Accounting › Section V · Responsibility accounting and decentralization › Topic V.3

How decisions affect responsibility-center evaluation

The way a manager is measured changes the decisions that manager makes. Controllable costs, allocated costs, investment measures and transfer prices can all push a segment manager towards choices that help the segment's report but hurt the company, unless the evaluation is designed with care.

Measures shape decisions

Kettleby Foods has a Mill Division, which grinds flour, and a Bakery Division, which bakes bread for supermarkets, plus a chain of shops. Each manager is evaluated through the responsibility centres described in "Types of responsibility centers", and bonuses depend on the results. That gives every manager a reason to make decisions that improve their own report. Good evaluation design makes the decision that is best for the segment's report also the decision that is best for Kettleby, which is goal congruence. This topic looks at four places where the two can come apart.

Controllable and uncontrollable costs

A controllable cost is one a manager can significantly influence, such as staff hours, overtime, training, supplies and routine maintenance. An uncontrollable cost is one the manager has little or no power to change, at least in the short term, such as property tax rates, a lease signed by head office or the price per unit of electricity. Controllability depends on level and time: a shop manager controls how much electricity the shop uses but not the tariff, and a regional director may control a lease that a shop manager cannot. The controllability principle says managers should be evaluated only on what they can control.

Allocated costs

Head-office costs, such as the finance team, information systems and the chief executive's office, are often allocated to segments using a formula, for example in proportion to revenue. Allocation tells management whether each segment covers its share of company costs, but the segment manager cannot control the amount. Reports therefore separate the two: the controllable margin, revenue minus the costs the manager controls, judges the manager, while profit after allocations helps judge the segment as an investment. Whether to keep a segment at all is a separate question, covered in "Keeping or dropping a segment".

Worked example: a shop manager's report

Kettleby's Harbour shop had revenue of $600,000 and controllable costs of $480,000; its budgeted controllable margin was $115,000. Head office allocated $70,000 of its costs to the shop. 1. Controllable margin: \(600{,}000 - 480{,}000 = 120{,}000\), which is 5,000 F against budget. 2. Profit after allocations: \(120{,}000 - 70{,}000 = 50{,}000\). 3. Next year head office installs new company-wide software and the shop's allocation rises to $95,000. With the same controllable margin, profit after allocations falls to 25,000. 4. Conclusion: the $25,000 fall says nothing about the manager, who should be judged on the $120,000 controllable margin.

Short-term savings, long-term costs

Some controllable costs can be cut today with no visible effect until later: routine maintenance, staff training, research, advertising. A manager under pressure to hit this year's target may defer maintenance, which often leads to larger and more disruptive repairs later, or skip training that would have cut errors next year. The report improves; the business does not. Companies counter this by budgeting such spending separately, reviewing it over several years and adding nonfinancial measures, such as machine downtime or customer complaints, as "The balanced scorecard" explains.

Worked example: a project that lowers ROI

The Mill Division earns operating income of $440,000 on average operating assets of $2,000,000, an ROI of 22%. A new sifting line costing $300,000 would add $45,000 of income a year, a 15% return. Kettleby requires 12%. 1. New ROI: \(485{,}000 \div 2{,}300{,}000 \approx 21.1\%\). It falls, so a manager judged on ROI will reject the project. 2. Residual income before: \(440{,}000 - 12\% \times 2{,}000{,}000 = 200{,}000\). 3. After: \(485{,}000 - 12\% \times 2{,}300{,}000 = 209{,}000\), a rise of 9,000. 4. The project beats the 12% minimum, so it helps Kettleby, and residual income rewards the manager for accepting it. "Return on investment, residual income, and EVA" explores this further.

Transfer prices

A transfer price is the price one segment charges another segment of the same company. When the Mill Division supplies flour to the Bakery Division, the transfer price is revenue for Mill and a cost for Bakery. For Kettleby as a whole the two cancel, so the price does not change company profit directly. It does decide how that profit is split between the divisions, and so how each manager is rewarded. A poorly chosen price can lead a manager to refuse an internal sale or buy outside when buying inside would be cheaper for the company.

Three ways to set a transfer price

1. Market-based: the price the seller charges outside customers. It suits profit and investment centres and is common when the seller is at full capacity, but needs a reliable market price. 2. Cost-based: variable cost, full cost (variable plus fixed per unit) or either one plus a markup, called cost-plus. It is simple, but a price at variable cost earns the seller nothing, and full cost can pass on fixed costs that the transfer does not cause. 3. Negotiated: the managers agree a price, often between the seller's cost and the outside market price; it preserves autonomy but takes time and can cause conflict. Across national borders, tax authorities generally expect transfer prices to match what unrelated parties would charge, the arm's-length principle.

Capacity and the price range

The seller should not accept less than its variable cost plus any contribution margin it gives up on outside sales, its opportunity cost:

\text{Minimum} = \text{Variable} + \text{Opportunity}

The buyer should not pay more than it would pay outside. With spare capacity, the opportunity cost is zero, so the minimum is variable cost and there is room to negotiate. At full capacity, every internal unit replaces an outside sale, so the minimum rises to the outside price.

Worked example: flour for the Bakery Division

Mill's variable cost is $9 a bag and fixed cost $3 a bag at normal volume; it sells outside at $16. Bakery needs 40,000 bags and can buy them outside at $16. 1. With spare capacity, the minimum is $9 and the maximum $16. 2. Cost-plus prices with a 20% markup are \(9 \times 1.2 = 10.80\) on variable cost and \(12 \times 1.2 = 14.40\) on full cost. 3. At $14.40, Mill gains \((14.40 - 9) \times 40{,}000 = 216{,}000\) and Bakery saves \((16 - 14.40) \times 40{,}000 = 64{,}000\). 4. Kettleby gains \((16 - 9) \times 40{,}000 = 280{,}000\) over buying outside, at any price in the range. 5. With no spare capacity, the minimum is \(9 + 7 = 16\).

Common mistakes to avoid

First, holding managers responsible for allocated or other uncontrollable costs. Second, rewarding short-term cuts in maintenance, training or research that raise future costs. Third, assuming a project is bad because it lowers a division's ROI, when it beats the company's required return. Fourth, believing a transfer price changes company profit directly; it changes how profit is shared and, through that, decisions. Fifth, ignoring capacity: at full capacity, the lost outside contribution margin must be added to variable cost.

Key takeaways

How managers are measured shapes their decisions, so evaluations should promote goal congruence. Managers should be judged on controllable items; allocated head-office costs belong in a separate line. Short-term savings on discretionary costs can hurt later results, so they need longer-term and nonfinancial checks. ROI can lead managers to reject projects that beat the required return, while residual income rewards them. Transfer prices can be market-based, cost-based or negotiated; the seller's minimum is variable cost plus opportunity cost, and the buyer's maximum is the outside price.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Goal congruence

What is best for the segment's report is also best for the company

The aim of good evaluation design.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

Which cost should be used to evaluate a shop manager?

Question 2 of 5

A division has an ROI of 25%. A project would earn 18%, and the company's required return is 14%. What will a manager judged only on ROI probably do, and is it good for the company?

Question 3 of 5

A selling division has spare capacity. Its variable cost is $9 a unit, fixed cost $3 a unit and outside price $16. What is the lowest transfer price it should accept?

Question 4 of 5

The same division is at full capacity, so every internal unit replaces an outside sale at $16. What is now the lowest transfer price it should accept?

Question 5 of 5

A division's full cost is $12 a unit, of which $9 is variable. What is the cost-plus transfer price using a 20% markup on full cost?

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