Microeconomics › Section N · Labor markets and income › Topic N.2
Wages when employers have market power
Monopoly is one seller facing many buyers; its mirror is one buyer facing many sellers - and the sellers here are workers. A monopsony employer pays less than the value its last hire adds and employs fewer people than a competitive market would.
Labour power, two sides
Imperfect competition in labour markets has two sources: market power on the demand side - employers - and market power on the supply side - organised workers. This topic takes the first; the next takes the second. Where the monopolist is the single SELLER, the monopsonist is the single BUYER, facing the market supply curve alone.
What a monopsony is
A monopsony is a labour market with only one employer. Joan Robinson made the idea central to economics in 1933, crediting the classicist Bertrand Hallward with coining the word. The condition is stark: with no other hirer for their skills, workers who want a job must accept the wage on offer. The classic image is the company town, where the mine owns the houses, the store and the jobs; modern cases include a large employer facing workers whose skills or family ties keep them local. What matters is not literal singularity but the gap between one employer's wage and the next best option.
The marginal cost of labour
A competitive employer can hire all it wants at the going wage: one more worker costs exactly the wage. A monopsonist cannot. Being alone, it faces the market supply curve: to attract one more worker, it must offer a higher wage - and the higher wage must be paid to ALL its workers, not just the new hire. The marginal cost of labour (MCL) therefore rises faster than the wage: with a supply schedule of $10, $20, $30, $40 and $50 for the first five workers, the total wage bill is $10, $40, $90, $160 and $250 - so the MCL runs $10, $30, $50, $70, $90. From the second worker onward, hiring costs more per worker than the wage paid.
Worked example: the monopsony outcome
The monopsonist's labour demand (VMPL) for workers one through five: 50, 40, 30, 20, 10. 1. Hiring rule, as ever: hire until marginal cost meets marginal value - here \(MCL = VMPL\). 2. Worker 1: MCL 10 against 50 - hire. Worker 2: MCL 30 against 40 - hire. Worker 3: MCL 50 against 30 - stop. 3. Employment: 2 workers, paid the wage from the supply curve at 2 workers: $20. 4. The competitive comparison: a competitive market hires where wage = VMPL - worker 3 ($30 = $30), so \(L_c = 3\), \(W_c = 30\). 5. The verdict: the monopsony pays LESS ($20 vs $30) and hires FEWER (2 vs 3) than the same market would with competing employers. And the second worker adds $40 but is paid $20: a gap between marginal value and pay that exists only because the employer faces no rival bidder. Assumptions: supply and demand as stated.
The mirror of monopoly
Lay the analysis beside its mirror: the monopolist faces the market demand curve, restricts output, and charges a price above marginal cost; the monopsonist faces the market supply curve, restricts employment, and pays a wage below the value of marginal product. Both leave a deadweight loss: trades worth more to the buyer than they cost the seller that never happen. In the coarse schedule, worker 3's value ($30) only just covers the wage needed to attract them ($30); measured in hours rather than whole workers, the hours between the two outcomes are worth more to the firm than workers ask, and that lost surplus is the deadweight loss. The gap between the marginal worker's VMPL and the wage is the mirror of monopoly's price-cost markup. It gives the 'exploitation' charge of the previous topic a precise meaning: pay below marginal value, caused by power.
Where monopsony lives today
The company town is mostly history, but the conditions persist wherever workers' outside options are thin. Examples include rural healthcare, single-plant meatpacking towns, remote mining regions and, research suggests, some occupations dominated by a few large employers even in big cities. The mechanisms that CREATE thin outside options are policy's real target: non-compete clauses that bar workers from moving to rivals, no-poach agreements between competing firms, licensing rules that block mobility, and employer concentration itself. The 2023 federal merger guidelines explicitly cover labour markets. The FTC's 2024 nationwide ban on most non-competes was blocked in court, and in 2025 the agency dropped its defence of the rule, so the issue now rests with states such as California and Minnesota, which ban most non-competes, and with case-by-case enforcement.
Worked example: the minimum wage surprise
The chapter on price floors taught that a minimum wage above equilibrium causes unemployment. Monopsony flips the lesson. 1. Recall the setup: the monopsonist hires 2 workers at $20 because the third worker's MCL (50) exceeds its VMPL (30). 2. Now set a minimum wage of $30: the firm must pay 30 to everyone, and up to 3 workers will supply labour at that wage. 3. The firm's marginal cost of labour becomes flat at 30 - hiring one more no longer requires raising everyone's pay. 4. Hiring rule: hire while \(VMPL \geq 30\): workers 1 (50), 2 (40) and 3 (30) qualify - employment rises to 3. 5. The result: wage up ($20 to $30) AND employment up (2 to 3) - the competitive outcome restored. The caveat: at $40, four people want work but the firm hires only workers 1 and 2 (VMPL of at least 40), so employment falls back to 2. In this model a well-set minimum can raise pay without costing jobs; how much real employers have such power is still debated, which is one reason estimates of minimum-wage effects differ. Assumptions: schedules as before; the minimum enforced.
The labour-law response
Bargaining imbalance between single workers and employers drew a long legal response. The US framework includes the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, giving workers the right to organise and creating the board that rules on disputes, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, setting the minimum wage, overtime rules and child-labour limits. Later laws added anti-discrimination protections, family leave, layoff notice and pension safeguards. The federal minimum wage has been $7.25 an hour since July 2009, though many states set higher floors. One economic reading of these laws is that floors and bargaining rights can offset employer power; in a competitive labour market, by contrast, a floor set above equilibrium causes unemployment, as the price-floor topic showed.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, computing monopsony hiring with the wage instead of the MCL - the whole result lives in the difference. Second, reading the minimum-wage surprise as universal: it holds under monopsony up to the competitive wage, not above it and not automatically in competitive markets. Third, assuming 'only one employer' means literally one: dominance and thin outside options do the work. Fourth, reading every pay gap as monopsony: pay below marginal value is the test, and it needs evidence about outside options.
Key takeaways
Labour-market power has two sides; the employer side is monopsony - the single buyer, analysed by Joan Robinson, facing the market supply curve alone. Its machinery: hiring one more means paying all more, so the marginal cost of labour runs above the wage (10, 30, 50, 70, 90 against wages 10 to 50), and the firm hires where MCL = VMPL then pays the supply-curve wage: 2 workers at $20, against the competitive 3 at $30 - lower pay, fewer jobs and a deadweight loss. The mirror of monopoly, down to the markup: the second worker adds $40 and is paid $20. Under monopsony, a floor at the competitive wage ($30) flattens the MCL, raising BOTH wage and employment. US floors and bargaining rights (NLRA 1935, FLSA 1938, a $7.25 federal minimum since 2009) can be read partly as checks on employer power.
Flashcards
Flashcard
A labour market with one employer
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
Why does a monopsonist's marginal cost of labour exceed the wage from the second worker onward?
Question 2 of 5
With VMPLs of 50, 40, 30, 20, 10 and an MCL schedule of 10, 30, 50, 70, 90, what does the monopsonist do?
Question 3 of 5
Why can a minimum wage of $30 raise both the wage AND employment under monopsony?
Question 4 of 5
Same schedules (VMPLs 50, 40, 30, 20, 10; supply wages 10, 20, 30, 40, 50). What happens if the minimum wage is $40 instead?
Question 5 of 5
Which modern practice would a monopsony analysis most directly target as suppressing workers' outside options?
