Microeconomics › Section L · Environmental protection and negative externalities › Topic L.3
Pollution taxes, permits, and property rights
Where command orders, markets bargain: put a price on the harm - through a tax, a tradable permit, or a property right - and let every firm decide for itself how much cleanup is worth doing. The same total reduction emerges at the lowest possible cost, because the cheap cleaners clean and the expensive ones pay.
Internalising the externality
Every market-based tool shares one move: making the decision-maker face the full social cost of the choice - internalising the externality. The economics-of-pollution topic showed the unpriced harm acting like a subsidy; pricing it removes the subsidy and lets the ordinary market machinery, superb at finding cheap ways to do things, go to work on cleanup. Arthur Pigou, who set out the approach in The Economics of Welfare (1920), saw the essential point: you need not command anyone - make the ledger tell the truth, and self-interest finds the efficient quantity on its own.
Pigouvian taxes
The direct instrument: tax each unit of the harmful activity by the amount of external damage it causes - a Pigouvian tax, equal to marginal external cost. Carbon taxes price greenhouse gases; fuel duties price congestion and pollution; charges on plastic bags price litter. The tax dictates no one's behaviour: firms that can abate cheaply do so to avoid paying, firms that cannot pay the tax and keep polluting - which is correct, because forcing the expensive cleaners to clean would waste resources. What the tax fixes is the price; quantity follows through millions of private decisions, now informed by the truth.
Worked example: taxing the river right
Return to the river from the economics-of-pollution topic: demand \(P = 50 - Q\), private cost \(10 + Q\), damage $20 per tonne - where the market made 20 tonnes and society wanted 10. 1. Set the tax equal to the external cost: $20 per tonne. 2. The plant's cost curve becomes \(30 + Q\) - exactly the marginal SOCIAL cost curve. 3. New equilibrium: \(50 - Q = 30 + Q\), so \(Q = 10\) at \(P = 40\) - precisely the social optimum, with no quantity order issued. 4. Check: the tax made the private ledger match the social one, and the market did the rest. 5. Who pays: buyers pay $40 (up from $30), the plant keeps $40 - $20 = $20 per tonne (down from $30), and the government collects \(10 \times 20 = 200\) dollars. Here buyers and the plant each bear $10 of the $20 tax. Assumptions: damage constant; demand and costs as given.
Pigouvian subsidies
The mirror instrument for positive externalities: subsidise each unit of the beneficial activity by the amount of external benefit it creates. Examples include vaccination subsidies, since each jab also protects others, education funding and research support, since ideas spread to everyone who builds on them. The subsidy raises the private benefit to the social benefit, and quantity climbs toward the efficient one. The cautions: subsidies must be funded by taxpayers, they invite lobbying to inflate the 'external benefit', and poorly designed ones can pay for activity that would have happened anyway - a transfer, not a correction.
Cap-and-trade
The second market instrument fixes quantity instead of price. The regulator sets a total cap on emissions and issues permits adding up to it; each permit allows one unit of emission, and - the crucial design choice - the permits are TRADABLE. Firms that can cut cheaply cut more than required and sell their spares; firms facing high abatement costs buy permits instead of cleaning. The cap guarantees the environmental total; the trading guarantees the total is reached at least cost, because no high-cost abatement happens while any low-cost opportunity remains unfilled. Real programmes include the US sulphur dioxide trading programme created by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which cut acid rain, and the EU Emissions Trading System, running since 2005.
Worked example: two plants, one permit market
Two plants each emit 80 tonnes; the regulator caps total emissions at 80 and issues 80 permits, split 40 each. A abates at $15 per tonne; B at $45. 1. Without trading: each cuts 40 - total cost \(40 \times 15 + 40 \times 45 = 2400\) dollars. 2. With trading: A cuts all 80 at $1,200 and sells its 40 permits; B buys 40 permits and abates nothing. 3. Total abatement cost: \(1,200\) - half the command outcome, same environmental total. 4. The price: any price between $15 and $45 suits both - at $30, A's abatement is exactly covered by selling 40 permits, and B pays $1,200 for permits instead of $1,800 for abatement. 5. The general result: with rising abatement costs, trade continues until marginal abatement costs are equal across firms, the condition for least-cost cleanup; with the constant costs here, it ends when the cheap abater has cut all it can. Assumptions: costs constant; perfect monitoring; no market power in permits.
