Philosophy › Section G · Epistemology › Topic G.2
Knowledge and the Gettier problem
Knowing seems to be more than believing truly, but what is the extra ingredient? A three-page paper from 1963 showed that the most natural answer fails, and the search for a better one reshaped epistemology.
More than true belief
Suppose you guess that a coin will land heads, and it does. Your belief was true, but you did not know. Suppose instead you are sure the train leaves at 9, and it leaves at 10. You believed, but you did not know, because knowledge cannot be false. So knowledge requires truth, and it requires belief: it sounds contradictory to say "she knows the shop is shut, but she does not believe it". It also seems to require something more, which rules out lucky guesses. The question is what.
Justified true belief
The best-known answer is the tripartite, or justified true belief (JTB), analysis. On this view, someone knows a proposition when three things hold together: the proposition is true, the person believes it, and the person has good reasons or evidence for it. Each condition is meant to be necessary, and the three together sufficient. Justification excludes lucky guesses: the coin-guesser had no reason to expect heads. As "What epistemology studies" explained, such an analysis invites counterexamples: cases meeting every condition yet falling short of knowledge.
Where the analysis came from
The idea is often traced to Plato. In the Meno, Socrates says true opinions are like runaway statues until they are tied down by reasoning about why they are true. In the Theaetetus, he considers defining knowledge as true judgement together with an account, but finds every version wanting, and the dialogue ends without a definition. So Plato discussed something like JTB without clearly endorsing it. Many textbooks call JTB the accepted view until the 1960s, but historians such as Julien Dutant (2015) argue that this is a legend, stated most clearly by the writers who attacked it.
Gettier's 1963 paper
In "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", published in the journal Analysis in 1963, Edmund Gettier offered two counterexamples. In the first, Smith and Jones have applied for the same job. Smith has strong evidence that Jones will get it, and he has counted ten coins in Jones's pocket. He infers that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. In fact Smith gets the job, and, unknown to him, he too has ten coins in his pocket. His belief is true and justified, yet it seems he does not know it. Cases of this kind are now called Gettier cases, and the challenge they pose is the Gettier problem.
Worked example: Gettier's second case
1. Smith has strong evidence that Jones owns a Ford: Jones has always owned one and has just offered Smith a lift in one. 2. Smith has no idea where his friend Brown is, but he validly infers "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona" from the Ford belief. 3. Truth: Jones is driving a rented car and owns no Ford, but by sheer chance Brown is in Barcelona, so the disjunction is true. 4. Belief: Smith accepts it. 5. Justification: it follows from a well-supported belief. 6. Verdict: all three JTB conditions hold, yet Smith seems not to know, because what makes his belief true has nothing to do with his evidence.
Older and newer cases
Gettier was not the first. The Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara, of about the eighth century CE, described a desert traveller who sees a mirage and believes there is water ahead; on arrival he finds water hidden under a rock. Some textbooks credit the case to his predecessor Dharmakīrti. Bertrand Russell, in Human Knowledge (1948), described a man who reads a stopped clock at the very moment it shows the right time. In the fake barn case, devised by Carl Ginet and published by Alvin Goldman in 1976, Henry looks at the one real barn in a district full of barn façades. In each case a justified belief is true only by luck.
Adding a fourth condition
Many replies keep JTB and add a condition. Michael Clark (1963) proposed that knowledge must not rest on any false belief, a no-false-lemmas condition. It handles Gettier's cases, since Smith reasons from a falsehood about Jones, but not the fake barn: Henry infers nothing false; he simply looks. Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson (1969) proposed instead that there be no defeater, no true fact which, if the believer learned it, would undermine the justification. The façades are such a fact. The difficulty is misleading evidence: the true fact that someone has falsely claimed the suspect has a twin could count as a defeater and wrongly deny knowledge.
Replacing the justification condition
Other replies change the third condition. Goldman's causal theory of 1967 required that the fact believed cause the belief in the right way. Smith's belief is not caused by Brown's being in Barcelona, so he does not know. But Henry's belief is caused by a real barn, so the theory wrongly counts it as knowledge. Robert Nozick (1981) proposed sensitivity: if P were false, you would not believe it. Henry fails, since he would believe "barn" in front of a façade. Ernest Sosa (1999) proposed safety: your belief could not easily have been false. Reliability-based and virtue-based approaches are taken up in the topic "Justification".
Worked example: testing the fixes
Apply four proposals to the fake barn case. 1. No false lemmas: Henry reasons from no false belief, so the condition is met and the account wrongly grants knowledge. 2. No defeaters: the fact that the district is full of façades would undermine his justification if he learned it, so the account denies knowledge, as intuition does. 3. Causal theory: a real barn causes his belief, so it wrongly grants knowledge. 4. Safety: he could easily have been looking at a façade and believed falsely, so it denies knowledge. 5. Lesson: accounts that look only at the believer's reasoning, or at what caused the belief, miss the luck in the environment.
Is the problem solvable?
Six decades of proposals have produced no generally agreed analysis. Linda Zagzebski (1994) argued that this is inevitable: as long as justification falls short of guaranteeing truth, a justified belief can be false, and a stroke of good luck can then make it true, recreating a Gettier case. Timothy Williamson, in Knowledge and Its Limits (2000), drew a bolder conclusion. On his "knowledge first" view, knowledge cannot be broken into simpler parts; instead, it is basic, and belief and evidence should be explained in terms of it. Critics reply that unanalysed knowledge leaves too much unexplained.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, thinking Gettier showed that justification, truth or belief is unnecessary; he showed that the three are not sufficient. Second, assuming a Gettier case needs a false belief somewhere; the fake barn case contains none. Third, calling the believer unjustified; the justification is good, but the truth arrives by luck. Fourth, crediting Plato with firmly defending JTB, when the Theaetetus ends without accepting any definition. Fifth, treating any proposed fix as settled; every one discussed here faces objections.
Key takeaways
The JTB analysis says S knows P if and only if P is true, S believes P and S is justified. Gettier's 1963 cases, like Dharmottara's mirage, Russell's stopped clock and the fake barn, show justified true beliefs that are true by luck, so JTB is not sufficient. Fourth conditions include no false lemmas (Clark) and no defeaters (Lehrer and Paxson). Replacements include Goldman's causal theory, Nozick's sensitivity and Sosa's safety. Zagzebski argued that Gettier cases are unavoidable while justification is fallible, and Williamson treats knowledge as basic. No analysis has won general agreement.
Flashcards
Flashcard
S knows P iff P is true, S believes P and S is justified
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
What did Gettier's 1963 counterexamples show about the JTB analysis?
Question 2 of 5
Henry, in a district full of barn façades, looks at the only real barn and believes "that is a barn". Why does a no-false-lemmas condition fail to explain why he lacks knowledge?
Question 3 of 5
Which proposal says a belief counts as knowledge only if, had it been false, the person would not have believed it?
Question 4 of 5
Which statement about Plato and the JTB analysis matches the reading?
Question 5 of 5
Why did Zagzebski argue that Gettier cases cannot be escaped?
