Microeconomics › Section P · Information, risk, and insurance › Topic P.1

Imperfect and asymmetric information

The demand-supply model quietly assumes that buyers and sellers know what they are trading. When one side knows more than the other, good products can be driven out, prices can mislead, and markets can shrink or vanish, unless people find ways to share what they know.

When one side knows more

Buying a refurbished laptop online, you see a photo; the seller knows whether its battery is failing. Such gaps are everywhere. A job applicant knows more about her own work habits than the employer, and a borrower knows more about his plans to repay than the bank. Earlier topics assumed that both sides of a market understand what is being traded. This topic asks what happens when they do not, and what buyers, sellers and governments do about it.

Imperfect and asymmetric information

Imperfect information means that buyers, sellers or both are less than fully certain about a product's quality or price. Asymmetric information is the special case in which one party knows more than the other, as when a seller knows a car's repair history and the buyer does not. Asymmetry creates an incentive to mislead: the more faults a seller discloses, the lower the price. Economists distinguish two kinds of hidden information. Hidden characteristics are facts about quality known before a deal; hidden actions are choices made after a deal that the other side cannot observe.

The market for lemons

In a 1970 paper, George Akerlof showed how hidden quality can unravel a market. In US slang, a lemon is a defective product, especially a used car. Suppose buyers cannot tell good used cars from lemons. They will offer only what an average car is worth. That price is too low for owners of good cars, who keep them instead. As good cars leave the market, the average quality of cars for sale falls, buyers lower their offers again, and more good cars leave. In the extreme, only lemons trade. This is adverse selection: hidden information selects the worst products into the market.

Worked example: a market unravels

Half a town's used cars are good, half lemons. Buyers value a good car at $12,000 and a lemon at $5,000; good-car owners need at least $9,000, lemon owners $3,000. 1. Buyers cannot tell the cars apart, so they will pay at most the expected value: \(0.5 \times 12{,}000 + 0.5 \times 5{,}000 = \$8{,}500\). 2. Good-car owners want at least $9,000, so they withdraw. 3. Buyers now know any car on sale is a lemon and offer at most $5,000. 4. Only lemons trade, at a price between $3,000 and $5,000. 5. Read it: each good car could have produced \(12{,}000 - 9{,}000 = \$3{,}000\) of gains from trade, and all of it is lost to missing information.

Thin markets and price as a signal

When information problems are severe, buyers and sellers may simply stay away, leaving a thin market with few participants and few trades, rather than a thick one with many. Price itself can also carry information. Buyers who cannot judge quality often assume a higher price means better quality, whether for a lawyer, a restaurant or a gemstone. Then a seller who cuts prices may sell less, because buyers read the cut as a sign of poor quality, and a seller who raises prices may sell more. This reverses the usual law of demand, but only within limits, as information eventually spreads.

Reassurance from sellers

Sellers of good products have every reason to prove it. A money-back guarantee lets buyers try a product at little risk, which matters most for online sellers whose customers cannot touch the goods. A warranty promises to repair or replace a faulty product for a set period, and a service contract does the same for an extra fee. Reputation works as an unwritten guarantee: an established firm that wants repeat customers has much to lose from selling junk. Online ratings spread reputations quickly, which is why fake reviews matter; a Federal Trade Commission rule in force since October 2024 bans buying or selling fake reviews.

Signalling and screening

Two strategies attack asymmetric information from opposite sides. Signalling is an action by the informed party that reveals quality. Michael Spence, who shared the 2001 Nobel memorial prize with Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz, argued that education partly works as a signal of ability to employers. A signal is credible only if it is cheaper for high-quality types to send than for low-quality types; otherwise everyone sends it. Screening is an action by the uninformed party to sort people. Employers use tests, interviews and probation periods; lenders check credit histories; and, as the next topic shows, insurers offer menus of policies that different customers choose between.

Worked example: a signal that works

An employer values high-ability workers at $70,000 a year and others at $50,000, but cannot tell them apart. It pays $70,000 to anyone with a demanding certificate and $50,000 otherwise. Earning the certificate costs a high-ability worker the equivalent of $10,000 in effort and fees, and a low-ability worker $25,000. 1. High ability: \(70{,}000 - 10{,}000 = \$60{,}000\), better than $50,000, so get the certificate. 2. Low ability: \(70{,}000 - 25{,}000 = \$45{,}000\), worse than $50,000, so skip it. 3. The certificate separates the types. 4. Test it: if it cost low-ability workers only $15,000, they would net $55,000 and get it too, and the signal would stop carrying information.

Labour and credit markets

Labour markets add occupational licences, issued by government agencies to show that a worker has passed required training or exams. Doctors and lawyers need them, and in many states so do barbers. Morris Kleiner and Alan Krueger estimated that about 29% of US workers needed a licence in 2008, up from under 5% in the early 1950s. Licences reassure customers but also act as barriers to entry that can raise prices and reduce choice. Lenders, for their part, ask for proof of income, check credit histories, and require cosigners, who promise to repay if the borrower does not, or collateral, property the lender can seize.

The principal-agent problem

Hidden actions create a related problem. A principal, such as an employer or a firm's shareholders, hires an agent, such as a worker or a manager, whose effort and choices are hard to observe. The agent may pursue their own interests: shirking, empire-building or taking risks that pay off for them but not for the owners. Remedies tie the agent's rewards to results the principal can see, through performance pay, commissions, bonuses or stock options, and add monitoring and the discipline of reputation. Each remedy can create new distortions, such as managers boosting short-term profits to lift their bonuses.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, treating imperfect and asymmetric information as identical: asymmetry means one side knows more. Second, thinking adverse selection is about bad luck: it is about hidden information drawing the worst products or customers into a market. Third, assuming any costly action is a signal: it works only if it is cheaper for high-quality types. Fourth, confusing signalling, done by the informed side, with screening, done by the uninformed side. Fifth, assuming information remedies are free: licences, for example, restrict entry and can raise prices.

Key takeaways

Asymmetric information means one side of a deal knows more. Hidden quality causes adverse selection: in Akerlof's market for lemons, buyers offering an average price drive out good products, as in the worked example where an $8,500 offer drove away good cars needing $9,000. Thin markets and price-as-quality inferences follow. Guarantees, warranties, reputation and honest reviews reassure buyers. Signals work only if they are cheaper for high-quality types; screening sorts people from the uninformed side. Licences, credit checks, cosigners, collateral and performance pay manage information problems in labour and credit markets.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Imperfect information

Buyers, sellers or both are unsure of quality or price

The general case.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

In the worked example, buyers value good cars at $12,000 and lemons at $5,000, half are good, and good-car owners need at least $9,000. What happens?

Question 2 of 5

A credential costs high-ability workers $10,000 and low-ability workers $25,000. It raises pay from $50,000 to $70,000. Why does it work as a signal?

Question 3 of 5

Which is an example of screening rather than signalling?

Question 4 of 5

Why might a used-car dealer who cuts prices sell fewer cars when buyers cannot judge quality?

Question 5 of 5

What is the main economic cost of occupational licensing?

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