Anthropology › Section F · Language and communication › Topic F.2
Language and the mind
Does the language you speak shape the way you think? Anthropologists have argued about this for a century. The answer emerging from research is subtle: language does not imprison thought, but it nudges what people notice, remember and find easy.
An ant on your northern leg
Speakers of Guugu Yimithirr, an Aboriginal Australian language of the Hopevale area in Queensland, rarely use words for left and right. They describe space by compass directions, even at close range: an ant might be on your northern leg, or a cup just west of the plate. To speak this way, they must keep track of north at every moment, indoors and out. English speakers mostly describe space relative to their own bodies. Cases like this raise one of anthropology's oldest questions: does the language people speak affect how they think?
Relativity and universals
Every language sorts the world into categories, and languages sort it differently. Linguistic relativity is the idea that these differences reflect, and may shape, people's habits of thought. Yet all humans share the same bodies, senses and brains, so all languages also share features, called linguistic universals. Researchers in ethnoscience study folk taxonomies, the systems of categories a people use to organise knowledge of plants, animals, illness or kin. Folk taxonomies reflect both common human perception and local environment and interest, so relativity and universals turn out to be complementary, not opposites.
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
Franz Boas taught Edward Sapir, who taught Benjamin Lee Whorf, and in the 1920s and 1930s Sapir and Whorf argued that the language people speak shapes how they see the world. Later writers named this the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and distinguished two forms. The strong form, linguistic determinism, says language fixes thought, so people cannot think what their language has no words for. The weak form, linguistic relativity in the narrow sense, says language influences habitual thought, perception and memory without limiting what is thinkable. Researchers today largely reject the strong form and find measurable, often modest, support for the weak form.
Two famous overstatements
Whorf claimed in the 1930s that Hopi had no words or grammar for time as countable units, so Hopi speakers saw time as an unfolding process. The linguist Ekkehart Malotki, in Hopi Time (1983), documented many Hopi expressions for days, seasons and time units, undermining that claim. A second myth says that the "Eskimo" have hundreds of words for snow; "Eskimo" is an outsider name that many Inuit reject. Laura Martin showed in 1986 that the count was inflated, partly because Inuit languages build long words from roots. Specialists everywhere, such as Arctic hunters, skiers or sailors, develop a rich focal vocabulary for what matters to them.
Evidence for the weak form
Careful experiments find real effects. Russian has separate basic words for light blue, goluboy, and dark blue, siniy; in a 2007 study Russian speakers told two blues apart faster when they fell on opposite sides of that boundary, an advantage English speakers lacked and that vanished when Russians did a verbal task at the same time. In spatial tasks, Stephen Levinson and colleagues found that speakers of compass-based languages remember arrangements by direction. Among the Pirahã of the Brazilian Amazon, whose language has no exact number words, people matched large quantities only approximately, suggesting that number words act as a tool for exact counting.
Why the strong form fails
If language fixed thought, translation would be impossible and new ideas could never be expressed, yet people translate constantly and coin words for new things. Babies and many animals reason about objects and quantities before or without language. Some effects once claimed, such as grammatical gender making German and Spanish speakers describe bridges or keys differently, have not reliably replicated in later studies. Some spatial findings also depend on where people live and how a task is worded. Grammar can still steer attention: languages with evidentiality, such as Turkish and many Amazonian languages, make speakers mark whether they saw, heard about or inferred what they report. The current view is that language is one influence on thought among many, strongest for habits and fast judgements.
Universals in colour terms
Brent Berlin and Paul Kay's Basic Color Terms (1969), based on 98 languages, found that languages differ in how many basic colour words they have but follow a regular order. Every language distinguishes at least light and dark; a third term is red; green and yellow come next, then blue, then brown, and then purple, pink, orange and grey. Later research, including the World Color Survey of 110 languages, revised the early stages but kept the broad pattern. The same field thus shows both universals, rooted in human vision, and relativity, in where each language draws its boundaries.
Metaphors we live by
Much abstract thought rests on metaphor, using something concrete to understand something abstract. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argued in Metaphors We Live By (1980) that such metaphors are systematic. English speakers feel up or down, so happiness is up; they spend, save and waste time, so time is money. Some metaphors are widespread because they grow from shared bodily experience; others are cultural. Treating time as money makes sense in a society that pays wages by the hour, and it is not found in every language.
Worked example: the turning table
In a classic task used by Levinson and colleagues, a person sees three toy animals in a row on a table, all facing right, then turns 180 degrees to a second table and is asked to set them out the same way. 1. An English or Dutch speaker usually keeps them facing right, relative to the body. 2. A speaker of a compass-based language, such as Guugu Yimithirr or Tseltal Maya, usually keeps them facing the same compass direction, which now looks like left. 3. Interpretation: habitual language use shapes spatial memory. 4. Limit: both groups can learn the other system. 5. Check: this supports the weak form, not the strong form.
Worked example: testing a claim
Someone says: "Language Z has one word covering green and blue, so its speakers cannot see the difference." Test it. 1. Form: "cannot see" is the strong, determinist form. 2. Evidence against: speakers of such languages can sort green and blue chips when asked, and can coin or borrow a word. 3. Evidence for a weaker effect: Paul Kay and Willett Kempton (1984) found that English speakers, who have separate words, exaggerated the green-blue boundary more than speakers of Tarahumara, a Mexican language with one term. 4. Revised claim: the shared word may influence how sharply speakers judge the boundary. 5. Check: always ask whether a claim says language limits thought or merely influences it.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, treating the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis as one claim: it has a strong and a weak form. Second, citing the strong form as established, when it is rejected. Third, assuming the weak form means large effects: most are modest. Fourth, repeating the hundreds-of-snow-words myth or Whorf's Hopi claim without its correction. Fifth, seeing relativity and universals as opposites, when colour terms show both.
Key takeaways
Languages sort the world differently, yet share universals rooted in human biology. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has a strong form, linguistic determinism, which is rejected, and a weak form, linguistic relativity, which has modest support from studies of colour (2007), space (Levinson) and number (Pirahã). Whorf's Hopi claim was undermined by Malotki (1983), and the snow-words claim is exaggerated. Berlin and Kay (1969) found an ordered pattern in colour terms. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) showed that metaphor structures abstract thought.
Flashcards
Flashcard
Language differences reflect and may shape habits of thought
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
Which statement expresses the strong form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis?
Question 2 of 5
In a 2007 study, Russian speakers told light and dark blues apart faster than English speakers did, but the advantage vanished during a verbal task. What does this support?
Question 3 of 5
What did Ekkehart Malotki's Hopi Time (1983) show?
Question 4 of 5
Berlin and Kay (1969) found that a language with exactly three basic colour terms has terms for light, dark and which colour?
Question 5 of 5
After turning 180 degrees, a Guugu Yimithirr speaker sets out toy animals facing the same compass direction as before. What is the best interpretation?
