Macroeconomics › Section Q · Government budgets and fiscal policy › Topic Q.6
Practical problems with discretionary fiscal policy
On an AD/AS diagram, fiscal policy simply slides aggregate demand to potential GDP. In the real world it has to fight interest-rate effects, long delays, uncertainty and politics, which is why many economists see it as a blunt tool best saved for severe downturns.
From confidence to doubt
In the mid-1960s many economists and policymakers believed that well-timed changes in taxes and spending could keep the economy close to full employment almost permanently. The next two decades shook that confidence. The United States went through recessions in 1969 to 1970, 1973 to 1975, 1980 and 1981 to 1982, and in the 1970s high inflation and high unemployment arrived together. Economists began to ask why deliberate, or discretionary, fiscal policy is harder to use well than the textbook diagram suggests.
Interest rates and crowding out
When the government runs a larger deficit, it must borrow more in financial markets. That raises the demand for loanable funds and, other things equal, pushes up interest rates. Higher rates make firms less willing to borrow for new equipment and households less willing to borrow for homes and cars. So part of the extra demand from a tax cut or spending rise is offset by lower private investment and consumption. Economists call this crowding out. It is usually small in a deep recession, when rates are low and borrowing demand is weak, and larger near full employment. The later topic Government borrowing, investment, and crowding out examines it in depth.
Fiscal and monetary policy together
Because crowding out works through interest rates, the Federal Reserve's response matters a great deal. If the Fed holds short-term rates down while a stimulus takes effect, as it did in 2009 and 2020, the fiscal boost is less likely to be crowded out. If the Fed is raising rates to fight inflation, a fiscal expansion may simply lead it to raise them further, cancelling much of the effect. Equally, easier monetary policy can soften a contractionary fiscal policy, so deficit reduction need not cause a recession. The two arms of policy work best when they are coordinated.
Three time lags
Discretionary policy is slow. First comes the recognition lag, the time it takes to see that a recession has begun. Data arrive with delays and are revised, and the National Bureau of Economic Research, which dates US recessions, announced in December 2008 that a recession had started in December 2007. Next is the legislative lag, the time for Congress to draft, debate and pass a bill and for the President to sign it. Last is the implementation lag, the time for agencies to send out money or start projects. Building a road can take years from approval to construction.
Worked example: adding up the lags
Suppose a recession begins in month 0, and US recessions since 1945 have lasted roughly 10 to 11 months on average. 1. Recognition lag: clear data take about 6 months, so action starts in month 6. 2. Legislative lag: a bill takes 4 months, so it passes in month 10. 3. Implementation lag: the spending builds up over the following 12 months, so it is concentrated around months 10 to 22. 4. Compare: an average recession would end around month 10 or 11. 5. Conclusion: most of the stimulus would arrive during the recovery, when it may add to inflation rather than cure unemployment. Check: \(6 + 4 = 10\) months pass before a single dollar is spent.
How big is the gap, and how big the effect?
Even with perfect timing, the right size of policy is uncertain. Potential GDP can only be estimated, and estimates are revised. The size of the multiplier depends on the state of the economy, the type of tax or spending change and how the central bank responds, and economists disagree about its value. In the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, the economy shrank faster than early data showed, so policymakers underestimated the gap. A stimulus that is too small leaves unemployment high; one that is too large can push output above potential and raise inflation.
Temporary versus permanent changes
People and firms respond more strongly to changes they expect to last. A household told its taxes will fall for one year only may save much of the cut, since its long-run income has barely changed; a permanent cut raises its expected lifetime income and so its spending. Countercyclical policy, however, is meant to be temporary: deficits in the slump, restraint in the boom. That creates a built-in tension, because the policy that fits the cycle is also the kind people respond to least.
Worked example: a temporary or a permanent tax cut
A government cuts taxes by $1,000 per household for 20 million households, a total of $20 billion. Assume households spend 30% of a cut they believe is temporary and 80% of one they believe is permanent. 1. Temporary: first-round spending is \(0.30 \times 20 = 6\) billion dollars. 2. Permanent: first-round spending is \(0.80 \times 20 = 16\) billion dollars. 3. Ratio: \(16 \div 6 \approx 2.7\), so the permanent cut delivers more than two and a half times the first-round boost. 4. Check: the budget cost per year is $20 billion either way, but the permanent cut keeps costing in future years.
Structural change and the limits of demand
When an economy recovers, it does not simply return to its old shape. After 2007, jobs in housing construction and parts of finance shrank, and manufacturing employment has long been squeezed by automation and foreign competition. Workers who lose jobs that will not come back need time to retrain, move or find new industries. Fiscal policy can raise overall demand, but it cannot quickly move workers into new sectors. Nor can it push output above potential GDP for long without causing inflation, because once workers become scarce, wages and prices rise quickly.
Political realities
In a slump, when revenue falls, there is pressure to tighten belts, yet the policy calls for spending more or taxing less. In a boom, when revenue pours in, tax cuts and new programmes are tempting, yet the policy calls for restraint. Proposals to cut taxes or raise spending are seldom in short supply, but proposals to reverse them are harder to pass. For these reasons many economists see discretionary fiscal policy as a club, not a scalpel: useful in deep or long recessions such as 2008 to 2009 and 2020, while milder swings are often left to automatic stabilisers and monetary policy.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, assuming fiscal stimulus works instantly; the recognition, legislative and implementation lags can each take months. Second, ignoring interest rates; government borrowing can crowd out private spending, especially near full employment. Third, treating a temporary tax cut as equal to a permanent one; people respond more to lasting changes. Fourth, believing demand stimulus can fix job losses caused by structural change. Fifth, confusing the lags: the recognition lag is about seeing the problem, not about passing the law.
Key takeaways
Discretionary fiscal policy faces practical problems. Higher borrowing can raise interest rates and crowd out private spending, so coordination with monetary policy matters. Recognition, legislative and implementation lags mean help may arrive after a recession ends. The size of the gap and of the multiplier is uncertain. Temporary changes have weaker effects than permanent ones. Fiscal policy cannot quickly fix structural change or hold output above potential without inflation. Political pressures favour expansion over restraint. Many economists reserve it for severe recessions.
Flashcards
Flashcard
New laws that deliberately change taxes or spending
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
Data show the economy shrinking, but it takes six months before economists are confident a recession has begun. Which lag is this?
Question 2 of 5
A large deficit-financed stimulus is passed when the economy is near full employment and the central bank is raising interest rates. What is the most likely result?
Question 3 of 5
A $30 billion tax cut is announced. Households spend 25% of it if they think it is temporary and 75% if they think it is permanent. What is the difference in first-round spending?
Question 4 of 5
Why might the Federal Reserve keep interest rates low while Congress passes a stimulus in a deep recession?
Question 5 of 5
Thousands of jobs in a shrinking industry are lost permanently because of automation. Why can fiscal stimulus do little to bring those jobs back?
