American Government › Section J · Interest groups and lobbying › Topic J.2
Collective action and group formation
Millions of people may share an interest, yet few of them ever join a group to defend it. Explaining why, and how some groups manage to organise anyway, tells you which voices are loudest in American politics.
The group project problem
Most students have been in a group project where a few people did the work and everyone got the same grade. That is a small collective action problem: a situation in which people would all gain from acting together, but each has a reason to hold back. Interest groups face the same difficulty. A group needs dues, volunteers and members willing to call their representatives, yet each potential member can reason that the group's success does not depend on them. Groups exist only when they overcome this problem, and some kinds of interests overcome it far more easily than others.
Why acting alone rarely pays
Taking political action has real costs: time, money, effort and attention. Its benefit to any one person is often tiny, because a single phone call, donation or protest sign almost never decides whether a policy passes. Many citizens care about taxes, gun laws or the environment, but not enough to act, especially when their own contribution looks irrelevant. This does not mean people are lazy or selfish. It means the costs of acting are certain and personal, while the payoff is uncertain and shared. The economist Mancur Olson set out this logic in The Logic of Collective Action in 1965.
The free-rider problem
The sharpest form of the problem is free riding: enjoying a benefit without helping to pay for it. Many benefits that groups win are collective goods, which no one can easily be excluded from enjoying. If a union wins a pay rise for every worker at a factory, a worker who never joined still gets it. If a public radio station stays on the air, listeners who never donated still hear it. When everyone can free ride, too few contribute and the good may not be provided. The topic Special interest politics in the Microeconomics course shows how this helps small, concentrated interests beat large, scattered ones; here the focus is on how groups respond.
Worked example: the arithmetic of free riding
Suppose 10,000 apartment renters in a city would each save $50 a year if the city council passes a tenant-protection rule. A campaign needs $200,000. 1. Group gain: \(10{,}000 \times 50 = 500{,}000\) dollars a year, far more than the cost. 2. Fair share: $20 from each renter would fund it. 3. One renter's view: assume her $20 raises the chance of success by only 1 in 10,000. Her expected private gain is \(50 \div 10{,}000\), half a cent a year, against a certain $20 cost. 4. Result: each renter does better by free riding, so the campaign may never start. 5. Conclusion: an outcome good for the group can fail because it is bad for each individual decision.
Size and resources
Olson argued that small groups organise more easily than large ones. In a small group each member's share of the benefit is larger, members can see who is not contributing, and agreement is easier to reach. A dozen firms in one industry can meet around a table; millions of consumers cannot. Groups with money also have an advantage, because they can hire staff and lobbyists rather than relying on volunteers. Large, diffuse interests are not hopeless, but they need something extra to get started. The result, critics such as E. E. Schattschneider argued, is a group system that over-represents the organised and the better-off.
Selective incentives
Olson's main answer was selective incentives: benefits available only to people who join. Political scientists, notably Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson in 1961 and later Robert Salisbury, describe three kinds. Material incentives are tangible rewards, such as AARP's discounts on insurance and travel, which can be worth more than the dues. Solidary incentives are the social rewards of belonging, such as meeting people who share a background or concern. Purposive incentives, sometimes called expressive, are the satisfaction of working for a cause one believes in, such as defending civil liberties or protecting wildlife. Successful groups often combine all three.
Leaders, patrons and required membership
Other forces also help. Entrepreneurial leaders often found groups and absorb the early costs themselves. Patrons such as foundations, wealthy donors and even government agencies fund many groups, especially citizens' and public interest groups. The political scientist Jack Walker found in the 1980s that a large share of such groups relied on patrons when they were founded. Some membership is effectively required: many states require lawyers to join the state bar before they can practise. Labour unions have long argued that workers they represent should help pay for bargaining. Whether that can be required is itself contested, as the next worked example shows.
Disturbance theory
Sometimes an event does the mobilising. The political scientist David Truman argued in The Governmental Process, published in 1951, that disturbances in society, such as economic shocks, new technologies or dramatic events, lead affected people to organise. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, published in 1962, warned about pesticides such as DDT and helped spark the growth of environmental groups; the first Earth Day followed in 1970. After a mass shooting at a high school in Parkland, Florida, in February 2018, students organised the March for Our Lives for tighter gun laws, while gun-rights groups also mobilised their members in response. A disturbance often energises both sides.
Worked example: a free-rider dispute in court
Analyse Janus v. AFSCME, decided by the Supreme Court in 2018. 1. Background: in some states, public employees who chose not to join a union still had to pay an agency fee, because the union bargained for them. 2. The unions' argument: without fees, non-members free ride on bargaining that benefits them. 3. The challengers' argument: bargaining with a government is political speech, so forcing people to fund it violates the First Amendment. 4. The ruling: by 5 to 4, the Court held that public-sector agency fees cannot be required without the employee's consent, overruling a 1977 precedent. 5. Analysis: the case turned a collective action problem into a question of rights, and each side's view of the outcome depends on which value it ranks higher.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, assuming that a widely shared interest will automatically be organised: shared interests often go unrepresented because of free riding. Second, thinking free riders are simply selfish; for each individual, holding back can be the rational choice. Third, forgetting that small groups organise more easily than large ones. Fourth, assuming people join only for policy goals; material and solidary rewards matter too. Fifth, thinking disturbances mobilise only one side; they often energise opponents as well.
Key takeaways
A collective action problem arises when people would gain from acting together but each has reason to hold back, because acting is costly and one contribution rarely decides the result. Free riders enjoy collective goods without paying, so such goods can go unprovided. Olson showed that small, well-resourced groups organise more easily. Groups overcome the problem with selective incentives, material, solidary and purposive, and with leaders, patrons and sometimes required membership, whose limits Janus v. AFSCME tested in 2018. Truman's disturbance theory adds that shocks such as Silent Spring or the Parkland shooting can mobilise people on both sides.
Flashcards
Flashcard
People would gain from acting together, but each has reason to hold back
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
A neighbourhood would benefit from a new traffic light, but few residents attend the council meeting, each assuming others will go. What does this illustrate?
Question 2 of 5
According to Olson, which kind of interest finds it easiest to organise?
Question 3 of 5
A professional association offers members cheaper liability insurance and a monthly journal. Which kind of incentive is it using?
Question 4 of 5
What did the Supreme Court decide in Janus v. AFSCME in 2018?
Question 5 of 5
After Rachel Carson's Silent Spring appeared in 1962, environmental groups grew. Which explanation of group formation does this support?
