Microeconomics › Section M · Positive externalities and public goods › Topic M.3
Public goods and common resources
Markets run on prices, and prices need two things a market can enforce: keeping non-payers out, and letting each buyer have what they bought. Some goods break both rules - ones everyone shares without paying, and ones everyone can take without owning. The first starve; the second collapse.
Market failure, the umbrella term
A market failure is any situation where a free market, left alone, does not reach an efficient outcome - where total surplus could be raised by changing what is produced or who gets it. Earlier sections covered market power and externalities; information problems come later. This topic adds the last two, which come from the physical nature of the goods themselves: public goods, which markets starve of funding, and common resources, which markets strip bare.
Two questions that sort every good
Ask two questions of any good. Excludable? Can non-payers be kept from using it? Rival? Does one person's use reduce what is left for others? The answers make a two-by-two. Both yes: a private good - a sandwich, the ordinary case. Neither - a public good: national defence, street lighting, flood defences, basic science. Rival but not excludable: a common resource - ocean fish, groundwater, congested roads. Excludable but not rival: a club good - streaming services, cable television, uncrowded private parks. The corners predict the failure: the public corner starves, the commons corner collapses.
Public goods: the free-rider's feast
Why can markets not sell national defence? Because no one can be excluded from its protection: an armed force defends everyone within reach, paid or not. That is the free-rider problem, a prisoners' dilemma: each person reasons that if others pay, the good arrives anyway, and if no one pays, one contribution would not save it. Rational individuals withhold; the market, finding no paying demand, produces far too little. The goods sharing this fate are not luxuries - defence, law and order, flood defences, basic research. The standard solution is compulsory taxation, but not the only one: broadcast radio funds itself through advertising, and neighbourhood groups and charities use social pressure to curb free-riding.
Worked example: summing the benefits vertically
A village of three households considers street lamps costing $500 each. Household marginal benefits from the first lamp: $300, $200, $150. From a second: $200, $100, $50. 1. The public-good rule: one lamp serves all three, so the benefits ADD vertically: first lamp \(300 + 200 + 150 = 650\) against marginal cost 500 - worth providing. 2. Second lamp: \(200 + 100 + 50 = 350 < 500\) - stop. Efficient provision: one lamp. 3. The contrast with private goods: a sandwich's benefits do not add - only its eater consumes it, so demand sums horizontally over units; public goods sum benefits vertically because everyone consumes the SAME unit. 4. Check the market's version: a private supplier must charge each household enough to cover $500 - but each would rather let the neighbours pay and enjoy the light free. Provision collapses toward zero. Assumptions: benefits and costs as stated; one price for all.
The valuation problem
How much public good should government provide? The efficient rule is the worked example's: provide until the sum of everyone's marginal benefits meets marginal cost. The operational difficulty is finding the numbers. Cost-benefit analysis estimates benefits through surveys and revealed behaviour - but people answering surveys about a good they will not directly pay for have every incentive to misstate: supporters overstate to swell the project, opponents overstate the costs. So public-goods decisions are made under systematically noisy information.
Common resources: the tragedy of the commons
The other failing corner. A common resource is rival - every fish taken is gone - but non-excludable: anyone who shows up can take some. The incentive arithmetic is fatal. Each user captures the FULL benefit of their own extra use, but the cost of depletion is spread over EVERYONE - so each user's private arithmetic says 'take more', while the social arithmetic says 'stop'. Garrett Hardin named the pattern the tragedy of the commons for the shared pasture where each herder gains fully from another animal yet bears a sliver of the overgrazing. The tragedy is not cruelty but multiplication: individually rational choices, summed, destroy the shared base.
Worked example: the lake's fatal arithmetic
Ten fishers share a lake. Each extra fishing trip earns a fisher $200, but reduces the future fish stock by $500 of value - a cost spread across all ten, $50 each. 1. Each fisher's private calculus: \(200 > 50\) - fish. 2. The lake's social calculus: each trip adds $200 of earnings and destroys $500 of future stock - a net loss of $300 per trip to the village. 3. The outcome: everyone fishes until the stock collapses - the pattern that struck Atlantic cod off Newfoundland, where a great fishery collapsed in the early 1990s and was closed by moratorium. 4. The remedy's shape: make the private calculus match the social one. An individual tradable quota caps the total catch at the sustainable level, and the quota's market price makes each fisher a stakeholder in the stock's future. Assumptions: values as stated; catch shares enforced.
Tools for the commons
The remedies all work by restoring one of the two missing features. Regulation: catch limits, hunting seasons, road access rules. Prices: congestion charges, extraction fees, licence fees. Property rights: individual fishing quotas (tradable ones adding the efficiency of permit trading), grazing allotments, water rights. And the discovery that changed the textbook: Elinor Ostrom - the first woman to win the Nobel memorial prize in economics, 2009 - documented communities managing commons for centuries with their own rules, monitoring and graduated sanctions, no government and no market required. Institutions built by the users themselves can hold the tragedy off when conditions are right.
Club goods: the fourth corner
The remaining box - excludable but not rival - is the club good: streaming services, cable television, software, uncrowded private parks. Non-payers can be kept out (no free-riding), and one viewer's use does not reduce another's (until congestion). Markets CAN supply these - and do - but the cost structure has a familiar twist: one more user costs almost nothing, so average cost falls with subscribers, and the natural-monopoly analysis of section K can return: a single large supplier may undercut all rivals, though many club markets (gyms, streaming) still have several. Four corners: private goods fine, public goods starving, commons collapsing, club goods prone to market power.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, defining public goods by who produces them - 'government-made' is not the definition; non-excludability and non-rivalry are. Second, summing benefits horizontally for a public good - the point is vertical summation, since everyone consumes the same unit. Third, treating the tragedy of the commons as a parable about wickedness - it is multiplication of rational choices, and it reverses when the incentives do. Fourth, assuming commons need privatisation or state control - Ostrom's communities show a third way. Fifth, forgetting the club-good corner's risk: excludability solves free-riding but falling average cost invites market power.
Key takeaways
Market failure is the umbrella: market power, externalities, information problems, and - this topic - the goods' own physical nature. Two questions sort everything: excludable? rival? Private goods (both) work; public goods (neither) starve from free-riding - markets underprovide, so taxation usually funds them, and the efficient quantity sums marginal benefits VERTICALLY until they meet marginal cost (the village's first lamp: 650 against 500; the second: 350 - stop), under systematically noisy valuation. Common resources (rival, non-excludable) collapse: each user gains the full benefit and bears a sliver of the depletion (the lake: each $200 trip destroys $500 of stock, $50 of it borne by the taker) - the tragedy Hardin named and Newfoundland's cod lived. Remedies restore a missing feature: regulation, prices, property rights, tradable quotas - and Ostrom's community-managed commons, Nobel 2009. Club goods (excludable, non-rival) can drift toward natural monopoly. Four corners, four fates.
Flashcards
Flashcard
A free market outcome that is not efficient
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
A village's three households value a first street lamp at $300, $200 and $150, and a second at $200, $100 and $50. Lamps cost $500 each. How many lamps are efficient?
Question 2 of 5
Why do markets underprovide public goods like national defence?
Question 3 of 5
In the lake example, each fishing trip earns the fisher $200 but destroys $500 of future stock spread across ten fishers. Why does the tragedy unfold?
Question 4 of 5
What did Elinor Ostrom's research show about commons management?
Question 5 of 5
Why do club goods like streaming services raise natural-monopoly questions?
