Microeconomics › Section P · Information, risk, and insurance › Topic P.2

Insurance, adverse selection, and moral hazard

Insurance turns a large, uncertain loss into a small, certain payment by pooling risks. But the insurer never knows its customers as well as they know themselves, and two information problems, adverse selection and moral hazard, shape almost every feature of real insurance policies.

How insurance works

Insurance protects households and firms from ruin by one bad event. Each member of a pool pays a regular premium; the few who suffer a covered loss are paid from the pool. Because the insurer covers many people, its total claims are far more predictable than any one person's. A basic law of insurance follows: over time, premiums plus investment income must cover claims, administrative costs and the insurer's profit. Governments run insurance too. The FDIC insures bank deposits up to $250,000 per depositor, per bank, for each ownership category; unemployment insurance is a joint federal-state programme and states require workers' compensation; and Social Security and Medicare work as social insurance.

Worked example: setting a premium

An insurer covers 1,000 homes. 800 are low-risk, with a 5% chance a year of a $6,000 loss; 200 are high-risk, with a 20% chance of a $10,000 loss. Ignore costs and profit. 1. Expected loss, low-risk: \(0.05 \times 6{,}000 = \$300\). 2. Expected loss, high-risk: \(0.20 \times 10{,}000 = \$2{,}000\). 3. If the insurer can tell the groups apart, the actuarially fair premiums are $300 and $2,000. 4. If it cannot, one pooled premium must cover the average:

\frac{800 \times 300 + 200 \times 2{,}000}{1{,}000} = \$640

5. Check: \(640 \times 1{,}000 = \$640{,}000\), which equals expected claims of \(240{,}000 + 400{,}000\). In the pool, low-risk customers pay $340 more than their expected loss.

Risk groups and actuarial fairness

A risk group is a set of people who share roughly the same chance of a loss. A premium is actuarially fair when it equals the expected claims of a typical member of the person's risk group. Without risk groups, low-risk people subsidise high-risk ones. With them, high-risk people can face very high premiums. Which traits may be used is often a political choice. Car insurers in most states may charge young men more than young women. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 bars health insurers from using genetic test results, and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) bars health insurers from charging more for pre-existing conditions.

Moral hazard

The previous topic distinguished hidden characteristics from hidden actions. Moral hazard is the hidden-action problem in insurance: people take more risks, or less care, when insurance covers the cost. A fully insured driver may park carelessly; a business insured against theft may skimp on alarms; a patient who pays nothing for a doctor's visit may visit more often. The insurer cannot watch everything customers do. It fights extreme cases with fraud investigations and rewards care directly, for example with discounts for fire sprinklers or safe-driving records.

Cost sharing

The main tool against moral hazard is making the insured person pay part of each loss. A deductible is an amount the policyholder pays before coverage begins. A copayment is a fixed fee, such as $25 per doctor's visit. Coinsurance is a percentage of the cost the policyholder pays, such as 20%, often with an annual out-of-pocket maximum. The effect can be large. In the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, run from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, families randomly given plans with substantial cost sharing used roughly 30% less medical care than those with free care, with little measurable difference in health for the average participant.

Worked example: who pays the bill?

A health plan has a $1,000 deductible, 20% coinsurance and a $3,000 out-of-pocket maximum. 1. A $5,000 hospital bill: the patient pays the $1,000 deductible, then 20% of the remaining $4,000, which is $800, so \(1{,}000 + 800 = \$1{,}800\). The insurer pays \(5{,}000 - 1{,}800 = \$3{,}200\). 2. A $20,000 bill: the formula gives \(1{,}000 + 0.2 \times 19{,}000 = \$4{,}800\), above the cap, so the patient pays $3,000 and the insurer $17,000. 3. Read it: cost sharing makes patients weigh small, optional spending, while the cap still protects them from ruin on large bills.

