Microeconomics › Section N · Labor markets and income › Topic N.6

The economics of immigration

Immigration stirs arguments about culture and identity that economics cannot settle. What economics can do is trace who gains and who loses in labour markets and public budgets, using the same supply-and-demand tools as the rest of this section.

What economics can and cannot say

Debates about immigration mix two kinds of question. Some concern culture, language and national identity, and there economics has little special authority. Others are about money: does immigration lower wages, does it help or strain public budgets, and does it make the country richer? Those are market questions, and earlier tools apply directly. Arriving workers add to labour supply; as consumers, they add to demand for goods and so to labour demand; and as taxpayers and users of schools, they change government budgets.

Two ways to read the numbers

The same statistics support opposite headlines. As a headcount, the immigrant population is at a record: the Census Bureau's American Community Survey counted about 50.2 million foreign-born residents in 2024. As a share, the picture is less dramatic. The foreign-born share was about 14.8% in 1890, fell to a low of about 4.7% in 1970, and was back to about 14.8% in 2024, matching the 1890 high. The count is far higher mainly because the population is far larger, having grown from about 76 million in 1900 to about 340 million in 2024. Always ask whether a figure is a count or a share.

Where immigrants come from

Policy has shaped the flows. The Immigration Act of 1924 set national-origin quotas favouring northern and western Europe and cut arrivals sharply. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished those quotas and gave priority to family ties and skills. In the early 1900s most arrivals were European; today most immigrants were born in Latin America or Asia, and Mexico remains the largest single country of birth. Origins matter economically because they shape the mix of education and skills new workers bring, which decides which labour markets feel the change.

An hourglass of skills

If arrivals exactly matched the existing population in age, skills and occupations, immigration would act like ordinary population growth: the immigrants would gain most, and wages per worker would barely change. Real immigration differs. Compared with US-born adults, immigrants are overrepresented at both ends of the education ladder: among adults without a high school diploma and among scientists and engineers with advanced degrees. So immigration shifts supply in particular markets, such as construction and food processing at one end, software and medicine at the other. Each market needs its own analysis.

Worked example: a low-skill labour market

In a city's landscaping market, labour demand is \(Q_d = 20{,}000 - 500W\) and current workers' supply is \(Q_s = 500W - 2{,}000\), with \(W\) the hourly wage. 1. Before immigration: \(Q_d = Q_s\) gives \(1{,}000W = 22{,}000\), so \(W = \$22\) and 9,000 are employed. 2. Now 2,000 immigrants join, willing to work at any wage, so supply becomes \(Q_s = 500W\). 3. New equilibrium: \(20{,}000 - 500W = 500W\) gives \(W = \$20\), with 10,000 employed. 4. Read it: the wage falls about 9%, employment rises by 1,000, and only 8,000 current workers still choose to work, down from 9,000. Customers and employers gain; competing workers lose. Assumptions: demand unchanged, workers interchangeable.

Immigrants are customers too

The example held demand fixed; real immigration does not. Immigrants rent homes, buy food and pay for services, raising labour demand. If their spending shifted demand in that market to \(Q_d = 21{,}000 - 500W\), the wage would settle at $21, a fall of about 4.5% rather than 9%. Firms also adapt, sometimes choosing more labour-intensive methods, and US-born workers often move into tasks that reward English communication skills. Minimum wage laws also put a floor under the lowest wages. These forces help explain why measured effects are smaller than the simple model suggests.

What the evidence finds

A 2017 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report reviewed decades of research. It concluded that over ten years or more, immigration has little effect on the overall wages or employment of US-born workers, with any losses falling mainly on earlier immigrants and on workers without a high school diploma. Natural experiments are fiercely debated. After about 125,000 Cubans reached Miami in the 1980 Mariel boatlift, David Card found little effect on local low-skill wages; George Borjas later reanalysed the data and argued that wages of the least-educated men fell substantially. The dispute is over how much the least-skilled lost, not over the small overall effects.

Budgets: federal and local

Fiscal effects land unevenly. Much of what immigrant workers pay goes to Washington as income and payroll taxes, while many costs, above all schooling their children, fall on states and school districts that rely on sales and property taxes. The National Academies found that first-generation immigrants are, on average, a net cost to state and local budgets, mainly because of education, while the second generation, those children as adults, are among the strongest net contributors of any group. A single-year snapshot can mislead.

Worked example: one household's ledger

Take a hypothetical immigrant household: two working adults, one child in public school. 1. Federal side: the adults pay $15,000 a year in income and payroll taxes and draw $6,000 in federal services, so Washington gains $9,000. 2. State and local side: they pay $6,000 in sales tax and, through rent, property tax. Schooling costs $16,000 and other local services $1,000, so the net is \(6{,}000 - 17{,}000 = -\$11{,}000\). 3. Combined: \(9{,}000 - 11{,}000 = -\$2{,}000\) a year while the child is in school. 4. Read it: the household helps one budget and strains another, and once the educated child works and pays taxes, the lifetime balance can turn positive.

Policy choices

Policy can steer the skill mix. Canada and Australia use points systems favouring education, language skills and job offers. The US H-1B visa for specialised workers is capped at 65,000 a year, plus 20,000 for holders of US advanced degrees. A September 2025 presidential proclamation added a one-time $100,000 fee to many new H-1B petitions, alongside expanded deportation efforts. Bills offering citizenship to people brought here as children have repeatedly failed in Congress; the 2012 DACA programme instead gave temporary protection and has faced years of court challenges. Most economists judge total gains to exceed total costs, but the losses are concentrated, which keeps the politics hard.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, comparing headcounts across a century without adjusting for population. Second, treating immigrants only as workers: as customers they shift labour demand too. Third, assuming effects fall evenly: they land on workers who compete most closely with arrivals, while those in complementary jobs can gain. Fourth, judging fiscal effects from one level of government or one year: schooling is an investment that pays back later. Fifth, mistaking a debate over size for one over sign: most research finds small overall gains.

Key takeaways

The foreign-born population was a record 50.2 million, or about 14.8%, in 2024 (Census Bureau), matching the 1890 share. Immigration shifts labour supply in particular markets, set by arrivals' skills; in the worked example the wage fell from $22 to $20 with demand fixed, but only to $21 once spending raised demand. Research finds small overall wage effects, with losses concentrated among the least-educated. Federal budgets tend to gain while local budgets carry schooling costs, and the second generation contributes strongly.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Count or share?

Immigration figures can be headcounts or shares of the population

A record count in 2024; the share only matched its 1890 level.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

The foreign-born share of the US population was about 14.8% in 1890 and about 14.8% again in 2024, when the count was a record 50.2 million. What does this comparison show?

Question 2 of 5

In the worked example, demand is Qd = 20,000 - 500W and 2,000 immigrants shift supply from Qs = 500W - 2,000 to Qs = 500W. What happens?

Question 3 of 5

Why are measured effects of immigration on low-skill wages smaller than a simple supply-shift model predicts?

Question 4 of 5

According to the 2017 National Academies report, how do the fiscal effects of immigration differ by level of government and generation?

Question 5 of 5

In the hypothetical household ledger, the family is +$9,000 for the federal budget and -$11,000 for state and local budgets. What is the best reading?

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