Microeconomics › Section R · Public economy › Topic R.3

Flaws in democratic decisions and government failure

Markets can fail, and earlier sections showed how government might help. But voting rules have logical quirks, and government agencies face weaker pressure to correct mistakes than firms do. Good policy compares an imperfect market with an imperfect government, not with a perfect one.

Majority rule is not as simple as it sounds

Democracy is often summed up as majority rule, and with two options it works cleanly: the option more than half the voters prefer wins. With three or more, things can go wrong. A candidate can win without majority support, the outcome can depend on the order of votes, and sometimes no option is preferred by a majority at all. These are not failures of particular politicians but properties of voting rules themselves.

Split votes

Suppose 55% of voters favour one broad approach and 45% another. With one candidate from each side, the 55% side wins. Now let two similar candidates share the majority side's support, splitting it 30% and 25%, while one candidate represents the other 45%. Under a rule where the most votes wins, the 45% candidate wins, even though most voters preferred one of the other two. The result reflects how the options were divided, not the majority's preference. Systems such as runoff elections and ranked-choice voting are designed partly to reduce this problem, though each has drawbacks of its own.

The median voter theory

Line voters up from those who want the least of something, such as public spending, to those who want the most. The median voter sits in the middle, with as many voters on one side as on the other. The median voter theory says that when two candidates compete on a single issue like this, each has an incentive to move toward the median voter's position, because whoever is closer to the middle wins more than half the votes. The theory predicts moderate, middle-of-the-road policy. It works less well when there are many issues, when turnout is uneven, or when organised special interests push policy away from what the median voter wants.

Worked example: a park budget

Five voters want park spending of $2, $4, $5, $9 and $10 million. Each prefers whichever proposal is closer to their own figure. 1. Order the figures; the median is the middle one, $5 million. 2. Test $5 million against $7 million: the voters at 2, 4 and 5 are closer to 5, the voters at 9 and 10 are closer to 7, so $5 million wins 3 to 2. 3. Test $5 million against $4 million: the voters at 5, 9 and 10 are closer to 5, so it wins 3 to 2 again. 4. Note that the mean is \(\frac{2 + 4 + 5 + 9 + 10}{5} = 6\) million, but it is the median, not the mean, that beats every rival in a two-way vote.

Voting cycles

Three flatmates vote on a weekend trip: a museum, the beach or a hike. Amir ranks museum, beach, hike. Beth ranks beach, hike, museum. Chloe ranks hike, museum, beach. Compare the options in pairs. Museum against beach: Amir and Chloe prefer the museum, so it wins 2 to 1. Beach against hike: Amir and Beth prefer the beach, 2 to 1. Hike against museum: Beth and Chloe prefer the hike, 2 to 1. Every option beats one rival and loses to another. A situation in which a majority prefers A to B, B to C, and C to A is called a voting cycle, and in it no option is the majority's choice.

Worked example: whoever sets the agenda wins

Use the flatmates' preferences and a rule of two-way votes, with the winner facing the remaining option. 1. Start with museum against beach: the museum wins, then loses to the hike, so the hike is chosen. 2. Start with beach against hike: the beach wins, then loses to the museum, so the museum is chosen. 3. Start with hike against museum: the hike wins, then loses to the beach, so the beach is chosen. 4. Conclusion: with identical preferences, each of the three options can win, depending only on the order of votes. Whoever controls the agenda controls the outcome. The economist Kenneth Arrow proved that, with three or more options, no ranking-based voting rule can meet every one of a small set of reasonable fairness conditions in all cases.

Government failure

Government failure occurs when an intervention makes outcomes worse, or fails to make them better, than the market would have achieved. Public choice economists, including James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1986, analyse politicians and officials as people who respond to their own incentives, like everyone else. Common causes are poor information about costs and benefits, unintended consequences, rent-seeking by special interests, short-term electoral incentives that favour visible benefits now over larger costs later, and bureaucratic inefficiency. The last has a structural reason, covered next.

No self-correcting mechanism

A firm whose products disappoint loses customers and, eventually, goes out of business. That threat pushes firms to cut costs and serve buyers. Most government agencies are funded by taxes rather than sales and face no competitor. If a licensing office is slow, you cannot take your business elsewhere. Elected officials can replace managers or reorganise an agency, but that pressure is far milder than the threat of bankruptcy. One remedy is to introduce competition where possible, for example by letting private contractors bid against a city's own crews for services such as rubbish collection.

Worked example: a capped taxi market

A city limits taxi licences to protect drivers' incomes and keep service orderly. 1. Supply is fixed by law while demand grows with the city, so cabs grow scarce: waits lengthen and, where fares are not regulated, prices rise above the competitive level. 2. Because each licence earns profits above normal, licences themselves become valuable assets. In New York City, medallions sold for over $1 million at their peak, around 2013 to 2014. 3. Licence owners now have a large, concentrated stake and lobby to keep the cap: rent-seeking. 4. When ride-hailing apps arrived, unmet demand became visible and licence values collapsed, hurting owners who had borrowed to buy them. Result: a policy meant to keep service orderly became a source of rents for insiders, a government failure.

Choosing policies wisely

Three ideas belong together: markets are powerful ways to allocate scarce resources; markets sometimes fail, through monopoly, pollution, public goods and information problems; and government action can fail too. The practical question is which imperfect arrangement does better in a given case. Useful tools include cost-benefit analysis, pilot programmes and randomised trials that test a policy before it spreads, sunset clauses that make a policy expire unless it is renewed, and designs that work with incentives, such as pollution taxes, rather than against them. People of different political views can use these same tools.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, assuming the candidate with the most votes is the majority's choice: a split field can elect a minority favourite. Second, confusing the median voter with the average: the median is the middle position. Third, thinking a voting cycle means voters are irrational: each person's ranking is consistent, yet the group's choices are circular. Fourth, treating market failure as proof that government action will help: it may fail too. Fifth, treating government failure as proof that markets are always better: both must be judged case by case.

Key takeaways

Majority rule works cleanly with two options, but with three or more a split vote can elect a candidate most voters opposed, and a voting cycle can leave no majority choice, so the agenda decides. The median voter theory predicts that two candidates converge on the middle voter's position on a single issue. Government failure arises from poor information, unintended consequences, rent-seeking, short-term electoral incentives and the lack of competitive pressure on agencies. Sound policy compares imperfect markets with imperfect governments, using cost-benefit analysis, trials, sunset clauses and incentive-based designs.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Majority rule with two options

The option preferred by more than half wins

Problems start with three or more.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

Three voters rank three options. Ann: X, Y, Z. Ben: Y, Z, X. Cal: Z, X, Y. What happens in pairwise majority votes?

Question 2 of 5

Five voters want a library budget of $1, $3, $4, $8 and $9 million. Under the median voter theory, which budget would beat every rival in a two-way vote?

Question 3 of 5

In an election, 60% of voters prefer one approach, but two similar candidates split them 35% and 25%, while one candidate takes the other 40%. Under a most-votes-wins rule, who wins?

Question 4 of 5

Why are government agencies often under weaker pressure to improve than private firms?

Question 5 of 5

A city limits taxi licences. Years later licences sell for very high prices and their owners lobby hard to keep the cap. What does this illustrate?

← Previous topicNext topic →