Philosophy › Section J · Applied ethics › Topic J.1
Bioethics
Medicine can now start, prolong, end and even redesign human life. Bioethics asks what we owe patients, research participants and future people when it does, and on its hardest questions, abortion and euthanasia, careful thinkers still disagree.
Ethics at the bedside and the bench
Bioethics, a word usually credited to the American biochemist Van Rensselaer Potter in about 1970, studies moral questions raised by medicine, biology and health technology. It belongs to applied ethics: instead of building a theory, it brings theories to concrete cases. Its tools come from the topics "Consequentialism and utilitarianism", "Deontology", "Virtue ethics" and "Feminist theories of ethics". On contested issues this topic takes no side, setting out the strongest arguments and objections on each.
Four principles
In Principles of Biomedical Ethics (first edition 1979), Tom Beauchamp and James Childress proposed four widely used principles. Respect for autonomy: honour the informed choices of competent patients. Non-maleficence: avoid causing unnecessary harm. Beneficence: act for the patient's good. Justice: distribute benefits, burdens and scarce resources fairly. The principles are not ranked, and they often pull apart, as when a patient refuses a treatment that would help. Applying them takes judgement. Critics reply that a list can hide the need for a deeper theory saying when one principle gives way.
Research ethics and informed consent
Research rules grew out of abuses. The Nuremberg Code (1947) answered Nazi doctors' experiments. In the US Public Health Service study at Tuskegee (1932 to 1972), Black men with syphilis were observed without being told their diagnosis, and treatment was withheld even after penicillin became the standard cure in the 1940s. The Belmont Report (1979) set out respect for persons, beneficence and justice, and institutional review boards now vet studies. Valid informed consent needs capacity, adequate information, understanding, and an uncoerced, voluntary choice. Clinical equipoise adds that a randomised trial is fair only if experts genuinely do not know which treatment is better.
Worked example: refusing a transfusion
An adult Jehovah's Witness needing surgery refuses a blood transfusion on religious grounds, knowing he may die. 1. Name the principles in play: autonomy supports honouring the refusal; beneficence favours transfusing. 2. Test the conditions of consent: he has capacity, information and understanding, and is not coerced, so the refusal is valid. 3. Weigh: most medical-ethics frameworks, and the law in many countries, hold that a competent adult's informed refusal must be respected even when it is fatal. 4. Look for other options: doctors can offer blood-conserving surgical techniques. 5. Contrast a young child, who cannot yet consent: courts in many countries may authorise the transfusion.
Abortion: two central questions
An abortion deliberately ends a pregnancy. Philosophical debate turns on two questions. First, moral status: does an embryo or fetus have a serious right to life, and from when? Second, bodily autonomy: if it does, does that right require a pregnant person to sustain it with their body? Even the words are disputed: "fetus" or "unborn child". The law has shifted too: in the United States, Roe v. Wade (1973) recognised a constitutional right to abortion before viability, and Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022) overruled it, returning the question to the states.
The case that abortion is seriously wrong
Don Marquis, in "Why Abortion Is Immoral" (1989), argued that killing an adult is wrong mainly because it deprives the victim of a valuable future, a "future like ours". A fetus has such a future, so killing it is, in general, seriously wrong. The argument does not depend on calling the fetus a person. A second line appeals to identity: the human organism that exists from conception is the same living being who later reasons, so it shares that being's worth. Objections: critics ask whether sperm and egg also have a valuable future (Marquis replies that no single subject has it), and Joel Feinberg argued that a potential bearer of rights does not yet have actual rights.
The case that abortion is permissible
Mary Anne Warren (1973) listed traits central to personhood: consciousness and the capacity to feel pain, reasoning, self-motivated activity, communication, and self-awareness. A fetus lacks them, she argued, so it is not a person and abortion is permissible. Judith Jarvis Thomson, in "A Defense of Abortion" (1971), granted for argument that the fetus is a person. Imagine waking to find your kidneys connected to an unconscious violinist who will die if unplugged: you are not obliged to stay, she argued, because a right to life is not a right to use another's body. Objections: Warren's traits seem to exclude newborns too; critics of Thomson note the violinist was attached by kidnapping, which fits pregnancy after rape best, and that unplugging lets die while abortion kills.
