Philosophy › Section F · Metaphysics › Topic F.3

The mind as self: physicalism

If the self is the mind, the next question is what a mind is. Physicalists answer that it is something physical, most likely the working brain. This topic sets out the main physicalist theories and the strongest objections to each, without settling the debate.

From self to mind

Many philosophers, in many traditions, have located the self in the mind: you are the one who thinks, feels, remembers and decides. But what is a mind? Thoughts and pains seem private and hard to locate, while the brain is a physical organ that scientists can weigh and scan. The mind-body problem asks how the two are related. Broadly, dualists say the mind is something non-physical, a view examined in the topic "Descartes, mind-body dualism, and behaviorism". Physicalists say the mind is physical. Physicalism is a form of the monism met earlier in this section: there is one basic kind of stuff, and it is physical.

What physicalism claims

Physicalism holds that everything that exists is physical, or depends wholly on the physical. A common way to state the dependence is supervenience: there can be no mental difference without a physical difference, so two beings exactly alike physically would be alike mentally too. Defining "physical" is harder than it sounds. If it means what today's physics describes, physicalism is probably false, since physics is incomplete. If it means whatever a finished physics would describe, the claim becomes vague. Most physicalists accept a rough answer: the physical is what the natural sciences study, and it excludes souls and other basically mental things.

Worked example: the argument from causal closure

A widely used argument runs: 1. Mental events cause physical events: deciding to wave makes your arm move. 2. Causal closure: every physical event that has a cause has a sufficient physical cause. 3. Physical effects are not routinely caused twice over, once physically and once by a separate mental cause. 4. So mental events must themselves be physical events. Evaluate: the argument is valid, so critics must reject a premise. A dualist who thinks minds move bodies directly must deny premise 2. A dualist who thinks minds cause nothing physical denies premise 1, and some accept double causes, denying premise 3. Jaegwon Kim's related exclusion argument says non-physical mental properties would have no causal work left. Supporting evidence for physicalism also comes from neuroscience: brain injuries, drugs and disease change memory, mood and personality in systematic ways.

Identity theory

In the 1950s U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart proposed that mental states are identical to brain states. Pain is not caused by a brain process, nor merely linked with one: it is that process. They compared this to scientific discoveries that two descriptions pick out one thing, as lightning turned out to be electrical discharge and water turned out to be H₂O. Such identities are found by investigation, not by analysing what words mean, so the fact that "pain" and "neural firing" mean different things is no objection. The theory gives mental states real causal power, because brain states plainly cause behaviour.

Multiple realisability

Hilary Putnam objected in the 1960s that the identity theory is too narrow. An octopus has a nervous system organised very differently from ours, yet it seems able to feel pain. A future robot or an alien might feel pain with no neurons at all. If pain just is one particular kind of human brain state, these beings could not be in pain. Putnam concluded that the same mental state can be realised by different physical states, a property called multiple realisability. The objection targets type identity, the claim that each kind of mental state is one kind of brain state, rather than the weaker claim that each individual pain is some physical event.

Functionalism

Functionalism responds by defining mental states by what they do rather than what they are made of. A mental state is identified by its causal role: what typically causes it, how it affects other mental states, and what behaviour it produces. Pain is whatever state is caused by bodily damage, produces distress and the desire for relief, and leads to flinching and protecting the injured part. Compare a clock: anything that keeps time counts, whether it uses gears, a pendulum or a quartz crystal. Functionalism thus allows octopuses, aliens and perhaps computers to have minds, and is often compared to software running on different hardware.

The Chinese Room

John Searle's Chinese Room argument (1980) challenges the idea that running the right program is enough for a mind. Imagine a person who knows no Chinese locked in a room with a rulebook. Chinese questions are passed in; by matching symbols to the rules, the person passes back fluent Chinese answers. To outsiders the room understands Chinese, yet the person understands nothing. Searle concluded that syntax, the manipulation of symbols, is not sufficient for semantics, meaning. The systems reply answers that the whole room, person plus rulebook, understands. Searle responded that the person could memorise the rules and still understand nothing.

Eliminative materialism

Paul and Patricia Churchland defended a more radical physicalism. Everyday folk psychology, which explains behaviour by beliefs and desires, is a theory, they argued, and theories can turn out false. Earlier folk theories of heat, disease and burning were replaced, and their key terms, such as phlogiston, turned out to name nothing. A mature neuroscience might likewise replace talk of beliefs and desires rather than explain it. Critics reply that the view defeats itself: to assert eliminativism is to express a belief. Eliminativists answer that this objection assumes the very folk psychology under question.

Worked example: Mary's room

Frank Jackson's knowledge argument (1982) is a famous challenge to physicalism. 1. Mary, a brilliant scientist, has lived all her life in a black-and-white room, yet knows every physical fact about colour vision. 2. On leaving and seeing a red tomato, she learns something new: what seeing red is like. 3. So not every fact is a physical fact. 4. So physicalism is false. Replies: the ability hypothesis, from David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow, says Mary gains new abilities, such as recognising and imagining red, not new facts. Others say she gains a new concept of a physical fact she already knew. Jackson himself later rejected the argument's conclusion and became a physicalist.

Common mistakes to avoid

First, physicalism is not the claim that minds do not exist; most physicalists hold that minds are real and are physical. Second, multiple realisability undermines type identity, not physicalism as a whole. Third, functionalism does not say minds are made of silicon; it says the material does not settle whether something has a mind. Fourth, the Chinese Room targets programs as sufficient for understanding, not machines as such. Fifth, eliminativism is a prediction about future science, not a report of current findings.

Key takeaways

Physicalism says everything, the mind included, is physical or depends wholly on the physical, and two physical duplicates would be mental duplicates. The causal closure argument and neuroscience support it. Place and Smart identified mental states with brain states; Putnam's multiple realisability pushed many towards functionalism, which defines mental states by causal roles. Searle's Chinese Room argues that symbol manipulation is not understanding. The Churchlands' eliminativism predicts folk psychology will be replaced. Jackson's Mary argument challenges physicalism, and the ability hypothesis is a leading reply.

Flashcards

Flashcard

Mind-body problem

How thoughts and feelings relate to the physical brain and body

Dualists and physicalists answer differently.

Test your understanding

Question 1 of 5

Putnam's octopus example is mainly an objection to which view?

Question 2 of 5

A theorist says a state counts as fear whenever it is caused by a perceived threat, produces worry and leads to avoidance, whatever it is made of. Which theory is this?

Question 3 of 5

What did Searle conclude from the Chinese Room?

Question 4 of 5

Which reply to Frank Jackson's Mary argument is the ability hypothesis?

Question 5 of 5

In the causal closure argument, which premise must a dualist reject if she holds that the non-physical mind moves the body directly?

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