Philosophy › Section F · Metaphysics › Topic F.7

Free will

When you choose, it feels as if more than one future is open to you. But if every event has causes that stretch back before your birth, can any choice really be up to you? The free will debate sets determinism against our practices of praise, blame and punishment, and it remains unresolved.

Does feeling free make you free?

You hover over a menu and pick the soup. It felt like a free choice: you could have picked the salad. Now imagine a scientist who, from a scan of your brain a moment earlier, had predicted your choice correctly. Would that show the choice was not free? The feeling of freedom is real, but feelings can mislead. The free will problem asks whether we ever genuinely control what we do, and the answer matters for moral responsibility: whether people deserve praise, blame and punishment for their actions.

Two ideas of freedom

On one idea, you act freely only if you could have done otherwise. Philosophers call this the principle of alternative possibilities, or PAP. It fits legal practice: someone forced at gunpoint is usually excused, because there was no real alternative. On a second idea, freedom is doing what you want, without being blocked or forced. Thomas Hobbes and David Hume defended versions of this view. Harry Frankfurt (1971) refined it with second-order desires, desires about which desires to act on. An addict who hates the craving is unfree in a way that a person acting on desires she endorses is not.

Determinism

Determinism is the thesis that every event, including every human choice, is fixed by earlier events together with the laws of nature: given the past and the laws, only one future is possible. Pierre-Simon Laplace (1814) imagined an intellect that knew the position and force of every particle and could therefore predict the whole future. Baron d'Holbach, in The System of Nature (1770), argued that humans are part of nature and obey its laws like everything else. Less sweeping influences point the same way: upbringing, culture and social position shape what options we even consider.

Indeterminism and the problem of luck

Indeterminism holds that some events are not fixed by the past. On standard interpretations of quantum mechanics, some physical events are genuinely random, though other interpretations are deterministic. William James, in "The Dilemma of Determinism" (1884), welcomed real chance as leaving room for open possibilities. Yet randomness does not obviously help. If a choice results from a chance event in the brain, it seems no more under your control than a determined one: it simply happened to you. This is the luck objection, and it means the free will problem arises whether or not determinism is true.

Incompatibilism: two opposite verdicts

Incompatibilists hold that free will and determinism cannot both be true. They then divide. Hard determinists such as d'Holbach conclude that we lack the free will that deep moral responsibility needs; Derk Pereboom's hard incompatibilism adds that undetermined choices would not supply it either. Critics, following P. F. Strawson (1962), reply that resentment and gratitude are too deep in us to give up. Libertarians conclude that we have free will, so determinism must be false for at least some human choices. Agent-causal libertarians, following Thomas Reid and Roderick Chisholm, say the agent, not a prior event, causes the decision. The existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre held that humans are wholly free and so wholly responsible for what they make of themselves. Critics ask how agent causation fits the natural world, and whether undetermined choices escape the luck objection.

Compatibilism

Compatibilists hold that free will and determinism are compatible: a choice can be both caused and free. On classical versions, from Hobbes and Hume, you act freely when your action flows from your own will without external constraint, even if your will has causes. Frankfurt's endorsed desires give a fuller account. James called the view soft determinism and dismissed it as a "quagmire of evasion". A leading modern objection is Peter van Inwagen's consequence argument (1983): if determinism is true, our acts follow from the laws of nature and the distant past, neither of which is up to us, so our acts are not up to us either.

Worked example: a Frankfurt case

Frankfurt (1969) attacked the principle of alternative possibilities with cases like this. 1. Black, a neuroscientist, has secretly fitted a device to Jones's brain. If Jones shows any sign of voting for Smith, the device will make him vote for Lee instead. 2. Jones, for his own reasons, votes for Lee; the device never acts. 3. Jones could not have done otherwise, since any move towards Smith would have been blocked. 4. Yet Jones seems fully responsible, because he chose exactly as he would have anyway. 5. So responsibility may not require alternative possibilities. Reply: critics say Jones still had a flicker of freedom, the sign he might have shown, and debate whether that matters.

Worked example: three verdicts on one act

Maria, tired and anxious about a deadline, copies a classmate's essay. 1. Hard determinist: her act followed from her character, stress and circumstances, which trace back to causes she did not choose, so she does not deserve blame in the deepest sense. Pereboom adds that we may still warn her, protect others and help her change. 2. Libertarian: she could have chosen otherwise at that moment, so she is responsible. 3. Compatibilist: she acted on her own desires, without coercion, and could have responded to reasons such as fear of being caught, so she is responsible even if her choice was caused. 4. Check: all three agree on what happened; they disagree about what freedom requires.

The Libet experiments

In 1983 Benjamin Libet asked people to flex a wrist whenever they felt the urge and to report when they first became aware of it. Brain activity called the readiness potential began several hundred milliseconds before that reported awareness. Some concluded that the brain decides before we consciously do, so free will is an illusion. Libet himself suggested we might still consciously veto an action. Critics note that timing reports are unreliable, that a 2012 study by Aaron Schurger and colleagues proposed the readiness potential may reflect random build-up of neural activity rather than a decision, and that flicking a wrist on a whim differs from deliberate choice.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, libertarianism about free will is unrelated to political libertarianism. Second, determinism is not fatalism: it says outcomes depend on causes, including your choices, not that they happen whatever you do. Third, being predictable is not the same as being determined, though the two are linked. Fourth, compatibilists do not deny determinism; most accept that it might be true. Fifth, Libet's findings concern simple, spontaneous movements, so claims that they disprove free will go beyond the evidence.

Key takeaways

Freedom may mean being able to do otherwise (PAP) or acting on one's own endorsed will. Determinism says the past and laws fix one future; indeterminism allows chance, but the luck objection shows chance is not control. Incompatibilists split into hard determinists, who deny free will, and libertarians, who deny determinism, sometimes appealing to agent causation. Compatibilists, from Hobbes and Hume to Frankfurt, say caused choices can be free; van Inwagen's consequence argument challenges them. Frankfurt cases question PAP, and Libet's experiments are contested evidence.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Free will problem

Whether we genuinely control our actions

Matters for praise, blame and punishment.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

"You acted freely only if you could have done something else." What is this principle called?

Question 2 of 5

Which claim do compatibilists make?

Question 3 of 5

In Frankfurt's case, Jones votes for Lee on his own, though a hidden device would have forced that vote. What is the case meant to show?

Question 4 of 5

Why does indeterminism not obviously rescue free will?

Question 5 of 5

Which is a criticism of using Libet's experiments to deny free will?

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