Philosophy › Section F · Metaphysics › Topic F.4
Locke, personal identity, and the problem of consciousness
John Locke proposed that what makes you the same person is not your body or your soul but your consciousness, reaching back through memory. That answer still shapes debates about personal identity, and it leads straight to a harder question: what is consciousness itself?
A third answer to persistence
Earlier topics gave two answers to what makes a person the same over time: a lasting soul, or nothing more than changing physical and mental processes. John Locke (1632 to 1704) offered a third. In a chapter on identity added to the second edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1694), he argued that personal identity does not depend on sameness of body or of soul substance. It depends on sameness of consciousness, an approach that still has many defenders.
Substance, man and person
Locke insisted that "same" means different things for different kinds of thing. The same mass of matter is the same atoms. The same oak, or the same man, meaning the same human animal, is one continuous life, even as its matter changes. The same person is something else again. A person, for Locke, is a thinking, intelligent being with reason and reflection, able to consider itself as the same thinking thing at different times and places. He also called "person" a forensic term: it marks who can be held accountable, praised and blamed, rewarded and punished.
Consciousness makes the person
On Locke's view, a person reaches as far back in time as their consciousness can reach: you are the same person who did a past act if you can be conscious of doing it, chiefly by remembering it from the inside. This is often called the memory criterion. It has a striking consequence. Locke held that if consciousness could be transferred from one soul substance to another, the person would go with it; the soul would be irrelevant. Equally, a person could not be justly punished for acts they had no consciousness of having done, although Locke allowed that human courts, unable to see inside minds, may still punish them.
Worked example: the prince and the cobbler
Locke imagines the soul of a prince, carrying all the prince's consciousness of his past life, entering the body of a cobbler as the cobbler's own soul departs. 1. Ask who is the same man: the body in the workshop is the cobbler's continuing human animal. 2. Ask who is the same person: the being in that body remembers the prince's life from the inside and plans as the prince did, so by the memory criterion he is the prince. 3. Ask who should keep the prince's promises: the person, not the man. 4. Conclusion: "same man" and "same person" can come apart, which is exactly what Locke wanted to show.
Butler's circularity objection
Joseph Butler, a cleric and philosopher who later became a bishop, objected in 1736 that the memory criterion is circular. Genuinely remembering an act, as opposed to merely seeming to, already requires that you are the one who did it. So memory presupposes personal identity and cannot be what constitutes it. A modern reply comes from Sydney Shoemaker, who defined quasi-memory: a memory-like experience of a past act caused in the right way by that act, without assuming that the one who recalls it is the one who did it. Defenders of Locke can then say that identity consists in chains of quasi-memory, avoiding the circle.
Worked example: Reid's brave officer
Thomas Reid (1785) imagined a boy flogged for stealing from an orchard, who later, as a young officer, captures an enemy flag, and later still becomes a general. 1. The officer remembers the flogging, so by the memory criterion the officer is the boy. 2. The general remembers capturing the flag, so the general is the officer. 3. The general has forgotten the flogging, so the general is not the boy. 4. But identity is transitive: if A is B and B is C, then A is C. Steps 1 to 3 break this rule. 5. Reply: replace direct memory with overlapping chains of memory, so the general is linked to the boy through the officer.
Psychological continuity today
Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons (1984), developed that reply into the psychological continuity view: a later person is you if linked to you by overlapping chains of memories, intentions, beliefs and character. He then pressed a puzzle of fission. Suppose each half of your brain were transplanted into a different body, and each resulting person were psychologically continuous with you. Both cannot be you, since they are two people. Parfit concluded that identity may not be what matters in survival; continuity is. Rival animalists, such as Eric Olson, hold that each of us is simply a human animal, like Locke's "same man".
The problem of consciousness
Locke built personal identity on consciousness, but what is consciousness? Philosophers distinguish phenomenal consciousness, the felt quality of experience, from access consciousness, Ned Block's term for information available for reasoning, report and control of action. The felt qualities, such as the taste of coffee or the ache of a toothache, are called qualia. Thomas Nagel (1974) said a creature is conscious if there is something it is like to be it, and argued that knowing every physical fact about a bat's echolocation would not tell us what echolocating is like from the bat's point of view.
The hard problem and zombies
David Chalmers (1995) separated the easy problems of consciousness, explaining functions such as attention, discrimination and verbal report, from the hard problem: why any physical processing is accompanied by experience at all. The easy problems are difficult but suit the methods of neuroscience; the hard problem seems not to. Chalmers also argued that a philosophical zombie, a being physically identical to you with no experience, is conceivable, so possible, so consciousness is not fixed by physical facts. Critics reply that zombies are not truly conceivable, or that conceivability does not prove possibility, much as water without H₂O once seemed conceivable.
Theories and radical options
Scientists and philosophers have proposed rival theories. Global workspace theory, from Bernard Baars and Stanislas Dehaene, holds that information becomes conscious when it is broadcast widely across the brain. Integrated information theory, from Giulio Tononi, links consciousness to how much a system's information is unified. Higher-order theories say a state is conscious when one is aware of being in it. Each is contested and under experimental test. Two radical views reject the framing: illusionists, such as Keith Frankish and Daniel Dennett, say phenomenal consciousness as usually conceived is an illusion, while panpsychists, such as Philip Goff, say consciousness is a basic feature of all matter.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, Locke did not say the person is the soul; he said personal identity would follow consciousness even if the soul changed. Second, "same man" and "same person" are different questions for Locke. Third, Reid's objection is about transitivity, not about forgetting as such. Fourth, the hard problem is not just that the brain is complicated; it asks why there is experience at all. Fifth, conceivability arguments need the extra premise that what is conceivable is possible.
Key takeaways
Locke separated same substance, same man and same person, and made personal identity a matter of consciousness reaching back through memory; "person" is a forensic term. The prince and cobbler case shows man and person can come apart. Butler charged circularity, answered with quasi-memory; Reid's brave officer breaks transitivity, answered with overlapping chains. Parfit's fission case suggests continuity, not identity, is what matters. Phenomenal consciousness raises Nagel's what-it-is-like question and Chalmers's hard problem. Rival theories, illusionism and panpsychism remain in debate.
Flashcards
Flashcard
Essay Concerning Human Understanding; identity chapter added in 1694
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
According to Locke, what makes someone the same person over time?
Question 2 of 5
What does Reid's brave officer case show about the memory criterion?
Question 3 of 5
What was Joseph Butler's objection to Locke's memory criterion?
Question 4 of 5
Which of these is the hard problem of consciousness, in Chalmers's sense?
Question 5 of 5
Critics of the zombie argument most often attack which step?
