Accounting › Section G · Fraud, internal controls, and cash › Topic G.1

Fraud in the accounting workplace

Most workplace fraud is committed not by career criminals but by trusted employees who meet pressure, opportunity and an excuse at the same time. Understanding why and how they do it is the first step to designing the controls in the rest of this section.

What counts as fraud

Fraud is intentional deception used to gain a benefit, usually money, or to cause someone else a loss. Intent is what separates it from error: a bookkeeper who keys $1,500 as $15,000 by accident has made a mistake, while one who does it to cover a theft has committed fraud. Occupational fraud is fraud by an employee, manager or owner who uses their position to enrich themselves by misusing the organisation's resources. Small organisations are often hit hardest, because one trusted person may handle everything.

Three kinds of occupational fraud

The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) sorts occupational fraud into three categories. Asset misappropriation is stealing or misusing the organisation's assets, such as cash, inventory or equipment; in the ACFE's regular surveys of real cases it is by far the most common category, though the typical loss is the smallest. Corruption is misusing influence in a business deal, through bribes, kickbacks or hidden conflicts of interest. Financial statement fraud is deliberately misstating the financial statements; it is the least common category but causes the largest losses. This topic concentrates on asset misappropriation; "Financial statement fraud and Sarbanes-Oxley" covers the third category.

Common schemes for stealing assets

Skimming takes cash before it is ever recorded, such as a cashier who pockets a payment and never rings up the sale. Cash larceny takes cash after it has been recorded, such as removing money from the day's deposit. Billing schemes make the business pay false invoices, often from a fake supplier the employee controls. Payroll schemes pay a ghost employee, a fake or departed worker, or inflate hours. Expense reimbursement schemes claim personal or inflated costs as business expenses. Lapping hides a stolen customer payment by crediting that customer with a later customer's payment. Inventory and supplies can be stolen too, but cash is the most frequent target.

The fraud triangle

In the mid-twentieth century the American criminologist Donald Cressey interviewed people imprisoned for embezzlement, most of them otherwise law-abiding and trusted. He found the same pattern again and again: a financial problem the person felt unable to share, a position that gave a way to solve it secretly by breaking trust, and a way of explaining the act to themselves. Accountants now teach this pattern as the fraud triangle, with three sides: pressure (also called incentive), perceived opportunity and rationalisation. All three are typically present when an employee commits fraud. Remove one, and fraud becomes much less likely.

Pressure and rationalisation

Pressure is the motive. It can be financial, such as debts, medical bills, living beyond one's means or greed; a vice, such as gambling or addiction; or work-related, such as impossible targets or resentment over pay or a missed promotion. Rationalisation is the story the person tells themselves: "I'm only borrowing it", "they underpay me", "nobody is really harmed" or "everyone does it". Both sit inside a person's head and life, so an employer rarely sees them, though spending that far outruns a salary is one visible sign.

Opportunity: the side accountants control

Perceived opportunity is the belief that the fraud can be committed and concealed, usually because controls are weak, missing or easy to override. It is the side of the triangle an organisation can shape most directly, which is why the rest of this section is about internal controls. Typical openings are one person who handles cash and also records it, nobody reviewing bank statements, unchecked supplier lists, and managers able to override procedures. Behavioural red flags that often point to opportunity being used include refusing to take holidays or share duties, an unusually close relationship with one supplier, and defensiveness when records are questioned.

Worked example: a case through the fraud triangle

This case is fictional. Over six years, the office manager of Hollis Veterinary Clinic wrote $214,000 of cheques to a "supply company" she had registered herself. 1. Pressure: she had large medical bills and growing credit-card debt. 2. Opportunity: she alone prepared and signed cheques with a stamp of the owner's signature, received the bank statements, kept the supplier list and never took more than two days off. 3. Rationalisation: she told herself her unpaid overtime entitled her to it and that she would repay it. 4. Controls that would have broken the triangle: the owner signing cheques, bank statements sent to the owner unopened, a supplier-approval step, and mandatory holidays with someone else covering her duties.

Worked example: following a lapping scheme

A receivables clerk who opens the post also posts customer accounts. 1. Day 1: Customer A mails $600. The clerk keeps it, so A's account still shows $600 owed. 2. Day 5: Customer B mails $850. The clerk deposits it but credits A with $600 and B with only $250, so B now appears to owe $600. 3. Day 9: Customer C mails $1,000. The clerk credits B $600 and C $400, so C appears to owe $600. 4. Check: $2,450 arrived and $1,850 was deposited and credited, so $600 is missing, and the hole moves from customer to customer. 5. Detection: monthly customer statements, comparing the dates on remittances with posting dates, and separating opening the post from posting accounts.

How fraud is uncovered

In the ACFE's surveys, tips from employees, customers and suppliers are consistently the most common way occupational fraud is detected, which is why many organisations run anonymous hotlines. Internal audit and management review find many more cases, and a surprising number come to light by accident. Mandatory holidays and job rotation work because many schemes, like lapping, need constant attention and collapse when someone else does the job. Data analytics can scan every transaction for duplicate payments, round amounts or suppliers sharing an employee's address. Benford's law also helps: in many natural data sets about 30% of numbers begin with the digit 1, so invented figures often show the wrong pattern.

Who fights fraud

Management is responsible for designing and running controls. Internal auditors are employees who independently evaluate controls and operations and report their findings, ideally to the board's audit committee; many hold the Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) credential from the Institute of Internal Auditors. External auditors work for an independent CPA firm, not the client, and give an opinion on whether the financial statements are fairly presented under GAAP; an audit gives reasonable, not absolute, assurance, so it is not designed to catch every small theft. Forensic accountants investigate suspected fraud and gather evidence for court.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, treating every error as fraud: without intent it is a mistake, though it still needs correcting. Second, saying any one side of the triangle is enough; fraud typically needs pressure, opportunity and rationalisation together. Third, assuming controls can remove pressure or rationalisation; they mainly reduce opportunity. Fourth, confusing skimming, which takes unrecorded cash, with cash larceny, which takes cash already recorded. Fifth, believing the external audit is the main way fraud is found; tips find far more.

Key takeaways

Fraud is intentional deception for gain; intent separates it from error. Occupational fraud falls into asset misappropriation (most common, smallest typical loss), corruption, and financial statement fraud (rarest, largest losses). Schemes include skimming, cash larceny, false billing, payroll and expense fraud, and lapping. The fraud triangle, from Donald Cressey's research on embezzlers, has three sides: pressure, perceived opportunity and rationalisation. Organisations control opportunity most directly through internal controls. Tips are the most common way fraud is detected; mandatory holidays, job rotation, customer statements and data analytics also expose it. Internal auditors, external auditors and forensic accountants each play a part.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Fraud

Intentional deception to gain a benefit or cause a loss

Intent separates fraud from error.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

Which side of the fraud triangle can an organisation reduce most directly through internal controls?

Question 2 of 5

A cashier accepts $40 from a customer, hands over the goods and pockets the money without ringing up the sale. What scheme is this?

Question 3 of 5

A clerk keeps a $700 payment from Customer X, then uses Customer Y's $900 payment to credit X with $700 and Y with $200. How much cash is missing at this point?

Question 4 of 5

According to the ACFE's surveys of real cases, what is the most common way occupational fraud is detected?

Question 5 of 5

An accounts clerk taking money from the company tells herself, "They owe me for all that unpaid overtime." Which element of the fraud triangle is this?

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