Macroeconomics › Section R · The impacts of government borrowing › Topic R.3
Government borrowing and private saving
If people see that today's government borrowing means higher taxes tomorrow, they might save more now to pay them. That idea, Ricardian equivalence, would make deficits almost harmless; the evidence says it holds only in part.
The third possible response
The identity \(S + (M - X) = I + (G - T)\) says that a larger budget deficit must be matched by lower investment, a larger trade deficit, higher private saving, or some mix. The topic "Government borrowing, investment, and crowding out" followed the first route, and "Fiscal policy and the trade balance" the second. This topic asks whether households and firms might save more in response to government borrowing. If they did so fully, a deficit would leave investment and the trade balance untouched, because private saving would rise by exactly the amount the government borrows.
Ricardian equivalence
The argument runs like this. A government that cuts taxes today and borrows to cover the gap must repay that debt, with interest, from future taxes. A forward-looking household sees that its lifetime tax bill has not changed, only its timing. So instead of spending the tax cut, it saves it, ready to pay the later tax. The theory that private saving rises to offset government borrowing, and falls to offset government saving, is called Ricardian equivalence. It is named after David Ricardo (1772 to 1823), who discussed the idea but doubted people really behaved this way. Robert Barro revived it in a famous 1974 paper that asked whether government bonds count as net wealth for the households that hold them.
What full equivalence would mean
If Ricardian equivalence held completely, the way a government finances its spending would not matter. Paying for a given level of spending with taxes now or with borrowing now and taxes later would have the same effect on the economy. A tax cut financed by borrowing would not raise consumption, so it would not shift aggregate demand. Private saving would rise one for one with the deficit, so there would be no crowding out of investment and no extra trade deficit. A budget surplus would be offset by lower private saving. Deficits would neither help in a recession nor harm long-run growth.
Worked example: saving a tax cut
A government gives a household a $1,000 tax cut this year, financed by a one-year bond at 5% interest. 1. Next year the government must repay \(1{,}000 \times 1.05 = 1{,}050\) dollars, raised by taxing the same household. 2. If the household saves the $1,000 at the same 5%, it will have exactly $1,050 next year. 3. So saving the whole cut leaves its spending in both years unchanged, as if the tax cut never happened. 4. Check with present value: the future tax is worth \(1{,}050 \div 1.05 = 1{,}000\) dollars today, exactly cancelling the cut. A household that sees this has no reason to spend more.
The assumptions behind it
The theory needs strong assumptions. Households must look far ahead and understand the government's budget. They must be able to borrow and save freely, so their spending depends on lifetime income rather than this month's pay. The future taxes must fall on them, or on children whose welfare they treat as their own. Taxes must not change people's incentives to work or save. And everyone must expect the debt to be repaid with taxes, not by spending cuts or by growth. Each assumption fails for some people, which is why most economists expect only a partial effect.
Who spends a tax cut
The clearest failure involves households with few savings and little access to credit. A family that would like to spend more now but cannot borrow will spend most of an extra $1,000, whatever it expects about future taxes. Such liquidity-constrained households are common, especially on lower incomes. That is why economists often expect transfers aimed at lower-income households to boost spending more than tax cuts aimed at the wealthy. Others may simply not think about future taxes, or may expect someone else to pay them, such as future generations or taxpayers with higher incomes.
What the evidence shows
Studies generally find that private saving rises when deficits rise, but by much less than one for one, with estimates varying across countries and periods. Research on the US tax rebates of 2001, by David Johnson, Jonathan Parker and Nicholas Souleles, found that households spent about 20% to 40% of their rebates on non-durable goods within three months of receiving them. US history gives mixed signals. Private saving fell as the budget moved into surplus in the late 1990s, as the theory predicts, but large deficits in the mid-1980s brought no matching rise in saving. Saving jumped in 2020 alongside a huge deficit, though lockdowns that closed shops were a big reason.
Worked example: a partial offset
In a hypothetical economy the budget deficit rises by 200 billion dollars. Suppose private saving rises by 30 cents for each extra dollar of deficit, and the trade deficit widens by 80 billion. 1. Extra private saving: \(0.30 \times 200 = 60\) billion. 2. The identity requires the extra 200 of borrowing to be matched by changes in saving, foreign inflows and investment. 3. Saving supplies 60 and foreign inflows 80, a total of 140. 4. Investment must fall by the rest: \(200 - 60 - 80 = 60\) billion. 5. Check: with full Ricardian equivalence, saving would have risen by the whole 200, and neither investment nor the trade balance would have changed.
Why it still matters
Even a partial Ricardian effect changes the picture. It means a debt-financed tax cut stimulates demand less than a simple multiplier suggests, because some of it is saved. It means deficits crowd out less investment and draw in less foreign capital than they would if saving did not respond at all. And it reminds policymakers that people's expectations about future policy shape how they react today. But because the offset is far from complete, the earlier conclusions stand: large, sustained deficits still tend to reduce investment, widen trade deficits, or both.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, thinking Ricardian equivalence says deficits are good; it says, if it holds, that they make no difference. Second, assuming it holds fully, when the evidence shows a partial offset at best. Third, forgetting liquidity constraints: households that cannot borrow spend most of a tax cut. Fourth, applying it to a surplus the wrong way round; a surplus would be offset by lower private saving, not higher. Fifth, leaving out other terms in the identity; whatever saving does not cover must come from lower investment or foreign inflows.
Key takeaways
Ricardian equivalence holds that rational households save a debt-financed tax cut to pay the future taxes it implies, so private saving offsets government borrowing. If it held fully, deficits would not affect demand, investment or the trade balance. It rests on strong assumptions, and liquidity-constrained households break it. Evidence finds a partial offset: saving rises when deficits rise, but well short of one for one, and many households spend much of a tax cut. So deficits still crowd out investment or widen the trade deficit, if by less than they otherwise would.
Flashcards
Flashcard
Private saving offsets government borrowing or saving
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
According to Ricardian equivalence, what do households do with a tax cut financed by government borrowing?
Question 2 of 5
In an economy where Ricardian equivalence holds fully, the budget deficit rises from 40 to 90. What happens?
Question 3 of 5
The budget deficit rises by 300. Private saving rises by 30% of that, and the trade deficit widens by 150. By how much does investment fall?
Question 4 of 5
Which household is least likely to behave as Ricardian equivalence predicts when it receives a $1,000 tax cut?
Question 5 of 5
A household gets a $500 tax cut, financed by a one-year bond at 4%. Next year its taxes rise by $520. If it saves the cut at 4%, what happens?