Providers and moral hazard

Moral hazard has a supply side too. Under fee-for-service payment, doctors and hospitals earn more for each extra test or procedure, so an insured patient's willingness to accept more care meets a provider's incentive to provide it. Health maintenance organisations (HMOs) and other managed-care plans instead receive a fixed amount per enrolled person, called capitation, which rewards providers for avoiding unnecessary care, but also risks too little care. Many US arrangements now blend the two, adding bonuses or penalties tied to quality measures.

Adverse selection in insurance

Adverse selection is the hidden-characteristic problem. Buyers usually know more about their own risk than the insurer does: their family health history, how they really drive. People who expect high claims are the keenest to buy insurance. If the insurer charges everyone an average premium, low-risk customers find it poor value and drop out, leaving a riskier pool. Premiums must then rise, which drives out the next-lowest risks, and so on. This self-reinforcing cycle is called a death spiral. In the extreme, the insurer stops offering cover at all, and even people willing to pay a fair price cannot buy it.

Worked example: a death spiral

Return to the 1,000 homes. Suppose each low-risk owner, being risk-averse, would pay up to $450 for cover, more than their $300 expected loss. 1. The insurer cannot tell the groups apart and charges the pooled $640. 2. Low-risk owners compare $640 with the $450 they would pay, so all 800 drop out. 3. Only the 200 high-risk owners remain, and the $640 premiums bring in \(200 \times 640 = \$128{,}000\) against expected claims of \(200 \times 2{,}000 = \$400{,}000\). 4. To break even, the premium must jump to $2,000. 5. Read it: low-risk owners who valued cover above its fair cost end up uninsured. A rule making everyone buy would keep them in at $640, subsidising high risks.

Fixes for adverse selection

Several remedies keep low-risk people in the pool. Group insurance through employers mixes healthy and sick workers who joined for the job, not the cover. Mandates, such as state requirements to carry car liability insurance, force everyone in. Screening offers a menu: a high-deductible plan with a low premium appeals to low-risk buyers, a comprehensive plan to high-risk ones, so customers sort themselves. Governments may provide cover directly, as Medicare does for people 65 and over. The ACA combined guaranteed issue with an individual mandate and subsidies; Congress cut the mandate penalty to zero from 2019. About 7.9% of Americans were uninsured all year in 2025, against about 13% in 2013 (Census Bureau).

Common mistakes to avoid

First, swapping the two problems: adverse selection is about who buys, decided before the deal; moral hazard is about behaviour after it. Second, thinking actuarially fair means equal premiums for everyone: it means each premium matches the expected claims of the buyer's risk group. Third, forgetting that a capped premium must be paid for by someone, either other buyers or taxpayers. Fourth, believing cost sharing only saves insurers money: it changes how much care people use. Fifth, ignoring the out-of-pocket maximum when working out what a patient pays.

Key takeaways

Insurance pools risks, and premiums plus investment income must cover claims, costs and profit. An actuarially fair premium equals a risk group's expected loss: $300 and $2,000 in the worked example, or $640 if the groups are pooled. Moral hazard, from hidden actions, is limited by deductibles, copayments and coinsurance, and by how providers are paid. Adverse selection, from hidden characteristics, can drive low-risk buyers out in a death spiral; group cover, mandates, screening menus and public insurance keep them in.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Premium

The regular payment a policyholder makes for cover

Pooled to pay the few who suffer losses.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

800 low-risk homes have a 5% chance of a $6,000 loss; 200 high-risk homes have a 20% chance of a $10,000 loss. What single pooled premium covers expected claims?

Question 2 of 5

After buying full theft insurance, a shop owner stops locking the back door. Which problem is this?

Question 3 of 5

A plan has a $1,000 deductible, 20% coinsurance and a $3,000 out-of-pocket maximum. How much does the patient pay on a $5,000 bill?

Question 4 of 5

Why can charging everyone one average premium cause a death spiral?

Question 5 of 5

How does a menu of a high-deductible plan and a comprehensive plan help an insurer facing adverse selection?

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