Euthanasia and assisted dying
Euthanasia, from the Greek for "good death", is ending a life to spare suffering. It is voluntary at a competent person's request, non-voluntary when the person cannot choose and left no instructions, and involuntary against a competent person's wishes, which almost everyone condemns. It is active when death is caused and passive when life-sustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn. In physician-assisted suicide a doctor supplies the means and the patient takes them. Supporters appeal to autonomy and relief of suffering. Opponents appeal to the wrongness of intentionally killing, the doctor's role as healer, and a slippery slope towards pressure on vulnerable people. The doctrine of double effect, traced to Aquinas, permits pain relief that may hasten death if death is foreseen but not intended.
Worked example: Rachels's bare-difference argument
James Rachels, in "Active and Passive Euthanasia" (1975), challenged the view that letting die can be acceptable while killing never is. 1. Smith drowns his young cousin in the bath to inherit money. 2. Jones plans the same, but the child slips and drowns while Jones simply watches. 3. The cases differ only in killing versus letting die, yet both men seem equally bad. 4. So the distinction is not morally important in itself, and where passive euthanasia is allowed, active euthanasia, which can end suffering sooner, should be too. 5. Replies: critics say both cases share a vile motive, so they cannot show the difference never matters, and that withdrawing treatment lets a disease take its course, while killing makes the doctor the cause.
Genes, enhancement and fair shares
Gene editing with CRISPR-Cas9 (2020 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier) sharpens two distinctions. Somatic edits affect only the treated person; germ-line edits pass to descendants, who cannot consent and who inherit unknown risks. Therapy restores normal function; enhancement goes beyond it. Defenders such as John Harris and Julian Savulescu argue that enhancement continues what medicine and education already do; critics fear unknown risks and wider inequality. In 2018 He Jiankui announced gene-edited twins, drawing worldwide condemnation and a prison sentence in China. In AMP v. Myriad Genetics (2013) the US Supreme Court held that isolating a natural gene does not make it patentable. Justice also governs scarce care: organs and intensive-care beds can go by expected benefit, priority to the worst off, waiting time or lottery.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, treating the four principles as a ranked formula: they conflict and need judgement. Second, assuming a signed form proves valid consent: capacity, understanding and voluntariness matter too. Third, thinking Thomson denied that the fetus is a person: she granted it for argument. Fourth, thinking Marquis's argument rests on personhood: it rests on the loss of a valuable future. Fifth, confusing passive euthanasia with physician-assisted suicide, or reading double effect as permission to intend death. Sixth, presenting either side of abortion or euthanasia as settled.
Key takeaways
Beauchamp and Childress's four principles are autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice. Research ethics demands informed consent and equipoise. On abortion, Marquis and identity arguments oppose it; Warren and Thomson defend its permissibility; each faces strong objections. Euthanasia may be voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary, active or passive; Rachels questioned killing versus letting die; opponents stress intent and slippery slopes. Germ-line editing raises consent worries; enhancement divides defenders and critics.
Flashcards
Flashcard
Applied ethics of medicine, biology and health technology
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
A competent adult, fully informed and not coerced, refuses a life-saving transfusion. On most medical-ethics frameworks, what should the doctors do?
Question 2 of 5
Which argument grants, for the sake of argument, that the fetus is a person?
Question 3 of 5
According to Marquis, what mainly makes killing an adult human wrong?
Question 4 of 5
Smith drowns his cousin for money; Jones lets his cousin drown for the same reason. What does Rachels conclude from the pair?
Question 5 of 5
Why do many ethicists treat germ-line editing as more serious than somatic editing?
