Microeconomics › Section K · Monopoly and antitrust policy › Topic K.2
Regulating anticompetitive behavior
Merger review asks what a market might become; conduct law asks what firms are actually doing. Cartel agreements are flatly illegal - but a wide grey belt of 'restrictive practices' sits between competition and collusion, and the law's hardest work happens there.
From mergers to conduct
Antitrust law does not stop at the merger desk. It also polices what firms DO with whatever market position they hold - the cartel conduct of the oligopoly topic made criminal. Competitors may not agree to fix prices, limit output, rig bids, or divide up customers, territories or suppliers between themselves. Those are the bright-line rules: an agreement between supposed rivals to act as one monopoly is illegal per se, no defence about efficiency invited. Real-world prosecutions of international cartels have produced some of the largest corporate fines in history, proof that the conduct happens and enforcement is serious.
Monopoly itself is not the crime
A principle students often miss: being a monopoly is legal in the United States and most market economies. A firm that wins its market through a patented invention, a better product, or lower costs has violated nothing and may lawfully earn above-normal profits - indeed the patent system promises exactly that as the reward for innovation. What the law forbids is maintaining or extending market power by improper conduct: collusion, exclusion, predation. The distinction matters enormously in practice: regulators must prove not that the firm is big, but that the firm did something improper with its bigness. That is why conduct cases are hard and why 'near-monopoly' alone convicts no one.
The grey belt: restrictive practices
Between the bright line of cartel agreements and the clear field of honest competition lies a belt of 'restrictive practices': contractual arrangements that are legal in some settings, illegal in others, controversial in most. Minimum resale price maintenance (a maker setting the lowest price its retailers may charge), exclusive dealing, tying, bundling, predatory pricing - each can be pro-competitive in one contract and anti-competitive in the next, and the litigation is precisely about which. This is deliberate in the law's design: contracts that restrain some competition can create more elsewhere, so judges weigh effects rather than following a list. The three practices that follow are the belt's most famous residents.
Exclusive dealing
A manufacturer requires its dealers to sell only its products - is that restraint or competition? Both, in different cases. Legal: a car maker selling through its own franchised dealers is encouraging those dealers to invest in its brand, competing with other makers' dealer networks. Illegal: a dominant manufacturer using exclusivity to lock suppliers or distributors so thoroughly that rivals cannot reach customers at all - foreclosing the market rather than contesting it. The test is where the exclusion lands: exclusive deals that sharpen competition among brands are fine; exclusive deals that keep new brands out of the shop altogether are the offence. In 2024 a US federal court ruled that Google had illegally maintained its search monopoly partly through exclusive default-search deals with phone makers and browsers; the 2025 remedy barred such exclusive contracts.
Tying and bundling
Tying: the seller makes buying one product conditional on buying another - you may not have the popular item unless you also take the tied one. Bundling: products are sold as a package, usually at an appealing price, even though consumers might prefer them separately. Both are common and often legal: season tickets bundle hit games with duds, software suites bundle programs few buyers would choose singly. The antitrust concern arises with market power: a dominant firm can use a strong product as a lever, extending its dominance into the tied market and squeezing independent sellers there. Roughly: bundling by a competitive firm is a pricing choice; tying by a monopolist can be a conquest. The US case against Microsoft, decided on appeal in 2001, centred on its tying of a web browser to Windows.
Predatory pricing
Predatory pricing is the deepest cut: an incumbent prices below cost to drive a new entrant out - or to teach future entrants fear - then raises prices again to recover. In theory it can be rational (the entry-deterrence logic of sequential games); as prosecution it is genuinely hard, because the same low price is what competition looks like. The best-known evidence test (Areeda-Turner): selling below average variable cost - the shutdown price from the competitive chapter - makes little business sense except as predation. But even that test meets real-world fog: which costs are 'variable' is contested in complex firms, recouping losses must be plausible, and courts are wary of chilling legitimate price-cutting.
Worked example: is this price predatory?
An airline charges $180 on a route for years. A new entrant appears at $120. The incumbent immediately cuts its own fare to $90. Steps: 1. The innocent reading: matching the entrant is ordinary competition - the incumbent's fares were simply above the competitive level. 2. The sinister reading: $90 may be below the incumbent's costs, sustainable only until the entrant's capital runs out - then fares return to $180. 3. Apply the cost test: if the incumbent's average variable cost on the route is $110, then $90 is below AVC by $20 - the shutdown zone from the competitive chapter, where no rational firm sells except for strategy. 4. But if AVC is $75, the $90 fare clears variable cost by $15 - consistent with tough but lawful competition. 5. The residual problem: even knowing the costs, the court must ask whether recoupment is plausible - can higher prices later repay the sacrifice? Predation cases hang on both threads, cost and recoupment. Assumptions: costs as stated in each branch.
Worked example: judging a tying allegation
A dominant games-console maker requires buyers of its console to use its own online subscription service; independent subscription services are locked out. 1. Market definition: is the relevant market 'online services for this console' or 'all gaming subscriptions'? The broader definition dissolves the complaint; the narrower one makes it serious - and both are argued by interested parties. 2. Market power in the tying product: the maker dominates console sales, though rival consoles and PC gaming still compete for players. 3. The effects: the tie may fund genuine integration and quality (the defence's story) or extend console dominance into subscriptions (the plaintiffs'). 4. The honest verdict: grey-belt - tying by a firm with genuine market power, with plausible efficiencies AND plausible foreclosure; exactly the case that turns on evidence rather than definitions. 5. The lesson: restrictive-practice disputes rarely end at the textbook - they end in a courtroom's reading of particular facts. Assumptions: facts as stated.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, thinking monopoly is illegal - it is not; the conduct is, and the burden of proving it falls on whoever brings the case. Second, treating every exclusive deal or bundle as an offence: the same arrangements are everyday practice in competitive markets. Third, ignoring the recoupment question in predation: below-cost pricing without a plausible way to profit later is just irrationality, not strategy. Fourth, assuming the cost test settles predation: variable-cost classification in real firms is contested terrain. Fifth, forgetting that restrictive-practice law is case law: the answer to 'is this legal?' is usually 'it depends, and here is on what'.
Key takeaways
Conduct law polices behaviour, not size: monopoly by patent or merit is legal; collusion is not - price fixing, output limits, bid rigging and market division are per-se violations that have drawn record fines. The grey belt is the hard part: exclusive dealing (legal when it sharpens brand competition, illegal when it forecloses rivals), tying and bundling (common pricing practices that become conquests when a dominant firm uses a strong product as a lever), and predatory pricing - genuinely hard to prove, with below-AVC pricing as the proposed evidence test ($90 fares point to predation if AVC is $110, competition if $75) and recoupment as the strategic requirement. The console-tying case shows why these disputes live on evidence, not definitions: grey-belt cases are the law's daily work.
Flashcards
Flashcard
Cartel agreements: price fixing, output limits, bid rigging, market division
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
Under US antitrust law, which of these is illegal in itself?
Question 2 of 5
Why is monopoly by itself not an antitrust violation?
Question 3 of 5
An airline drops its fare to $90 against a new entrant. What determines whether this is predatory?
Question 4 of 5
When can exclusive dealing be legal, despite excluding rival suppliers from a dealer?
Question 5 of 5
Why are tying and bundling treated as grey-belt practices?
