Microeconomics › Section R · Public economy › Topic R.1

Voter participation and the cost of elections

Economics is usually about markets, but the same tools of costs, benefits and incentives can be turned on politics. Applied to voting, they explain why many eligible citizens stay home, why many others vote anyway, and how to think about the billions spent on campaigns.

Economics meets politics

Earlier sections showed markets failing through monopoly, pollution and public goods, and suggested government remedies. But governments are run by voters, politicians and officials who also respond to incentives. The study of politics with economic tools is called public choice, and this section applies it. The starting point is turnout. According to the US Census Bureau's surveys, about 66.8% of voting-age citizens voted in the 2020 presidential election and about 65% in 2024. In the 2022 midterm elections, with no presidential race, the figure was about 52%, and local elections often draw far fewer.

Turnout around the world

Many democracies see higher turnout than the United States, and some make voting a legal duty. Australia has required citizens to vote in federal elections since 1924, and turnout there is usually around 90% of enrolled voters; Belgium and Brazil are among other countries with compulsory voting. Even a legal duty cannot guarantee a careful vote, though: a law can make people turn up, not make them study the candidates. In most democracies, including the United States, the freedom to vote also includes the freedom not to.

Voting as an economic choice

Treat the decision to vote like any other choice: weigh costs against benefits. The costs are real, if small: time to register, travel and queue, time away from work or family, and above all the time needed to learn about candidates and issues. The benefit depends on how much the outcome matters to you multiplied by the chance that your vote changes it. In any large election that chance is tiny, because the margin of victory is usually thousands or millions of votes. A single vote is decisive only if the race would otherwise be tied or lost by one vote.

Worked example: the voter's calculation

Suppose a citizen believes one candidate would make her about $5,000 better off, and estimates the chance her vote decides a statewide election at one in 10 million. Voting takes an hour, which she values at $15. 1. Expected benefit: \(\frac{1}{10{,}000{,}000} \times 5{,}000 = 0.0005\) dollars, a twentieth of a cent. 2. Cost: $15. 3. Comparison: the cost is 30,000 times the expected benefit, so on these narrow terms voting does not pay. 4. Check the logic: even if the outcome mattered $1 million to her, the expected benefit would be only $0.10. On narrow self-interest alone, the puzzle is why so many people vote.

Rational ignorance

The same arithmetic applies even more strongly to becoming informed. Studying candidates' records and policy proposals takes many hours, and the payoff, a slightly better-chosen vote that almost certainly will not decide anything, is tiny. The theory of rational ignorance says that a self-interested person may sensibly choose to stay uninformed, or not to vote at all, when the costs of informing themselves and voting outweigh the expected benefit. The economist Anthony Downs set out this reasoning in An Economic Theory of Democracy in 1957. Rational ignorance is not stupidity: it is a sensible response to a vote's small weight, with troubling effects for democracy as a whole.

Why people vote anyway

Tens of millions of Americans vote in every presidential election, so the narrow calculation misses something. Economists and political scientists point to benefits beyond the outcome: a sense of civic duty, the satisfaction of expressing a view, the habit of taking part, and social pressure from family and neighbours who ask whether you voted. Research finds that people who are more settled and connected vote more often: married people, homeowners, long-term residents, people with jobs, and those with more education and income. Age matters too. In 2020, Census surveys found about 76% of citizens aged 65 to 74 voted, against about 51% of those aged 18 to 24.

Why turnout gaps matter

Politicians who want to win pay most attention to the people who actually vote. If older, wealthier and better-educated citizens vote at higher rates, their concerns are likely to carry more weight in policy than those of groups that vote less, such as young adults and people on low incomes. That does not mean policies ignore non-voters entirely, but it does mean a government elected by about two-thirds of eligible citizens, or about half in a midterm, may not weigh everyone's interests equally.

Raising turnout: proposals and debates

Reformers have proposed lowering the cost of voting: easier or automatic registration, longer polling hours, early and postal voting, or holding elections at weekends. The evidence suggests such changes have modest effects on turnout, perhaps because the biggest cost, becoming informed, remains. Rules on voter identification and on early or postal voting are actively debated. Supporters argue that stricter rules protect the security of elections and public confidence in results; critics argue that they raise the cost of voting for some groups more than others. Economics can frame this as a trade-off between cost and security, but weighing it is a political judgement.

Worked example: how big is campaign spending?

OpenSecrets, a nonprofit that tracks political money, estimated spending on the 2020 US federal elections at about $14.4 billion, and roughly 158 million votes were cast for president that year. 1. Per vote: \(14.4 \text{ billion} \div 158 \text{ million} \approx 91\) dollars. 2. Against an economy of about $21 trillion in 2020: \(\frac{14.4}{21{,}000} \approx 0.0007\), or about 0.07% of national output. 3. Interpretation: large as a headline, small relative to the economy and to the government budgets the winners would control. 4. Caution: whether it is too much depends on what the money buys, information for voters or influence for donors, which numbers alone cannot settle.

Campaign finance and the courts

In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court held that spending money on political speech is protected by the First Amendment. Limits on contributions to candidates were allowed, but limits on what candidates and independent groups spend were not, except as a voluntary condition of accepting public funds. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 tightened rules on party fundraising and pre-election advertising. In Citizens United v. FEC (2010), a 5-4 majority ruled that the government may not limit independent political spending by corporations and unions; direct corporate contributions to candidates remain banned. Supporters see free speech protected; critics fear outsized influence by large donors.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, equating non-voters with fools: rational ignorance is a sensible response to a vote's tiny chance of being decisive. Second, assuming low turnout has no policy effect: politicians respond to those who vote. Third, assuming compulsory voting produces informed votes: it raises turnout, not study. Fourth, judging campaign spending only by its headline total: compare it with the size of the economy and with what it buys. Fifth, thinking Citizens United allowed unlimited direct gifts to candidates: it concerned independent spending.

Key takeaways

Public choice applies economic reasoning to politics. US turnout was about 66.8% in 2020, about 65% in 2024 and about 52% in the 2022 midterms, lower than in many democracies. A vote's expected benefit is the value of the outcome times a tiny chance of being decisive, so rational ignorance can lead people to stay uninformed or home. Many vote anyway, for civic duty and social reasons, and older, wealthier and more settled citizens vote more, which shapes whose interests carry weight. US federal campaigns cost about $14.4 billion in 2020, roughly 0.07% of GDP, and the courts treat political spending as protected speech.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Public choice

The study of politics using economic tools of incentives, costs and benefits

Voters, politicians and officials respond to incentives too.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

According to the theory of rational ignorance, why might a well-educated citizen choose not to study the candidates before an election?

Question 2 of 5

A voter values an outcome at $10,000 and puts the chance that her vote decides it at 1 in 5 million. What is the expected benefit of her vote?

Question 3 of 5

In the 2020 US presidential election, how did turnout compare between citizens aged 65 to 74 and those aged 18 to 24, according to Census surveys?

Question 4 of 5

Why might low turnout among some groups affect government policy?

Question 5 of 5

What did the Supreme Court decide in Citizens United v. FEC (2010)?

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