Philosophy › Section K · Political philosophy › Topic K.4

Distributive justice

Every society divides up income, wealth, opportunities and burdens somehow. Distributive justice asks what a fair division looks like, and the two most influential modern answers, from John Rawls and Robert Nozick, point in opposite directions.

Who gets what, and why?

Three friends start a business together. One put in most of the money, one works the longest hours, and one has a sick child and needs more income. How should profits be shared? Every answer appeals to a principle: equal shares, reward for contribution or effort, or need. Distributive justice studies which principles should govern the division of benefits and burdens across a whole society: income, wealth, opportunities, rights and public services. This topic presents the main rival views; the course does not choose between them.

Candidate principles

Strict equality says everyone should have the same share. Need says resources should go first to those who lack the basics. Desert says people should get what they earn by effort or contribution. Utilitarianism says resources should be distributed to produce the greatest total well-being; because an extra dollar usually matters more to a poor person than to a rich one, this often favours some redistribution, but it allows any inequality that raises the total. Libertarian views say a distribution is just if it arose from free exchanges, whatever its shape. Nozick called the first three patterned, because they tie shares to a formula, and utilitarianism an end-state principle; his own principle is historical, looking at how holdings came about.

Rawls: justice as fairness

John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) asked which principles free and equal people would choose if the choice were fair. He imagined an original position in which choosers stand behind a veil of ignorance: they do not know their sex, race, class, talents, or their own idea of a good life, though they know general facts about society. Since no one can tailor the rules to benefit themselves, whatever they agree is fair. Rawls called this justice as fairness. He also rejected utilitarianism, arguing that it ignores the separateness of persons: it allows one person's losses to be cancelled by others' gains, as if society were a single individual.

Rawls's two principles

Rawls argued that the parties would choose two principles. First, each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties, such as freedom of speech, conscience and the vote, compatible with the same liberties for all. Second, inequalities of income and wealth are just only if they are tied to positions open to all under fair equality of opportunity, and if they make the least advantaged as well off as possible: the difference principle. The first principle has priority: liberties may not be traded for economic gains. Rawls also held that natural talents are morally arbitrary, a matter of luck, so their rewards should be arranged to benefit everyone, including the worst off.

Worked example: three societies

Compare three societies, each with a rich group and a poor group of equal size, measured in average yearly income. A: rich $60,000, poor $60,000. B: rich $150,000, poor $70,000. C: rich $260,000, poor $50,000. 1. Strict equality prefers A, the only equal one. 2. Difference principle: compare the worst-off groups, $60,000, $70,000 and $50,000; B makes the poor best off, so B is preferred, even though it is unequal. 3. Average income across both groups, a rough stand-in for utilitarian welfare: A $60,000, B $110,000, C $155,000, so C ranks highest, though diminishing marginal utility narrows the gap. 4. Nozick would ask none of these questions: he would ask how the holdings arose.

Objections to Rawls

John Harsanyi argued that rational choosers behind a veil would maximise expected well-being, which supports utilitarianism, rather than playing safe by securing the worst position, as Rawls's reasoning suggests. Michael Sandel, in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), argued that the veil assumes an unencumbered self, detached from the communities and commitments that make people who they are. Cosmopolitans such as Thomas Pogge argued that if birthplace is as arbitrary as talent, the difference principle should apply worldwide; Rawls's The Law of Peoples (1999) proposed only more limited duties between societies. Nozick objected that keeping any pattern in place requires continual interference with people's free choices.

Nozick: entitlement theory

Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) argued that justice concerns how holdings came about, not their pattern. A distribution is just if everyone is entitled to what they hold under three principles: justice in acquisition, how unowned things may first be acquired; justice in transfer, such as free exchange and gift; and rectification of past injustice in either. His limit on acquisition follows Locke: taking something is permitted only if it does not leave others worse off. Nozick argued that people own themselves, so forcing them to work for others' benefit violates their rights; he compared taxing earnings for redistribution to forced labour. He defended a minimal state limited to protection against force, theft and fraud and the enforcement of contracts.

Worked example: the basketball star

Nozick's best-known argument runs as follows. 1. Start with any distribution you consider just, say D1, perhaps perfect equality. 2. Wilt Chamberlain, a basketball star, agrees to play if 25 cents from each ticket goes to him. 3. A million fans happily pay, and he ends the season with $250,000, far more than anyone else: distribution D2. 4. Each step was a voluntary exchange of holdings that were just under D1. 5. So D2 is just, though it breaks the original pattern. 6. Conclusion: liberty upsets patterns, and keeping a pattern would mean forbidding free exchanges or constantly taking from people. Critics reply that the fans did not consent to the effects of the star's new wealth on others, such as his political influence.

Objections to Nozick

Critics point first to history: almost no present holdings trace back through a clean chain of just acquisitions and transfers, given conquest, slavery and fraud, so rectification would demand vast change, not a minimal state. Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel argued in The Myth of Ownership (2002) that property rights are created by legal systems, including tax law, so pre-tax income is not simply ours. Others question the forced-labour comparison, since a taxpayer still chooses where and how much to work. Critics also argue that formal self-ownership means little to someone with no resources. Defenders answer that respecting persons means respecting their choices.

Capabilities and luck

Two further views widened the debate. Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach measures justice by what people are actually able to do and be, such as being healthy, educated and able to take part in public life, not by income or happiness alone; it shaped the United Nations Human Development Index. Ronald Dworkin and later luck egalitarians distinguished inequalities that result from people's choices, which may be fair, from those caused by brute luck, such as illness or disability at birth, which call for compensation. The topic "Egalitarianism, socialism, and anarchism" examines these egalitarian views and their critics in more depth.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, thinking Rawls demanded equal outcomes: the difference principle permits inequalities that benefit the worst off. Second, forgetting the priority of liberty: Rawls would not trade basic liberties for wealth. Third, reading Nozick as indifferent to injustice: his rectification principle requires correcting unjust acquisitions and transfers. Fourth, assuming utilitarianism always favours equality: it favours whatever maximises total well-being. Fifth, confusing the veil of ignorance with actual ignorance: it is a thought experiment for testing fairness.

Key takeaways

Principles include equality, need, desert, utility and entitlement; Nozick separated patterned from historical principles. Rawls's original position and veil of ignorance yield equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle; Harsanyi, Sandel, Pogge and Nozick objected. Nozick's entitlement theory judges holdings by just acquisition, transfer and rectification, illustrated by the basketball star, and supports a minimal state; critics cite historical injustice and the legal basis of property. Capabilities and luck egalitarianism offer further alternatives.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Distributive justice

Fair division of benefits and burdens across society

Income, wealth, opportunities, services.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

Why does Rawls place choosers behind a veil of ignorance?

Question 2 of 5

Society X: rich $200,000, poor $40,000. Society Y: rich $90,000, poor $55,000. Which does the difference principle prefer, other things equal?

Question 3 of 5

What is the main point of Nozick's basketball-star example?

Question 4 of 5

Which objection to Nozick did Murphy and Nagel press?

Question 5 of 5

Why did Rawls reject utilitarian principles of distribution?

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