Philosophy › Section H · Value theory › Topic H.2

Basic questions about values

Health, friendship, money, knowledge, justice: we value many things, and they often pull in different directions. This topic asks which things are valued for their own sake, whether all values reduce to one, and what to do when values cannot be measured against each other.

What it is to value something

"The fact-value distinction" separated claims about what is from claims about what is good. Value theory, or axiology, asks about the good itself. Which things are worth pursuing? Are they good for someone, as exercise is good for you, or good in a wider sense, as a just law might be? How are values related, and what should we do when they conflict? People answer these questions, at least implicitly, whenever they choose how to spend a day or a salary. Three tools help: the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, the debate between monism and pluralism, and the idea of incommensurability.

Intrinsic and instrumental value

Something has instrumental value if it is good as a means to something else: money buys food, and medicine restores health. Something has intrinsic value if it is good for its own sake. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, argued that chains of "for the sake of" must end somewhere, or desire would be empty, and that the final end is eudaimonia, flourishing or happiness. Christine Korsgaard (1983) pointed out that two distinctions are often run together: intrinsic versus extrinsic concerns where a thing's value comes from, while final versus instrumental concerns whether it is valued as an end or a means. A rare stamp may be valued as an end, though its value depends on its rarity.

Worked example: tracing a value chain

Ask Priya why she works long shifts. 1. "To earn money." Money is instrumental: nobody wants the coins themselves. 2. "Money pays for my nursing course." The course is also instrumental. 3. "The course will let me become a nurse." Still a means, though now partly valued for itself. 4. "I want to care for people, and I want security for my family." These two look intrinsic: asked why, Priya may reply only that they matter. 5. Result: the chain ends in two values, not one. 6. Question: do care and security both rest on something deeper, such as happiness, or are they separate final goods?

Monism

Value monism says a single basic value underlies every other. The most familiar version is hedonism: pleasure, with freedom from pain, is the only intrinsic good, a view Jeremy Bentham held. Monism's attraction is unity. If all goods are forms of one value, every choice can in principle be settled by asking which option yields more of it. Critics reply that monism distorts experience: the value of a friend or of understanding a proof does not seem to be just the pleasure they cause, and some things seem worth doing even when unpleasant.

Pluralism

Value pluralism holds that there are several fundamental values that cannot be reduced to one another. W. D. Ross, in The Right and the Good (1930), listed several prima facie duties, including fidelity, gratitude, justice, beneficence and non-injury, each binding unless outweighed by another in a particular case, and four intrinsic goods: virtue, knowledge, pleasure and justice. Isaiah Berlin argued that genuine goods such as liberty and equality can clash, so that some loss is unavoidable. Martha Nussbaum lists central capabilities, from health and practical reason to play and affiliation, that a good human life needs. The standard objection is practical: without a single master value, pluralism seems to give no procedure for deciding conflicts. Pluralists reply that judgement, not formula, is what hard cases require.

Incommensurability

Two values are incommensurable if there is no common measure, no single scale, on which both can be precisely weighed. Converting kilometres to miles is easy; converting a friendship into dollars seems misguided. Some philosophers add that certain options are incomparable: neither is better, nor are they equal. Ruth Chang has argued for a fourth possibility, parity: a career as a musician and a career as a lawyer might be comparable without one being better or the two being exactly equal. If a small improvement to one option does not make it the better choice, the two were not exactly equal; Chang argues they may be on a par.

Conflicts in other traditions

Value conflict is a theme across cultures. In the Analects, 13.18, a duke boasts that in his land an upright man testified that his own father had stolen a sheep. Confucius replies that among his people the upright behave differently: a father covers for his son and a son for his father, and uprightness lies in this. Family loyalty here outweighs public accusation, a ranking many readers dispute. In the Bhagavad Gītā, the warrior Arjuna refuses to fight against his own kin; Krishna urges him to do his duty as a warrior without attachment to its fruits. Both texts treat the clash as real and weighty.

Worked example: a hard choice

Tomás is offered a research post abroad, but his widowed mother needs help at home. 1. Identify the values: achievement and knowledge on one side; care and family loyalty on the other. 2. Ask whether they are instrumental: both look partly intrinsic. 3. Monist approach: estimate which option produces more total happiness for everyone affected, and choose it. 4. Pluralist approach, after Ross: both duties are real; ask which is weightier here, considering how much his mother depends on him and whether others can help. 5. Parity test: if a slightly better salary would not settle it, the options may be on a par. 6. Result: the tools clarify the choice without dictating one answer.

Pluralism is not relativism

Herodotus tells how the Persian king Darius asked some Greeks what they would accept to eat their dead fathers, and they were appalled; he asked the Callatians, who did eat their dead, what they would accept to burn them, and they were equally appalled. Such cases support descriptive relativism, the observation that moral codes differ. Normative moral relativism goes further: what is right is fixed by a culture's own code, so no code is better than another. Value pluralism differs from both. A pluralist says there are several genuine values, and that cultures may rank them differently, while still holding that some codes can be wrong, such as one that permits torture for amusement.

Judging relativism

Critics raise three objections to normative relativism. First, the reformer problem: if right means "approved by my culture", then anyone who opposed slavery while it was legal and accepted was wrong by definition. Second, people belong to many groups at once, so it is unclear which culture's code applies. Third, relativists often defend tolerance as a universal duty, which their own view cannot support. In reply, David Wong defends a pluralistic relativism: several moralities are equally adequate, but constraints from human nature rule some codes out. Others credit relativism with warning against treating one's own customs as the measure of all morality.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, assuming instrumental value means low value; medicine is instrumentally good and enormously important. Second, treating pluralism as relativism; pluralists can still call some practices wrong. Third, inferring normative relativism from the bare fact that cultures disagree; disagreement alone shows only descriptive relativism. Fourth, equating incommensurable with equal: options on a par, or incomparable ones, are not equally good. Fifth, assuming monism must be hedonism; a monist could choose a different single value.

Key takeaways

Instrumental goods are means; intrinsic goods are valued for their own sake. Monism, such as hedonism, traces all value to one source, gaining unity at the risk of distortion. Pluralists such as Ross, Berlin and Nussbaum accept several irreducible values and rely on judgement. Incommensurable values lack a common measure; Chang adds parity. The Analects and the Gītā show value conflict across traditions. Pluralism is not relativism, which faces the reformer, group-membership and tolerance objections; Wong's pluralistic relativism replies.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Axiology

The theory of value: what is good and how goods relate

Another name for value theory.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

A student values her degree only because it will help her get a well-paid job. What kind of value does the degree have for her?

Question 2 of 5

What distinguishes value pluralism from normative moral relativism?

Question 3 of 5

Which objection says normative relativism makes moral reformers wrong by definition?

Question 4 of 5

Choosing between two careers, a person finds that a small pay rise for one option still would not make it the better choice. What does Ruth Chang suggest this indicates?

Question 5 of 5

Why are monist theories such as hedonism attractive to their defenders?

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