowing European capital to build canals and railways. From the late 1800s until 1970 the pattern reversed, and goods surpluses were the norm. The modern series opens in 1960 with a goods and services surplus of about $3.5 billion and stays in surplus every year up to 1970. The balance turned negative in 1971 and 1972, the years in which the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates broke down. A surplus of about $12.4 billion in 1975 was the last one: the United States has run a goods and services deficit every year since 1976.
The deficits of the 1980s
In the 1980s the deficit grew far larger. Federal budget deficits widened sharply, interest rates were high, and a strong dollar made imports cheap and US exports dear. The goods and services deficit rose from about $16 billion in 1981 to about $152 billion in 1987. In 1985 the major economies agreed, in the Plaza Accord, to push the dollar down, and the deficit later shrank. By 1991, a recession year, it was down to about $31 billion, and the current account showed a tiny surplus. That surplus came largely from one-off payments by allies towards the cost of the Gulf War, which entered as secondary income.
Worked example: imports outrun exports, 1981-1987
Exports were about $294.4 billion in 1981 and $348.9 billion in 1987; imports were about $310.6 billion and $500.6 billion. 1. Export growth: \(\frac{348.9}{294.4} - 1 \approx 18.5\%\). 2. Import growth: \(\frac{500.6}{310.6} - 1 \approx 61.2\%\). 3. The balance: \(294.4 - 310.6 = -16.2\) in 1981 and \(348.9 - 500.6 = -151.7\) in 1987, a widening of about $135.5 billion. 4. Interpretation: exports did not collapse; they kept rising. The deficit grew because imports rose more than three times as fast. 5. Check: \(-16.2 - 135.5 = -151.7\). A widening deficit can come from fast-growing imports, not only from falling exports.
Two decades of widening deficits
After a short pause in the early 1990s, the deficit climbed again, from about $108 billion in 1997 to about $764 billion in 2006, roughly seven times as large. Several forces combined: a boom in business investment in computers and telecoms in the late 1990s, a falling household saving rate, renewed federal deficits after 2001, and fast growth in imports from Asia after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Measured against the size of the economy, the current account deficit peaked close to 6% of GDP in 2006. Since 2009 it has mostly stayed between about 2% and 4% of GDP, though the dollar totals have kept growing.
Worked example: two recessions compared
1. From 2008 to 2009, imports fell from about $2,561.9 billion to $1,987.6 billion, down about 22.4%, while exports fell from $1,849.6 billion to $1,592.8 billion, down about 13.9%. 2. Imports fell by more, so the deficit shrank from about $712 billion to $395 billion. 3. From 2019 to 2020, exports fell from about $2,554.1 billion to $2,172.8 billion, down about 14.9%, and imports fell from $3,113.4 billion to $2,818.9 billion, down about 9.5%. 4. This time exports fell faster, partly because foreign travel to the US, a service export, collapsed in the pandemic, so the deficit widened from about $559 billion to $646 billion. 5. Conclusion: recessions often shrink a deficit, but not always.
The rise of services
Services have changed the shape of US trade. In 1960 they were about a quarter of US exports; by 2025 they were more than a third. The United States has run a surplus on services in every year since 1971, selling the world finance, software, education, tourism and the right to use patents, films and brands. In 2025 that services surplus was over $300 billion. The goods balance tells a different story, with a deficit above $1 trillion. Anyone who quotes only the goods figure, as many headlines do, describes only part of US trade with the world.
Other countries, other patterns
The US pattern is not universal. Germany and Japan have run current account surpluses in most years for decades, and China's surplus grew very large in the mid-2000s. Oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia tend to run surpluses when oil prices are high and deficits when they fall. The United Kingdom, like the United States, has usually run deficits. In 2005 Ben Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve governor, argued that a "global saving glut" in surplus countries helped explain the large US deficit. Because one country's exports are another's imports, the world's balances should sum to zero, apart from measurement errors.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, comparing dollar deficits across decades without allowing for inflation and growth: $31 billion in 1991 and over $900 billion in 2025 differ less as shares of GDP than in dollars. Second, assuming recessions always shrink a deficit; 2020 shows otherwise. Third, quoting the goods deficit as if it were the whole trade balance. Fourth, assuming a deficit must come from falling exports; in the 1980s exports rose while imports rose faster. Fifth, reading a surplus as proof of national strength, the mercantilist idea Hume challenged.
Key takeaways
Mercantilists prized surpluses; Hume showed that imbalances set off forces that correct them. The United States borrowed abroad in the 1800s, ran surpluses from the late 1800s to 1970, and has run goods and services deficits every year since 1976. The deficit grew in the 1980s, shrank by 1991, and widened to about $764 billion in 2006, when the current account deficit was close to 6% of GDP. Recessions usually shrink deficits but did not in 2020. Services now earn a large US surplus, while Germany, Japan and China have run persistent surpluses.
Flashcards
Flashcard
The view that a nation gains by exporting more than it imports
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
What did David Hume's price-specie-flow mechanism predict for a country with a trade surplus under a gold standard?
Question 2 of 5
In 1981 a country exports $200 billion and imports $210 billion. By 1987 exports have grown 20% and imports 60%. What is its trade balance in 1987?
Question 3 of 5
Why did the US trade deficit widen in 2020, even though the economy was in recession?
Question 4 of 5
Since which year has the United States run a deficit on goods and services trade every single year?
Question 5 of 5
Which statement about US trade in services is correct?
