Macroeconomics › Section O · Monetary policy and bank regulation › Topic O.6

Pitfalls and unconventional monetary policy

Monetary policy is powerful but clumsy. It works with long delays, can stall when banks will not lend or rates reach zero, and has pushed central banks into new tools such as quantitative easing. This topic covers the pitfalls and the unconventional answers.

Long and variable lags

A policy change works through a long chain: the central bank must spot a problem, decide, and change rates; banks reprice loans; firms and households change spending plans; and only then do output and prices respond. Milton Friedman described the delays as long and variable. The main effects on output often take a year or more, and on inflation longer still. So central banks must act on forecasts of where the economy will be, not where it is. Acting too late lets a problem grow; acting on a wrong forecast can add instability.

Pushing on a string

Tight policy reliably cuts spending: higher rates make borrowing costlier for everyone. Loose policy is less certain. In a deep slump, banks fearing defaults may sit on extra reserves rather than lend, and firms and households worried about their jobs and sales may not want to borrow even at low rates. Central bankers compare this to pushing on a string. Japan is the classic case: its central bank cut its policy rate to zero in 1999 and created bank reserves on a huge scale from 2001, yet growth stayed weak and prices drifted down for years. Expansionary policy usually works, but sometimes only weakly.

Velocity and the quantity equation

The velocity of money, \(V\), is how many times a dollar is spent on final output in a year: nominal GDP divided by the money supply. Rearranged, this gives the quantity equation

MV = PY

where \(M\) is money, \(P\) the price level and \(Y\) real GDP, so \(PY\) is nominal GDP. It is true by definition. If \(V\) were stable, money growth would map neatly onto nominal GDP growth, and Friedman and others once urged a fixed money growth rule of a few percent a year. But velocity became erratic from the 1980s, as financial innovation changed how people hold money, and central banks moved to targeting interest rates and inflation instead.

Worked example: when velocity moves

An economy has \(M = 20\) trillion dollars and \(V = 1.5\). 1. Nominal GDP: \(PY = 20 \times 1.5 = 30\) trillion. 2. The central bank raises \(M\) by 5%, to $21 trillion, expecting nominal GDP to grow 5%. 3. But in a slump people hoard money and velocity falls 5%, to \(1.5 \times 0.95 = 1.425\). 4. New nominal GDP: \(21 \times 1.425 \approx 29.9\) trillion, slightly lower than before. 5. Interpret: the extra money was absorbed by slower spending, so nominal GDP barely changed. With velocity unpredictable, a money target alone cannot pin down output or prices, which is why money targets fell out of favour.

The zero lower bound and deflation

Short-term interest rates cannot easily go far below zero, because people could hold cash, which pays 0%, instead. This limit is the zero lower bound. The US hit it after 2008 and in March 2020, cutting its target to 0% to 0.25%. Deflation makes the trap worse. The real interest rate is roughly the nominal rate minus inflation. With a nominal rate of 0% and deflation of 3% a year, the real rate is \(0 - (-3) = 3\%\), high enough to discourage borrowing in a slump. Falling prices also raise the real burden of debts, pushing borrowers and banks towards default, as in the early 1930s.

Quantitative easing and tightening

When short rates hit zero, central banks turned to quantitative easing, or QE: buying large amounts of long-term government bonds and other assets, such as mortgage-backed securities, with newly created reserves. QE aims to push down long-term interest rates, support asset prices and signal that policy will stay loose. The Fed ran three rounds between late 2008 and 2014 and bought on a vast scale again from March 2020, and its balance sheet peaked at about $9 trillion in 2022. Quantitative tightening, or QT, reverses QE by letting bonds mature without replacement. The Fed ran QT from 2022 and stopped running off its Treasury holdings on 1 December 2025.

Negative rates and emergency lending

Some central banks went below zero, charging banks a small fee on reserves to push them to lend. The ECB's deposit rate was negative from 2014 to 2022, the Swiss National Bank's from 2015 to 2022, and the Bank of Japan's from 2016 until March 2024, when it made its first rate rise in 17 years. Effects were modest, and squeezed bank profits limited how far rates could fall. Central banks also act as lenders of last resort in panics, in the tradition of Bagehot. The Fed created emergency lending facilities in 2008 and March 2020, and a temporary programme for banks after the bank failures of March 2023.

Worked example: rates and a mortgage

A family borrows $300,000 on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. The monthly payment is

\text{payment} = \frac{P\,i}{1 - (1 + i)^{-n}}

with \(P = 300{,}000\), \(n = 360\) months and \(i\) the annual rate divided by 12. 1. At 3%, as some families paid when the Fed held rates near zero in 2020 and 2021: \(i = 0.0025\), giving about $1,265 a month. 2. At 7%, near rates seen in 2023: \(i \approx 0.005833\), giving about $1,996 a month. 3. Difference: about $731 a month, a rise of about 58%. 4. Interpret: this is the interest rate channel in action, and why home sales fell as rates rose.

The 2021 to 2023 inflation test

After the pandemic, US consumer price inflation climbed to 9.1% in the year to June 2022, its highest in four decades, driven by strong demand, supply bottlenecks and an energy price surge. The Fed at first judged the rise likely to be transitory and began raising rates only in March 2022, a delay many economists criticise. It then tightened at the fastest pace in decades, lifting its target range to 5.25% to 5.50% by July 2023, while also running QT. Inflation fell substantially and the US avoided recession through 2023 and 2024. Inflation stayed above 2%, and in September 2026 the Fed raised its range again.

Open debates

Several questions remain contested. Many central banks practise inflation targeting, putting a stated inflation goal first, while the Fed's dual mandate weighs employment too. Some economists argue central banks should also lean against asset bubbles and leverage cycles; others reply that central bankers cannot reliably spot bubbles and would face fury if they tried. Critics say long periods of low rates and QE inflated asset prices and widened wealth gaps; supporters reply that preventing deeper recessions protected lower-income workers most. On whether elected officials should run monetary policy, most countries opt for independence with accountability.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, expecting a rate cut to lift output within weeks: lags run to a year or more. Second, thinking QE means printing banknotes: it creates bank reserves. Third, assuming \(MV = PY\) proves that money growth always causes inflation; that requires stable velocity and output. Fourth, forgetting that deflation raises real interest rates. Fifth, treating the zero lower bound as an absolute floor: several central banks set slightly negative rates. Sixth, reading the Fed's Treasury bill purchases since QT ended as new QE: they only keep reserves ample.

Key takeaways

Monetary policy acts with long and variable lags, so it must rely on forecasts. Expansionary policy can be weak when banks hoard reserves and borrowers hold back. The quantity equation MV = PY shows why unstable velocity ended money growth rules. At the zero lower bound, central banks used QE, negative rates and emergency lending; QT reverses QE. The 2021 to 2023 surge showed the cost of reacting late, and the debate continues over mandates, bubbles, inequality and independence.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Long and variable lags

Policy affects output and inflation only after a year or more

Milton Friedman's phrase; act on forecasts.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

An economy has a money supply of $15 trillion and a velocity of 2. If the money supply rises to $16 trillion while velocity falls to 1.8, what happens to nominal GDP?

Question 2 of 5

The nominal interest rate is 0.5% and prices are falling 2% a year. What is the approximate real interest rate?

Question 3 of 5

What does a central bank do in quantitative easing?

Question 4 of 5

Why is expansionary monetary policy sometimes compared to pushing on a string?

Question 5 of 5

Which statement about the Fed's response to the 2021 to 2023 inflation surge is accurate?

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