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Consciousness and the hard problem

Even if we explained every function of the brain, a question would remain: why is there something it is like to see red or feel pain? This is the hard problem of consciousness.

What consciousness is

Philosophers distinguish several notions. Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective, experiential quality of mental states: what it is like to taste coffee or see a sunset. Access consciousness, in Ned Block's terms, is information being available for reasoning, report, and control of action. Self-consciousness is awareness of oneself as a subject. The deepest puzzles concern phenomenal consciousness.

What is it like to be a bat?

In a 1974 paper, Thomas Nagel argued that an organism has conscious experience if there is something it is like to be that organism. Bats perceive the world by echolocation; even if we knew all the physical facts about bat brains, we would not know what echolocating is like from the inside. Nagel concluded that physical science, which describes things objectively, may leave out the subjective character of experience.

The hard problem

David Chalmers (1995) distinguished the 'easy problems' of consciousness, explaining functions such as discrimination, attention, and report, which are difficult but approachable by neuroscience, from the 'hard problem': why and how any physical processing is accompanied by subjective experience at all. Explaining functions seems not to explain why there is experience.

Mary's room

Frank Jackson's knowledge argument (1982) imagines Mary, a brilliant scientist who knows every physical fact about colour vision but has lived her whole life in a black-and-white room. When she first sees a red tomato, does she learn something new? If so, it seems there are facts about experience that are not physical facts. Physicalists reply that Mary gains a new ability or a new way of knowing an old fact, not a new fact.

Zombies

Chalmers also argues that a philosophical zombie, a being physically identical to you but with no conscious experience, is conceivable. If such a zombie is possible, consciousness is not fixed by physical facts alone. Critics deny that zombies are really conceivable, or argue, as with water and H2O, that conceivability does not establish possibility.

Theories of consciousness

Scientific theories include global workspace theory, developed by Bernard Baars and Stanislas Dehaene, on which information becomes conscious when broadcast widely across the brain; integrated information theory, from Giulio Tononi, which measures consciousness by how integrated a system's information is; and higher-order theories, on which a state is conscious when the subject is aware of it. These theories are actively tested and debated.

Radical options

Some philosophers take more radical positions. Illusionists, such as Keith Frankish and Daniel Dennett, argue that phenomenal consciousness, as usually conceived, is an illusion created by the brain's self-representation. Panpsychists, such as Philip Goff, argue that consciousness is a fundamental feature of matter, present in simple forms everywhere. Both see the hard problem as showing that ordinary approaches need rethinking.

Worked example

Consider a future AI that reports feelings, discusses its experiences, and behaves like a conscious person. A functionalist might grant it consciousness if its internal organisation is right. A biological theorist might deny it without neurons. Integrated information theory would compute its integration, possibly finding it low despite fluent behaviour. An illusionist might say it has the same illusion we do. The case shows that the hard problem has practical stakes for how we treat machines and animals.

Key takeaways

Phenomenal consciousness is what experience is like; access consciousness is availability for reasoning and report. Nagel's 1974 bat paper argued objective science may leave out subjective character. Chalmers (1995) separated the easy problems of function from the hard problem of why experience exists. Jackson's Mary (1982) and Chalmers' zombies argue that consciousness is not purely physical; physicalists answer with ability and conceivability replies. Global workspace, integrated information, and higher-order theories compete scientifically. Illusionism and panpsychism are radical responses, with stakes for animals and AI.

Flashcard

Phenomenal consciousness

What an experience is like

Subjective quality.

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What does Frank Jackson's 'Mary's room' thought experiment aim to show?

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