Philosophy › Section F · Metaphysics › Topic F.5
Descartes, mind-body dualism, and behaviorism
René Descartes argued that the mind is a thinking thing quite distinct from the body, and his arguments still frame the debate. Behaviourism went to the other extreme, treating talk of the mind as talk about behaviour. Seeing why each view attracted followers, and why each met serious objections, clarifies the whole mind-body problem.
Two answers at opposite ends
The previous topics examined physicalist theories of mind and the problem of consciousness. This topic turns to two answers that sit at opposite ends of the debate. Substance dualism holds that a person has two fundamentally different parts, a non-physical mind and a physical body. Behaviourism holds that there is no hidden inner mind to explain at all: what we call mental life shows up in what people do and are disposed to do. Each faced objections that helped move philosophy towards the theories already met.
Descartes: thinking thing and extended thing
René Descartes (1596 to 1650) set out his dualism in Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). He divided reality into two kinds of created substance. Body, or res extensa, is extended: it takes up space, has shape and size, and can be divided. Mind, or res cogitans, is a thinking thing: it doubts, understands, wills, imagines and feels, and has no extension. Descartes identified himself with his mind. He concluded that the mind could exist without the body, at least by God's power, which leaves room for survival after death, though he did not claim the Meditations had proved immortality.
Worked example: the conceivability argument
One of Descartes's arguments can be set out like this. 1. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my body. 2. Whatever I can clearly and distinctly conceive is possible, at least for God. 3. So my mind can exist without my body. 4. So my mind is distinct from my body. Evaluate: critics attack the move from what I can conceive about a thing to what it is. Compare: I know my father; I do not know who the masked man is; so the masked man is not my father. That reasoning is invalid, since the masked man could be my father. Conceiving may reflect ignorance, not real possibility.
The divisibility argument
Descartes also argued from divisibility. Any body, however small, can in principle be divided into parts. But when I consider my mind, I find no parts: it is one and the same mind that wills, understands and feels. Losing a limb does not remove part of my mind. If the body is divisible and the mind is not, they have different properties and cannot be the same thing. Critics reply that willing, perceiving and remembering are distinct capacities that brain injury can damage separately, which suggests the mind may have parts after all. Defenders answer that capacities are not parts of a substance.
The interaction problem
The sharpest objection came from Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, in letters to Descartes in 1643. Bodies move only when something pushes them, and pushing seems to require contact and extension. How, then, can an unextended mind move an arm? Descartes suggested that mind and body interact in the pineal gland, a small structure in the brain, but that only says where, not how. He also replied that the union of mind and body is a basic notion, best known through ordinary experience. Later critics added the causal closure of physics: if every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, there seems to be no work left for a non-physical mind.
Other forms of dualism
Some dualists avoid interaction altogether. Nicolas Malebranche's occasionalism held that God causes the bodily movement on the occasion of each act of will, and Gottfried Leibniz held that mind and body run in pre-established harmony, like two clocks set to agree. Property dualism keeps one kind of substance, the physical, but holds that some of its properties, such as conscious experience, are not physical. Epiphenomenalism says mental states are caused by brain events but cause nothing; T. H. Huxley compared consciousness to a locomotive's steam whistle, which accompanies the engine's work without driving it. Critics object that our experiences would then play no part in causing our talk about them.
Weighing dualism
Dualists point to the privacy and felt quality of experience, the conceivability arguments, and the coherence of hopes for survival after death that many religious traditions share. Critics point to the close dependence of mental life on the brain: anaesthetics switch consciousness off, and brain damage alters memory and personality in predictable ways. Dualists reply that dependence is not identity, as a radio's output depends on the set without the broadcast being made by it. Critics also appeal to simplicity: if one kind of substance explains the evidence, a second is unneeded. Both sides accept that the interaction problem must be answered.
Behaviourism: the mind in behaviour
Behaviourism arose in the early twentieth century partly in reaction to introspective psychology and dualism. Methodological behaviourism, launched in psychology by John B. Watson in 1913 and developed by B. F. Skinner, holds that a science of mind should study only observable behaviour and its causes. Logical or analytical behaviourism makes a claim about meaning: statements about the mind are really statements about behaviour and dispositions to behave. Gilbert Ryle, in The Concept of Mind (1949), mocked Cartesian dualism as the "ghost in the machine". The strongest, or hard, form denies that there are inner mental states at all; softer forms allow them but build theory on behaviour.
Worked example: belief as a disposition
Try a behaviourist analysis of "Sam believes it will rain". 1. Translate it into dispositions: Sam is disposed to take an umbrella, close the windows and cancel the picnic. 2. Test it: Sam takes an umbrella only if she wants to stay dry. If she loves walking in the rain, she will leave it behind while still believing it will rain. 3. Repair it: Sam is disposed to take an umbrella if she wants to stay dry and believes umbrellas keep people dry. 4. Diagnose: the repair uses the mental words "wants" and "believes", which the analysis was meant to remove. 5. Conclusion: beliefs and desires produce behaviour only in combination, so they resist one-by-one translation.
Further objections to behaviourism
Hilary Putnam imagined super-spartans, people who feel pain but have trained themselves never to show it or even be disposed to show it; their pain seems real yet has no behavioural expression. Conversely, a skilled actor can show perfect pain behaviour without any pain. Behaviourism also struggles with first-person knowledge: you know you have a headache without watching your own behaviour. Supporters reply that the theory rightly ties mental words to public criteria we can check. These objections pushed many philosophers towards the identity theory and functionalism, covered in the topic "The mind as self: physicalism".
Common mistakes to avoid
First, Descartes's dualism is about two kinds of substance, not two parts of the brain. Second, the pineal gland locates interaction but does not explain it. Third, property dualism is not substance dualism: it allows only physical substances. Fourth, methodological behaviourism is a rule for doing psychology, while logical behaviourism is a claim about what mental words mean. Fifth, epiphenomenalism makes the mind an effect only, never a cause, so it is not an answer to how minds move bodies.
Key takeaways
Descartes divided mind, an unextended thinking thing, from body, an extended thing, and argued for their distinctness from conceivability and divisibility; critics question whether conceiving shows possibility. Elisabeth of Bohemia's interaction problem, sharpened by causal closure, is dualism's central difficulty; occasionalism, pre-established harmony, property dualism and epiphenomenalism are responses. Behaviourism treats mental life as behaviour and dispositions, in methodological and logical forms, but faces circularity, super-spartans, actors and first-person knowledge.
Flashcards
Flashcard
Mind and body are two fundamentally different kinds of substance
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
What did Descartes mean by res cogitans?
Question 2 of 5
What did Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia ask Descartes in 1643?
Question 3 of 5
Why is the masked man example used against Descartes's conceivability argument?
Question 4 of 5
A behaviourist analyses "Sam believes it will rain" as "Sam is disposed to take an umbrella". What is the main problem?
Question 5 of 5
What are Putnam's super-spartans meant to show?
