World History › Section V · World War I › Topic V.1
Alliances, expansion, and conflict
In 1900 Europe had gone almost a century without a war involving all its great powers. This topic follows how alliances, a late scramble for colonies and an arms race turned that peace into two armed camps by 1914.
A long peace of short wars
After Napoleon's defeat in 1815, the great powers managed their quarrels through the Concert of Europe, an informal habit of meeting to keep the balance of power. Wars still happened, but most were brief and local. Prussia beat Austria in about seven weeks in 1866, and beat France in 1870 to 1871. That second war created the German Empire, proclaimed at Versailles in January 1871, and gave it Alsace and part of Lorraine, leaving France resentful. The quick victories also taught a dangerous lesson: the next war, too, would be short.
Bismarck's web of treaties
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck wanted the new empire left in peace, and his chief fear was a France that could find an ally. He tied Germany to Austria-Hungary in the Dual Alliance of 1879, which Italy joined in 1882 to form the Triple Alliance. In 1887 he added a secret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, so that France stayed isolated. In 1890 the young emperor Wilhelm II dismissed Bismarck and let the Russian treaty lapse, leaving Russia free to look for a new partner.
Two blocs take shape
Russia found France. A military convention agreed in 1892 and in force from 1894 bound each to fight if Germany attacked the other, and to mobilise if any Triple Alliance member mobilised. Britain then left its "splendid isolation". The Entente Cordiale of 1904 settled colonial disputes with France, leaving Britain a free hand in Egypt and France in Morocco, and a 1907 convention with Russia divided their rivalries in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Together these formed the Triple Entente. Note the difference: the ententes were understandings, and Britain had no treaty duty to fight. Europe now held two blocs: rival groupings of states that stood together.
Weltpolitik and a late empire
Germany came late to colonies. In 1884 and 1885 it claimed Togoland, Cameroon, German South West Africa and German East Africa, then north-eastern New Guinea and Pacific islands, and in 1899 it shared Samoa with the United States. In 1898 it leased Qingdao in China. From 1897 the government pursued Weltpolitik, "world policy", and the foreign secretary Bernhard von Bülow demanded a "place in the sun". Colonial rule could be brutal: German forces' war against the Herero and Nama in South West Africa from 1904 to 1908 killed tens of thousands, and Germany acknowledged it as genocide in 2021.
Two crises over Morocco
Germany tested the Anglo-French entente twice. In March 1905 Wilhelm II landed at Tangier and backed the sultan's independence against French control. France's foreign minister resigned, but at the Algeciras conference of 1906 only Austria-Hungary supported Germany, and France's position was confirmed. In 1911, after French troops entered Fez, Germany sent the gunboat Panther to the port of Agadir to demand compensation. Britain's chancellor of the exchequer, David Lloyd George, publicly warned Germany. In November Germany accepted a strip of the French Congo and recognised French control of Morocco, which became a French protectorate in 1912.
Worked example: why the Moroccan gambles backfired
Question: Germany wanted to split Britain from France. Why did it achieve the reverse? 1. The aim: show that the entente gave France nothing, so that Paris would doubt London. 2. The method: a royal visit and a gunboat, which made the issue one of national prestige. 3. Britain's reading: if Germany could bully France, it could bully anyone, so British ministers backed France openly. 4. The effect: British and French staff talks deepened, and in 1912 the two navies agreed that France would concentrate in the Mediterranean while Britain guarded the Channel. 5. In Germany, leaders felt humiliated and military influence grew. Conclusion: pressure meant to break the entente tightened it.
The naval race
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, head of the German navy office from 1897, won Navy Laws in 1898 and 1900 for a large battle fleet. His "risk theory" held that a fleet big enough to damage the Royal Navy would make Britain wary of opposing Germany. Britain, which depended on the sea for food and trade, saw a direct threat. In 1906 it launched HMS Dreadnought, with ten 12-inch guns and steam turbines, which made every older battleship second-rate. The new type reset the race, Germany built its own, and in 1909 British crowds chanted "We want eight and we won't wait". Britain kept a clear lead.
Mass armies and war plans
On land, the continental powers conscripted young men, then kept them as reservists who could be called up within days, so peacetime armies could swell into millions. Britain kept a small professional army. In 1913 France lengthened service to three years and Russia began a "great programme" of expansion due to finish around 1917. German planners, facing France and Russia together, relied on a scheme associated with Alfred von Schlieffen: defeat France quickly through Belgium, then turn east. Historians debate how fixed this "plan" was, but its logic tied Germany to rapid attack once Russia mobilised.
Worked example: did the arms race cause the war?
1. The claim: armaments bred fear, and fear brought war. 2. Evidence for: the naval race poisoned Anglo-German relations and pushed Britain towards France. 3. Evidence against: by 1912 Britain had clearly won at sea, Germany shifted spending to its army, and the two powers cooperated at a London conference on the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913. 4. The land race weighed more: German generals feared that Russia's expansion would leave them outmatched by about 1917. At a December 1912 meeting with the emperor, the army chief Helmuth von Moltke argued that war was coming and was better soon. 5. Historians disagree on how much that meeting shows. Conclusion: arms fed fear, but they did not make war automatic.
A system built for deterrence
By 1914 each great power believed its alliances made it safer, and crises in 1905, 1908 and 1911 had ended without a general war. Yet the system had grown rigid. Military plans assumed speed, leaving little time for talks. Partners feared that failing to back an ally would leave them alone next time. And Germany's leaders increasingly saw themselves as encircled. A local quarrel involving one bloc's member could now pull in the rest, and the Balkans would supply one.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, mixing up the blocs: the Triple Alliance was Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy; the Triple Entente was France, Russia and Britain. Second, treating Britain's ententes as binding military treaties. Third, treating the alliances as automatic: the Triple Alliance was defensive, and Italy stayed out in 1914. Fourth, thinking the Moroccan crises divided Britain and France; they drew them closer. Fifth, saying Germany overtook the Royal Navy: it never matched British numbers. Sixth, treating war as inevitable; contemporaries saw several crises end peacefully.
Key takeaways
Short wars from 1866 to 1871 created a German Empire and left France resentful. Bismarck isolated France, but after 1890 Russia allied with France, and Britain's ententes of 1904 and 1907 completed the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance. Germany's Weltpolitik brought clashes, above all the Moroccan crises, which tightened the Anglo-French bond. Tirpitz's fleet and HMS Dreadnought drove a naval race Britain won, while conscript armies and fast war plans made crises harder to contain. Historians still weigh how far these pressures made war likely.
Flashcards
Flashcard
Informal practice after 1815 of great powers meeting to keep the balance of power
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
Why did Wilhelm II's decision in 1890 to let the Reinsurance Treaty lapse matter?
Question 2 of 5
How did Britain's commitments in the Triple Entente differ from the Franco-Russian alliance?
Question 3 of 5
What was the main effect of the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911 on the Anglo-French entente?
Question 4 of 5
Why did the launch of HMS Dreadnought in 1906 intensify the naval race?
Question 5 of 5
Which point weakens the claim that the naval race alone made war inevitable?
