Philosophy › Section G · Epistemology › Topic G.4

Skepticism

Could you be dreaming right now, or living inside a perfect simulation? Sceptical arguments use such possibilities to question whether we know anything about the world, and the replies to them reveal what knowledge really demands.

What sceptics claim

Philosophical scepticism is the view that knowledge, or justified belief, is impossible in some domain. A global sceptic doubts knowledge of nearly everything, or at least of the whole external world. A local sceptic targets one area: other minds, the future, morality or God. Scepticism is not ordinary doubt about a rumour, nor the claim that our beliefs are false. It says that, for all we can tell, they might be false, and that this is enough to stop them counting as knowledge. Many philosophers treat it less as a position to adopt than as a challenge any theory of knowledge must answer.

Ancient doubt in Greece and China

Pyrrhonian sceptics, whose views are recorded by Sextus Empiricus in about the second century CE, set opposing arguments of equal strength against each other and suspended judgement, a state they called epochē. They claimed this brought tranquillity. Critics objected that nobody can live without beliefs; Pyrrhonists replied that they followed appearances and custom without asserting that things really are so. In the Zhuangzi, of about the fourth century BCE, Zhuang Zhou dreams he is a butterfly and on waking cannot tell whether he is a man who dreamed of being a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming of being a man. Scholars disagree over whether the story is a sceptical argument or a lesson about the transformation of things.

Descartes: dreams and the demon

In his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), René Descartes tried to doubt everything that could be doubted, hoping to find a certain foundation. The senses sometimes deceive. Worse, dreams can feel exactly like waking life, so perhaps he is dreaming now. Even if so, arithmetic seems safe, since 2 + 3 = 5 in dreams too. So he imagined an all-powerful evil demon bent on deceiving him even about that. One thing survived: whenever he thinks, he must exist, since even being deceived requires a thinker. In the Meditations he puts it as "I am, I exist"; the famous wording "I think, therefore I am" comes from his Discourse on the Method (1637).

The brain in a vat

A modern version imagines that scientists have removed your brain, kept it alive in a vat of nutrients and connected it to a computer that feeds it experiences exactly like those of normal life. Nothing in your experience could reveal the difference. This is a sceptical hypothesis: a scenario in which your experiences stay the same but most of your beliefs about the world are false, like the dream and the demon. Hilary Putnam made the brain in a vat famous in Reason, Truth and History (1981), though, as a later card shows, he used it to argue against scepticism.

Worked example: the sceptical argument

Let SH be the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis and P be "I have hands". 1. Premise one: if I know that P, then I know that not-SH, since having hands rules out being a handless brain in a vat. This relies on closure: if you know something and know it entails something else, you know the second thing too. 2. Premise two: I do not know that not-SH, because my experience would be the same either way. 3. Form: from premise one, if I do not know not-SH, I do not know P. 4. Conclusion: I do not know that I have hands. 5. Check: the argument is valid by modus tollens, as taught in "Deductive, inductive, and abductive inference", so a reply must reject a premise.

Moore's reversal

G. E. Moore's 1939 lecture, introduced in "How philosophers arrive at truth", accepts the first premise but runs the argument the other way. 1. If I know I have hands, I know I am not a brain in a vat. 2. I do know I have hands. 3. So I know I am not a brain in a vat. This is valid by modus ponens. Moore's claim is that he is more certain of premise 2 than he could ever be of any sceptical premise, so rationality favours his version. Critics reply that Moore begs the question: whether he knows he has hands is exactly what the sceptic disputes, so simply asserting it is no answer.

Denying closure and contextualism

Fred Dretske (1970) and Robert Nozick (1981) rejected closure. On Nozick's sensitivity view, from "Knowledge and the Gettier problem", you know you have hands, since without hands you would not believe you had them; but you do not know you are not a brain in a vat, since if you were one you would still believe you were not. Critics, including Keith DeRose, find the resulting claim, "I know I have hands but not that I am not a handless brain in a vat", absurd: an "abominable conjunction", in DeRose's phrase. Contextualists such as DeRose, Stewart Cohen and David Lewis instead say that "know" sets higher standards when sceptical hypotheses are raised. In everyday contexts you know; in the seminar room you do not. Critics say ordinary speakers do not use "know" this way.

Putnam's semantic reply

Putnam argued that "I am a brain in a vat" defeats itself. His premise is semantic externalism: words refer to whatever things the speaker is causally connected with. A brain that has only ever been in a vat has never interacted with real brains or vats; its word "vat" would refer to the images of vats in its experience, or to the computer signals producing them. So when it thinks "I am a brain in a vat", it does not say something true. If the argument works, the hypothesis can never be truly thought. Critics note that it cannot rule out a recently envatted brain, whose words still refer to real vats, and that many reject externalism.

Worked example: global or local?

Classify each doubt. 1. "For all I know, I am dreaming this entire lecture." Global about the external world: if true, nearly all perceptual beliefs are undermined. 2. "No observation can establish what ought to be done, so nobody has moral knowledge." Local scepticism about morality, which the topic "Metaethics" examines. 3. "I cannot know the sun will rise tomorrow, since induction cannot be justified without circularity." Local scepticism about the future, drawn from Hume's problem in "Deductive, inductive, and abductive inference". 4. "I doubt this website's claim about vitamins." Ordinary doubt about one source, not philosophical scepticism. 5. Test: ask how wide the doubt reaches and whether it rests on a general argument.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, thinking the sceptic claims our beliefs are false; the claim is that we cannot know they are true. Second, assuming a sceptical argument is invalid because its conclusion is absurd; it is valid, so a reply must reject a premise. Third, confusing Descartes's method of doubt with his conclusion; he doubted in order to find certainty, not to remain a sceptic. Fourth, treating Putnam as a sceptic because he discussed the brain in a vat; he argued against the hypothesis. Fifth, calling every doubt scepticism; philosophical scepticism rests on a general argument about a whole domain.

Key takeaways

Scepticism says knowledge is impossible in some domain: globally, or locally about areas such as morality or the future. Pyrrhonists suspended judgement; the Zhuangzi's butterfly dream raises a contested sceptical question. Descartes used dreams and an evil demon, finding certainty only in his own existence. Sceptical hypotheses like the brain in a vat support a valid argument that depends on closure. Replies include Moore's reversal, denying closure (Dretske, Nozick), contextualism (DeRose, Cohen, Lewis) and Putnam's semantic argument. Each faces strong objections, and none is generally accepted.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Philosophical scepticism

The view that knowledge is impossible in some domain

Not the claim that beliefs are false.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

What does a global sceptic about the external world claim?

Question 2 of 5

In the sceptical argument "If I know I have hands, I know I am not a brain in a vat; I do not know I am not a brain in a vat; so I do not know I have hands", which principle supports the first premise?

Question 3 of 5

What is the main criticism of Moore's reply to scepticism?

Question 4 of 5

How do contextualists respond to the sceptic?

Question 5 of 5

Which doubt is local scepticism rather than global scepticism or ordinary doubt?

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