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Physicalist theories of mind

Most contemporary philosophers are physicalists: they hold that the mind is ultimately physical. But physicalism comes in several forms, each with strengths and difficulties.

Behaviourism

Logical behaviourists, such as Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind (1949), argued that talk of mental states is really talk about behaviour and dispositions to behave. Being in pain is being disposed to wince, cry out, and seek relief. Ryle mocked dualism as the 'ghost in the machine'. Critics noted that one can be in pain without showing it, and that behaviour depends on combinations of mental states, not single ones.

Identity theory

Mind-brain identity theorists of the 1950s, such as U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart, held that mental states are identical to brain states, just as lightning turned out to be electrical discharge. Pain might be identical to a certain pattern of neural firing. The theory takes neuroscience seriously and gives mental states real causal power.

Multiple realisability

Hilary Putnam objected that mental states could be realised in very different physical systems: an octopus, a human, and perhaps an alien or a computer might all feel pain with very different internal structures. If pain is identical to one specific brain state, creatures without that state could not feel pain, which seems wrong. This argument led many to functionalism.

Functionalism

Functionalism defines mental states by their roles: their typical causes, effects on other mental states, and effects on behaviour. Pain is whatever state is caused by bodily damage, causes distress and the desire to avoid it, and leads to wincing and withdrawal. Like a mousetrap, which can be made of many materials, a mind could in principle be realised in neurons, silicon, or something else.

Functionalism and artificial intelligence

If functionalism is right, a computer running the right program could have a mind. John Searle's Chinese Room (1980) challenges this: a person in a room follows rules to manipulate Chinese symbols, producing fluent answers without understanding Chinese. Searle concluded that syntax, symbol manipulation, is not enough for semantics, meaning. Responses argue that the whole system, not the person, understands.

Eliminative materialism

Paul and Patricia Churchland argued that everyday 'folk psychology', with its beliefs and desires, is a theory that may turn out false, like folk theories of witches or phlogiston. A mature neuroscience might eliminate these concepts rather than explain them. Critics reply that denying beliefs exist seems self-defeating, since it expresses a belief.

Mental causation

Physicalists aim to explain how minds cause actions. Jaegwon Kim's exclusion argument pressures non-reductive physicalists: if every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, mental properties distinct from physical ones seem to have no causal work left. Responses debate whether causation at different levels of description can coexist, as when both a molecular and a thermodynamic explanation describe the same boiling kettle.

Worked example

Consider a robot that detects damage, signals distress, avoids the source, and protects the damaged part. For a functionalist, if its internal state plays the full causal role of pain, it is in pain. An identity theorist would deny this, since it lacks human neurons. Searle would say it merely simulates pain. A behaviourist would focus on its dispositions. The case shows how each theory answers questions about animals and machines differently.

Key takeaways

Ryle's behaviourism (1949) analysed mental states as dispositions to behave and rejected the 'ghost in the machine', but struggles with hidden pain. Identity theory (Place, Smart) equates mental and brain states. Putnam's multiple realisability argument favours functionalism, which defines mental states by causal roles realisable in many materials. Searle's Chinese Room (1980) argues symbol manipulation is not understanding. The Churchlands' eliminative materialism predicts folk psychology may be replaced. Kim's exclusion argument challenges how non-reductive mental properties can cause anything.

Flashcard

Physicalism

Everything, including mind, is physical

Majority view.

Check your understanding

Which theory says mental states are defined by what they do, so that minds could in principle be made of silicon?

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