Philosophy › Section G · Epistemology › Topic G.5

Applied epistemology

Almost everything you know, you learned from other people. Applied epistemology asks when that trust is reasonable, how to handle disagreement and expertise, and how knowledge can be distorted, or wrongly withheld, along social lines.

Knowledge as a social achievement

The earlier topics of this section mostly pictured a lone knower weighing evidence. But you know the date of your birth, the shape of the continents and the existence of atoms almost entirely from others. Scientists build on results they have not checked themselves, and juries, courts and electorates form collective judgements. Applied epistemology takes the tools of epistemology to such practical settings. A central branch, social epistemology, asks how individuals should rely on others and whether institutions such as science, the press and the courts are organised to produce true beliefs. Practical checks on particular sources are covered in "Evaluating sources and evidence"; this topic examines the underlying theory.

Testimony

Testimony, in epistemology, is any telling, spoken or written, offered as true. When is believing it justified? Reductionists, often traced to David Hume, say testimony justifies only when the hearer has independent reasons, such as a speaker's track record, to think it reliable. Critics reply that young children could then know almost nothing. Anti-reductionists, following Thomas Reid, hold that we are entitled to accept testimony by default unless there are reasons for doubt. Critics reply that this licenses gullibility. A similar dispute ran through classical India: Nyāya counted testimony (śabda) as an independent pramāṇa, while Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika thinkers treated knowledge from testimony as a kind of inference.

Experts and novices

Much testimony comes from experts, but how can a non-expert tell which expert to trust? Alvin Goldman (2001) called this the novice/expert problem: if you could judge the experts' arguments, you would hardly need them. He suggested indirect evidence: agreement among other experts, credentials and track record, the quality of each side's replies to the other, and signs of bias or conflicts of interest. Agreement counts for most when the experts reached it independently, not by copying one another. Critics point out that whole fields have sometimes been wrong, so consensus raises probability without guaranteeing truth, and that judging bias can itself require expertise.

Peer disagreement

An epistemic peer, on some question, is someone with roughly the same evidence and ability as you. What should you do when a peer disagrees? Conciliationists, such as Adam Elga and David Christensen, say you should lower your confidence, perhaps meeting your peer halfway, since you have no special reason to think you are the one who erred. Steadfast views, defended by Thomas Kelly among others, say you may sometimes keep your belief if your original reasoning was in fact correct. Critics of conciliationism note a puzzle: philosophers disagree about conciliationism itself, so the view may tell its own supporters to abandon it.

Worked example: two peers disagree

Ana and Bo, equally skilled navigators with the same map, disagree about whether a mountain path joins the main road before or after the river. 1. Check peerhood: same evidence, same skill, so neither is obviously better placed. 2. Conciliationist step: each should become less confident, perhaps treating the question as open. 3. Look for an asymmetry: Bo admits he has not slept, which is a reason to discount his judgement and makes them no longer peers on this occasion. 4. Steadfast view: if Ana did read the map correctly, she may keep her belief. 5. Practical lesson: before going on, they should re-check the map together, gathering new evidence rather than only weighing each other's opinion.

Group belief and echo chambers

We say "the jury believes he is guilty" or "the committee holds that the plan is safe". On the summative view, a group believes something when all or most members do. Margaret Gilbert proposed instead that a group believes something when members jointly commit to accepting it as a body, even if some privately doubt it. Social structures also shape belief. C. Thi Nguyen (2020) distinguished an epistemic bubble, in which other voices are simply missing, from an echo chamber, in which members are taught to distrust outsiders. A bubble can burst when members meet new information; an echo chamber resists it, because contrary sources are discredited in advance.

Standpoint epistemology

Standpoint theorists, including Nancy Hartsock, Sandra Harding and Patricia Hill Collins, argue that social position shapes what people are placed to know. Those on the margins of a system often see features that those at its centre overlook: a factory worker may understand where a production line fails better than its managers, and a wheelchair user may judge a building's accessibility better than its architect. Harding argued that research which starts from marginalised lives achieves "strong objectivity". Critics object that no group shares one perspective, and that granting authority by identity is risky. Defenders reply that a standpoint is achieved through critical reflection, not handed out automatically by group membership.

Epistemic injustice

Miranda Fricker, in Epistemic Injustice (2007), named a wrong done to someone in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice leads a hearer to give a speaker less credibility than they deserve, as when a witness is disbelieved because of their accent, class or race. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a gap in a society's shared concepts leaves people unable to make sense of their own experience: before the term "sexual harassment" came into use in the mid-1970s, many women struggled to name what was happening to them. Later writers extended her account; Kristie Dotson (2012) argued that it misses contributory injustice, where marginalised groups have the concepts but others refuse to take them up.

Worked example: diagnosing the wrong

Classify each case. 1. A patient reports severe pain, and a doctor discounts it because of a stereotype about the patient's ethnic group. Testimonial injustice: credibility reduced by identity prejudice. 2. A worker experiences repeated, subtle exclusion that her workplace has no word for, so she doubts her own perception of it. Hermeneutical injustice: a gap in shared concepts. 3. A juror doubts a witness who has been caught lying twice before. Not injustice: the lower credibility rests on evidence about this speaker, not on prejudice. 4. A community has a precise term for its experience, but officials refuse to use it. Dotson's contributory injustice. 5. Test: ask whether the deficit tracks evidence or prejudice.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, treating testimony as second-rate knowledge; both reductionists and their critics agree that much of our knowledge comes this way. Second, thinking any disagreement makes a question merely subjective; disagreement may call for humility without showing there is no fact of the matter. Third, confusing an epistemic bubble with an echo chamber; the first lacks voices, the second distrusts them. Fourth, assuming standpoint theory says members of a group are always right about it; most defenders say standpoints must be achieved. Fifth, calling every doubt of a speaker testimonial injustice; distrust based on real evidence is not unjust.

Key takeaways

Social epistemology studies how knowledge depends on others and on institutions. Reductionists require independent reasons to trust testimony; anti-reductionists, after Reid, grant default trust; Nyāya and Buddhist thinkers held a parallel debate. Goldman's novice/expert problem is eased by independent consensus, track records and signs of bias. Conciliationists lower confidence when peers disagree; steadfast views sometimes allow holding firm. Groups may believe through joint commitment, and echo chambers differ from bubbles. Standpoint theory values marginalised perspectives, while critics question group perspectives. Fricker's testimonial and hermeneutical injustice name wrongs done to knowers.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Social epistemology

The study of how knowledge depends on others and on institutions

The central branch of applied epistemology.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

Which view holds that we may accept what others tell us by default, unless we have reason for doubt?

Question 2 of 5

Two equally informed and able friends reach opposite conclusions on the same evidence. What does conciliationism recommend?

Question 3 of 5

What distinguishes an echo chamber from an epistemic bubble, in Nguyen's sense?

Question 4 of 5

Before the term "sexual harassment" came into use, many women struggled to make sense of what was happening to them at work. Which concept describes this?

Question 5 of 5

A juror gives less weight to a witness who has been caught lying twice before. Is this testimonial injustice?

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