Philosophy › Section J · Applied ethics › Topic J.2

Environmental ethics

Most moral theories were built for dealings between living humans. Environmental ethics asks whether animals, forests, species and people not yet born also have claims on us, and how the costs of protecting them should be shared.

Widening the circle

A company plans to drain a marsh, home to rare birds, for cheap housing. Who could be wronged? Local families, if flooding worsens. But what about the birds, the marsh itself, or people born fifty years from now? Environmental ethics studies right conduct towards the non-human world and future generations. Two books prepared the ground: Aldo Leopold's A Sand County Almanac (1949), which urged people to see themselves as members of a wider land community, and Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962), which warned about pesticides. The academic field followed in the 1970s.

Human-centred value and its critics

Something has intrinsic value if it is good in itself, and instrumental value if it is good as a means. Anthropocentrism holds that only humans, or human interests, have intrinsic value, so nature matters as a resource. The historian Lynn White (1967) blamed environmental damage partly on a reading of Genesis that gives humans dominion over nature. Yet anthropocentrism can support strong protection, since clean air and a stable climate serve every human. William Baxter (1974) argued for an optimal level of pollution, balancing its benefits against its harms to people. Against this, Richard Routley (1973) imagined the last person alive destroying every remaining living thing. If that seems wrong, nature may matter beyond its use to us.

Animals

Jeremy Bentham argued that what matters morally is whether a being can suffer, not whether it can reason. Peter Singer's Animal Liberation (1975) built on this: discounting an animal's suffering just because of its species is speciesism, a prejudice like racism. As a utilitarian, Singer weighs interests rather than assigning rights. Tom Regan, in The Case for Animal Rights (1983), argued instead that many animals are subjects of a life, with beliefs, desires and a welfare of their own, and so have rights that cannot be traded away for benefits to others. Both views condemn factory farming. Critics, often Kantian, tie full moral status to rational agency, while still forbidding cruelty.

Biocentrism and ecocentrism

Biocentrism extends moral standing to every living thing. Paul Taylor, in Respect for Nature (1986), argued that each organism pursues its own good and so deserves respect, though humans may still act to meet their basic needs. Ecocentrism goes further, valuing wholes: species, ecosystems and the land. Leopold's land ethic judges actions by whether they preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. Holism can justify culling invasive animals to save a species. Its critics, including Regan, called it environmental fascism, because it seems to permit sacrificing individuals, even humans, for the good of the whole. Defenders reply that the land ethic adds to human ethics rather than replacing it.

Deep ecology and social ecology

The Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess coined the term deep ecology in 1973. Shallow environmentalism, he said, fights pollution for the sake of people in rich countries, while deep ecology holds that all life has value in itself and calls for a changed view of the self as part of a larger whole. The Indian historian Ramachandra Guha (1989) objected that its focus on wilderness reflects the concerns of wealthy nations and can harm poor rural people who depend on the land. Social ecology, developed by Murray Bookchin, traces environmental damage to social hierarchy and domination, and proposes small, locally governed communities. Critics doubt that local self-government can handle global problems such as climate change.

Worked example: the marsh, four ways

Return to the marsh and the housing scheme. 1. Anthropocentrist: count the human costs and benefits, such as homes, flood risk and lost recreation; if housing can go elsewhere at modest cost, protect the marsh, otherwise build. 2. Singer: also weigh the suffering of the birds and fish displaced or killed. 3. Regan: if the animals are subjects of a life, their rights cannot simply be outweighed by human convenience. 4. Ecocentrist: ask whether draining harms the integrity and stability of the wider ecosystem; losing a rare habitat counts heavily. 5. Compare: the views may agree here for different reasons, and diverge once the human gains are large.

Environmental justice

Harms are not shared equally. The sociologist Robert Bullard, in Dumping in Dixie (1990), documented how waste sites and polluting industries in the American South were placed disproportionately near Black communities. The environmental justice movement asks who bears the risks and who decides. In Flint, Michigan, a 2014 switch of the water source to save money left residents drinking water contaminated with lead from old pipes. Internationally, poorer countries often face the worst effects of climate change despite having contributed least to it.

Climate change as an ethical problem

Anthropogenic climate change is change in the climate caused by human activity, chiefly greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels. It is a collective-action problem: each emitter gains from emitting, while the harm is spread across the world and the future. The Montreal Protocol (1987) succeeded in phasing out most ozone-depleting chemicals partly because substitutes were available; replacing fossil fuels is far harder. The UN climate convention of 1992, and the Paris Agreement of 2015 that grew from it, rest on common but differentiated responsibilities. Polluter pays faces the objection that many past emitters are dead or did not know the harm; beneficiary pays answers that today's rich inherit the gains; ability to pay assigns costs by capacity rather than fault.

Distant and future people

Peter Singer, in "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" (1972), argued that if you can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, you ought to, and that distance makes no difference; critics say duties to compatriots are stronger and that poverty needs political change, not only charity. Future people raise a further puzzle. Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons (1984), noted that different policies cause different people to be born. A careless policy may leave the future worse than a careful one would, yet no particular person is worse off than they would otherwise have been, since they would not otherwise exist. This non-identity problem makes it hard to explain why the policy wrongs anyone.

Worked example: one holiday flight

Is it wrong to fly abroad on holiday? 1. Direct effect: one passenger's share of emissions makes no detectable difference to the climate. 2. Expected harm: some philosophers reply that each tonne of carbon carries a small risk of serious harm, which adds up across billions of people. 3. Fair share: others argue that joining a harmful collective practice is wrong in itself, whatever one person's effect. 4. Political duty: a third view says the main duty is to support fair policies, such as carbon pricing, because systems matter more than single choices. 5. Conclusion: each answer rests on a different account of responsibility for collective harm.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, assuming anthropocentrism means indifference to nature: it can justify strong protection for human sake. Second, confusing Singer and Regan: Singer weighs interests as a utilitarian, Regan defends rights. Third, treating biocentrism and ecocentrism as the same: one values each organism, the other values wholes such as ecosystems. Fourth, thinking the non-identity problem shows harming future people is fine; it shows a common account of harm struggles to explain why it is wrong. Fifth, assuming climate justice has one agreed formula for dividing costs.

Key takeaways

Anthropocentrism gives nature instrumental value yet can support protection; Routley's last-person case challenges it. Singer opposes speciesism by weighing interests; Regan grants rights to subjects of a life. Taylor's biocentrism values each organism; Leopold's land ethic values wholes and faces the charge of environmental fascism. Naess's deep ecology and Bookchin's social ecology diagnose the crisis differently. Environmental justice exposes unequal burdens. Climate ethics divides costs by polluter, beneficiary or ability to pay. Parfit's non-identity problem complicates duties to future people.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Intrinsic / instrumental value

Good in itself / good as a means

Anthropocentrism gives nature only the second.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

Routley imagined the last person alive destroying every remaining living thing. What is the case meant to challenge?

Question 2 of 5

Which thinker argued that many animals have rights because they are subjects of a life?

Question 3 of 5

A careless energy policy leads to different people being born than a careful one would. Why is it hard to say the careless policy harms them?

Question 4 of 5

What is a standard objection to the polluter-pays principle for historical emissions?

Question 5 of 5

How does ecocentrism differ from biocentrism?

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