Taxes versus permits
The two instruments are mirror images: a tax fixes the PRICE of pollution and lets quantity adjust; a cap fixes the QUANTITY and lets the price adjust. Which is better depends on what the policy most needs to get right. If the danger is a threshold - damage accelerating beyond some amount - certainty about quantity matters most, and the cap wins. If the harm is smooth and gradual but abatement costs are uncertain, the tax wins: firms know what pollution will cost them, and society avoids a badly set cap making cleanup absurdly expensive. Hybrid designs - caps with price floors and ceilings - try to take both certainties; real choices also weigh administration, politics and enforcement.
The Coase theorem
Ronald Coase (1960) noticed something that unsettled the Pigouvian story: with clear property rights and cheap bargaining, the parties themselves reach the efficient outcome - no regulator needed - and whoever HOLDS the rights does not change the outcome's efficiency. Over the coming year a café's music will cost the office next door $6,000 of lost work; soundproofing for the year costs $4,000. If the café has the right to make noise, the office pays for the soundproofing, since $4,000 beats a $6,000 loss. If the office holds the right to silence, the café installs it to avoid being shut down or paying $6,000 in compensation. Either way, soundproofing happens. What rights allocation DOES change is who pays - distribution, not efficiency.
Why Coase rarely scales
The theorem's two conditions - clear rights and cheap bargaining - are where large-scale environmental reality bites. A city's air pollution involves millions of breathers and thousands of emitters: the bargaining table cannot be built that large. Rights are often unclear (who owns the atmosphere?), affected parties are unborn (no seat at any table), and each breather's stake is too small to justify organising - the free-rider problem again. So small, clear-rights cases can settle privately, while big, many-party cases need taxes, caps or commands.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, calling Pigouvian taxes 'revenue grabs': their purpose is the price correction, and revenue is incidental. Second, forgetting that a tax set wrong - above or below the true external cost - moves quantity the wrong distance, so damage estimates matter. Third, confusing a falling permit price with policy failure: a low price can mean abatement turned out cheap, which is success. Fourth, overreading Coase: bargaining between two neighbours proves nothing about a million breathers - transaction costs are the theorem's fine print.
Key takeaways
Market tools price the harm and let self-interest find the cleanup. Pigouvian taxes set the price equal to marginal external cost - the river's $20 tax moved the market from 20 tonnes to the optimum of 10 - and subsidies run the same logic backward for beneficial activities, with funding and design cautions. Cap-and-trade fixes quantity instead: tradable permits deliver the cap at least cost, because cuts move to the cheapest abaters (the two plants' $2,400 fell to $1,200). Tax vs cap: price certainty with gradual harms, quantity certainty with thresholds. Coase: clear rights and cheap bargaining reach efficiency regardless of who holds the rights - but those conditions fail at scale.
Flashcards
Flashcard
Making decision-makers face the full social cost
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
In the river example (demand P = 50 - Q, private cost 10 + Q, damage $20 per tonne), what Pigouvian tax moves the market to the social optimum?
Question 2 of 5
Two plants face a cap of 80 total permits (from 160 tonnes of emissions), split 40 each. A abates at $15/tonne, B at $45. What does trading achieve?
Question 3 of 5
When should a cap be preferred to a tax?
Question 4 of 5
Over a year, a café's music will cost a neighbouring office $6,000 of lost work; soundproofing costs $4,000. Under the Coase theorem, what happens with clear rights and cheap bargaining?
Question 5 of 5
Why does Coasean bargaining fail for a city's air pollution?
