Macroeconomics › Section O · Monetary policy and bank regulation › Topic O.2
Bank regulation and financial crises
Banks are fragile by design, and when many fail together the damage spreads to the whole economy. This topic explains the classic defences of supervision, deposit insurance and the lender of last resort, and why crises still happened, from the savings and loan collapse to 2008.
Why banks are regulated
Earlier topics showed that a bank's capital can be wiped out by bad loans or rising interest rates, and that a run can sink even a solvent bank. One failure can also spread: depositors at other banks panic, and banks that lent to the failed one suffer losses. This spread is called contagion. So governments regulate banks. They set minimum capital, limit risky investments such as owning company shares, and send in supervisors. In the US the main supervisors are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for national banks, the Federal Reserve for bank holding companies and some state banks, the FDIC, state agencies, and the National Credit Union Administration for credit unions.
Deposit insurance
The first defence against runs is deposit insurance. The Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the FDIC, and today it insures deposits up to $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for each category of account ownership. Banks fund it through premiums, which are higher for riskier banks. Since the FDIC began insuring deposits in 1934, no depositor has lost a cent of insured money. Because small depositors know they are safe, they have no reason to run. The cost is moral hazard: protected depositors stop watching how their bank behaves, and banks may take more risk, which is one reason insured banks are closely supervised.
The lender of last resort
The second defence is the central bank as lender of last resort. If a sound bank faces heavy withdrawals, the Fed lends to it against good collateral, so it need not dump loans at fire-sale prices. The British writer Walter Bagehot set out the classic rule in 1873: in a panic, lend freely to solvent institutions, against good collateral, at a high interest rate. The penalty rate discourages banks from using emergency help as cheap everyday funding. Lending to insolvent banks would only delay their closure and reward bad management, which is why judging solvency matters. Deposit insurance and the lender of last resort reinforce each other.
When supervision failed: savings and loans
Rules only work if they fit the risks. US savings and loan institutions made long fixed-rate home loans funded by short-term deposits. When interest rates soared around 1980, they paid more on deposits than they earned on mortgages. Many became insolvent, but regulators let them keep operating and Congress widened what they could invest in. With little capital left to lose and deposits insured, some gambled on risky property and other investments. From 1986 to 1995 more than 1,000 savings institutions failed, and cleaning up cost taxpayers about $124 billion. The episode is a textbook case of moral hazard combined with weak supervision.
Bubbles and leverage
Many crises begin with an asset bubble: prices of houses, shares or other assets rise far above what their earnings or rents justify, driven mainly by the expectation of further rises. Examples include the dot-com share bubble that burst in 2000 and the US housing boom that peaked around 2006. Bubbles are most dangerous when buyers use leverage, borrowing to buy assets. Leverage magnifies gains on the way up and losses on the way down, and when prices fall, forced sellers push them down further.
Worked example: leverage cuts both ways
A family buys a $400,000 house with a $40,000 down payment and a $360,000 mortgage, so it is leveraged ten to one. 1. Prices rise 10%: the house is worth $440,000 and equity is \(440{,}000 - 360{,}000 = 80{,}000\). A 10% price rise doubled the family's stake. 2. Prices fall 10%: the house is worth $360,000 and equity is zero. A 10% fall wiped out the whole stake. 3. Prices fall 15%: the house is worth $340,000, so equity is \(-20{,}000\). The family is underwater, owing more than the house is worth. 4. Check: each 1% move in the price moves equity by $4,000, 10% of the down payment.
The 2008 global financial crisis
In the early 2000s, US lenders made many subprime mortgages, loans to borrowers with weak credit, often with little down payment or proof of income. Lenders sold the loans to be bundled into mortgage-backed securities, a process called securitisation, so the lenders that made the loans had less reason to check them. The securities spread through banks worldwide, often financed with heavy borrowing. When house prices fell from 2006, defaults soared and the securities lost value. In September 2008 the investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed, lending between banks froze, and a deep global recession followed; US unemployment reached 10% in October 2009.
Worked example: a thin capital cushion
An investment bank holds $300 billion of assets, financed with $290 billion of borrowing and $10 billion of capital. 1. Leverage: \(\frac{300}{10} = 30\) dollars of assets per dollar of capital. 2. A 2% fall in asset values loses \(0.02 \times 300 = 6\) billion, cutting capital to $4 billion. 3. The fall that would wipe out capital is \(\frac{10}{300} \approx 3.3\%\). 4. Lenders who see capital shrinking refuse to roll over short-term loans, so the bank must sell assets, pushing prices down further for every firm holding similar assets. 5. Check: a bank with 10 times leverage could absorb a fall of almost 10%. High leverage turned modest price falls in 2008 into failures.
Why financial crises hit so hard
Recessions that follow financial crises tend to be deeper and longer than ordinary ones, as Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff documented. Damaged banks cut lending to rebuild capital, a credit crunch. Households and firms pay down debt instead of spending, called deleveraging. The Great Depression showed how bad it can get: about 9,000 US banks failed between 1930 and 1933, and the money supply fell by about a third from 1929 to 1933. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued that the Fed's failure to act as lender of last resort turned a recession into a depression. Ben Bernanke, who studied that era and shared the 2022 Nobel prize for research on banks and crises, chaired the Fed in 2008.
The 2008 response and macroprudential policy
Learning from the 1930s, policymakers acted aggressively. The Fed cut its target rate to near zero by December 2008, lent widely and bought bonds on a vast scale. Congress authorised up to $700 billion for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, used largely to inject capital into banks, and passed fiscal stimulus in 2009; the deposit insurance limit rose to $250,000. These steps are widely credited with preventing a second Great Depression, though recovery was slow. Regulators also adopted macroprudential policy, which aims at the stability of the financial system as a whole rather than one bank at a time. The next topic covers these reforms.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, thinking deposit insurance covers any amount: the limit is $250,000 per depositor, per bank, per ownership category. Second, believing a lender of last resort should rescue insolvent banks: Bagehot's rule is for solvent ones. Third, treating leverage as harmful only when prices fall: it magnifies gains too, which is why it is tempting. Fourth, blaming 2008 on a single cause: bubbles, weak lending standards, securitisation and leverage combined. Fifth, assuming deposit insurance is free of side effects: it creates moral hazard.
Key takeaways
Banks are regulated because failures spread by contagion. Supervision and capital rules limit risk, FDIC deposit insurance up to $250,000 stops runs by small depositors, and the central bank lends freely to solvent banks in a panic, following Bagehot. Insurance creates moral hazard, as the savings and loan crisis showed. Crises often follow bubbles financed with leverage, which magnifies losses. The 2008 crisis grew from subprime lending, securitisation and high leverage; the response drew on lessons from the Great Depression.
Flashcards
Flashcard
One financial failure spreading to other institutions
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
An investor buys $200,000 of shares using $20,000 of her own money and a $180,000 loan. Share prices fall 6%. What happens to her equity?
Question 2 of 5
A depositor has $310,000 in one checking account in her own name at a single insured bank, which fails. How much is protected by FDIC insurance?
Question 3 of 5
Which statement best describes Bagehot's rule for a lender of last resort?
Question 4 of 5
Why does deposit insurance create moral hazard?
Question 5 of 5
A bank has assets 25 times its capital. Roughly what fall in asset values would wipe out its capital?
