Philosophy › Section H · Value theory › Topic H.3
Metaethics
When someone says "cruelty is wrong", are they stating a fact, voicing a feeling or issuing a command? Metaethics asks what moral claims mean, whether any are true and how we could know, questions that sit beneath every argument about right and wrong.
Three levels of ethics
Ethics is often divided into three levels. Applied ethics asks about particular issues, such as whether a medical practice is permissible. Normative ethics seeks general standards of right action and good character. Metaethics steps back from both. It asks what moral words like "good" and "wrong" mean, whether there are moral facts, how we could know them, and how moral judgements relate to motivation. The answers are contested; this course presents the main positions without choosing.
Mapping the positions
Two divisions organise the field. Cognitivists hold that moral judgements express beliefs, which can be true or false. Non-cognitivists hold that they express something else, such as feelings or commitments, which are not true or false in the ordinary way. Moral realists are cognitivists who add that some moral claims are true, and true independently of what anyone thinks of them. Anti-realists deny this. They include non-cognitivists, error theorists, who are cognitivists that think all positive moral claims are false, and relativists, discussed in "Basic questions about values", who make moral truth depend on cultures or individuals. Constructivists occupy a middle position, explained below.
Non-naturalist realism
G. E. Moore, whose open-question argument appeared in "The fact-value distinction", concluded that goodness is a real but non-natural property, known by intuition rather than observation. Later non-naturalists, such as Derek Parfit and Russ Shafer-Landau, hold that some moral truths are as objective as truths of logic or mathematics, which also are not discovered by the senses. Critics ask what non-natural properties are, how they relate to the natural features of actions, and how we could come to know them if they cause nothing we can observe.
Naturalist realism
Naturalist realists hold that moral properties are natural properties. Cornell realists, such as Richard Boyd, David Brink and Nicholas Sturgeon, argue that moral properties are natural properties, or are constituted by them, a fact learned by inquiry, as water was found to be H₂O. Philippa Foot, in Natural Goodness (2001), judged human conduct as we judge other living things: as healthy or defective relative to the kind of life the species lives. Mencius, whom some read as a naturalist, held that human nature contains sprouts of goodness: anyone who sees a toddler tottering towards the edge of a well feels alarm and compassion. Gilbert Harman (1977) objected that moral facts seem unnecessary to explain any observation: our psychology explains our moral reactions.
Error theory
J. L. Mackie, in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), agreed with realists about meaning but not about reality. Moral claims purport to state objective, binding facts, he argued, yet there are no such facts, so all positive moral claims are false. His argument from queerness says objective values would be unlike anything else in the universe, intrinsically motivating and known by some special faculty. His argument from relativity says moral disagreement is better explained by different ways of life than by some people misperceiving moral facts. Critics answer with "companions in guilt": reasons to believe, as in logic and science, look just as queer, so the argument would prove too much.
Emotivism and expressivism
A. J. Ayer, in Language, Truth and Logic (1936), argued that "stealing is wrong" states no fact; it expresses disapproval of stealing, much as a horrified tone of voice would. C. L. Stevenson added that moral language also aims to influence others' attitudes. R. M. Hare's prescriptivism (1952) treated moral claims as universal commands. Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism tries to show how a non-cognitivist can still earn the right to call moral claims true. Non-cognitivism explains the close tie between moral judgement and motivation. Critics ask how people can genuinely disagree if each only expresses a feeling, and press the problem in the next card.
Worked example: the Frege-Geach problem
Peter Geach, drawing on Gottlob Frege, posed this challenge in the 1960s. 1. Premise: lying is wrong. 2. Premise: if lying is wrong, then getting your brother to lie is wrong. 3. Conclusion: getting your brother to lie is wrong. 4. The argument is valid by modus ponens, so "lying is wrong" must mean the same in premises 1 and 2. 5. In premise 1, an emotivist says the words express disapproval. 6. In premise 2, the words appear inside an "if", where the speaker disapproves of nothing; they merely suppose. 7. So the meaning seems to shift, and the valid argument would commit equivocation. Expressivists such as Blackburn and Allan Gibbard have proposed answers; whether they succeed is debated.
Constructivism
Constructivists say moral truths are neither discovered out there nor mere feelings: they are what an idealised procedure of reasoning would produce. Immanuel Kant grounded morality in reason: an action is permissible only if its principle could be willed as a universal law. John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard developed constructivist views in this tradition. Critics ask whether the procedure's outputs are correct because of something independent of it, in which case the view collapses into realism, or whether they are arbitrary. In early China, Xunzi argued that human nature is bad and that goodness comes from deliberate effort, especially the rituals the sages devised, a view some scholars compare to constructivism.
Religious foundations
Many traditions ground morality in God. Divine command theory says an act is right because God commands it. The Euthyphro dilemma, explained in "Cosmology and the existence of God", asks whether God commands acts because they are right or makes them right by commanding them. The same question divided medieval Islamic theologians. Mu'tazilites held that reason can know good and evil and that God commands what is good; Ash'arites held that acts are good or evil only because God commands or forbids them. Thomas Aquinas's natural law theory holds that reason can discern, from human nature, goods such as life and knowledge that God's eternal law sets for us. Robert Adams defended a modified divine command theory: wrongness is contrary to the commands of a loving God, so the commands are not arbitrary.
Worked example: one claim, five readings
Take the claim "torturing animals for fun is wrong". 1. Non-naturalist realist: it states an objective, non-natural fact, known by intuition. 2. Naturalist realist: it states a natural fact, perhaps about suffering and what helps living things flourish. 3. Error theorist: it tries to state an objective fact, but none exists, so it is false, though we may keep using such claims. 4. Expressivist: it expresses a negative attitude towards such torture, together with an endorsement of others sharing it. 5. Constructivist: it is true because the idealised procedure of reasoning would reject a principle permitting it. 6. Note: all five can agree the practice should stop; they disagree about what that agreement is.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, equating anti-realism with having no morals; many error theorists and expressivists hold strong moral views. Second, assuming non-cognitivists think moral claims are meaningless; they think the meaning lies in expressing attitudes. Third, treating moral disagreement as proof of relativism; science shows that disagreement can coexist with facts. Fourth, confusing metaethics with normative ethics: whether lying is wrong is normative; what "wrong" means is metaethical. Fifth, thinking error theory says morality is unimportant; Mackie argued that we must invent morality because we need it.
Key takeaways
Metaethics asks what moral claims mean, whether there are moral facts, how we know them and how they motivate. Cognitivists treat moral judgements as beliefs; non-cognitivists as attitudes. Realists, non-naturalist (Moore, Parfit) or naturalist (Cornell realists, Foot, arguably Mencius), think some moral claims are objectively true. Mackie's error theory says none are. Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Blackburn and Gibbard offer non-cognitivist views that face the Frege-Geach problem. Constructivists, after Kant, ground morality in idealised reasoning, and Xunzi in human effort. Divine command theories face the Euthyphro dilemma, debated by Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites.
Flashcards
Flashcard
The study of what moral claims mean, their truth and how we know them
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
Which question belongs to metaethics rather than normative ethics?
Question 2 of 5
What do error theorists and moral realists agree about?
Question 3 of 5
"If lying is wrong, then getting your brother to lie is wrong." Why does this sentence pose a problem for emotivism?
Question 4 of 5
Which argument says objective moral values would be utterly unlike anything else in the universe?
Question 5 of 5
Which view did Ash'arite theologians hold?
