Philosophy › Section H · Value theory › Topic H.4
Well-being and a meaningful life
What makes a life go well for the person living it, and what makes it meaningful? The two questions overlap but are not the same, and philosophers in many traditions have given rival answers to each.
What is good for a person
Well-being, also called welfare or flourishing, is what makes a life good for the one who lives it. It differs from moral goodness: a life can be admirable and unhappy, or comfortable and selfish. Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons (1984), sorted theories of well-being into three families. Hedonism says well-being consists in pleasure and the absence of pain. Desire-satisfaction theories say it consists in getting what you want. Objective list theories say certain things, such as knowledge or friendship, are good for you whether or not you enjoy or want them.
Hedonism
Hedonists hold that pleasure is the only thing good in itself for a person and pain the only thing bad. This is not indulgence: Epicurus, introduced in "Classical Greek philosophy: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle", sought ataraxia, freedom from mental disturbance, through simple living and friendship. Jeremy Bentham measured pleasures by dimensions such as intensity and duration; "Consequentialism and utilitarianism" examines the moral use of this idea. John Stuart Mill, in Utilitarianism (1861), distinguished higher pleasures of the intellect from lower bodily ones, arguing that those who know both prefer the higher. Critics reply that Mill's ranking smuggles in a value other than pleasure itself.
The experience machine
Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), imagined a machine giving you any experiences you chose without your knowing you were plugged in. Would you plug in for life? Nozick thought most people would refuse, because we want to actually do things and be a certain kind of person, not merely to have experiences, so pleasure cannot be all that matters. Hedonists reply that the refusal may reflect bias towards what is familiar. Felipe De Brigard (2010) reported that when people were told their present life was already a machine, many preferred to stay plugged in.
Desire satisfaction
Desire theories say your life goes well to the extent that your desires are satisfied. They respect the variety of human lives, since people want different things. Since we often want what will not benefit us, most defenders appeal to informed desires: what you would want if you knew all the relevant facts. Two objections remain. John Rawls imagined a gifted person who wants only to count blades of grass on lawns; Rawls granted that counting would be this man's good, but many readers doubt that it makes his life go well. And Jon Elster described adaptive preferences, as in the fable of the fox who decides unreachable grapes are sour: deprived people may learn to want little, so their satisfied desires can mask a poor life.
Objective lists
Objective list theorists name goods that benefit anyone: knowledge, friendship, achievement, health and virtue are common entries. Aristotle distinguished friendships of utility, of pleasure and of character, and held that only the last, in which friends love each other for who they are, is complete. Martha Nussbaum's list of central capabilities, from "Basic questions about values", is another example. Objective lists explain why the experience machine and the grass-counter fall short. The main objection is alienation: if knowledge benefits someone who has no interest in it at all, the theory seems to impose an outside standard. Hybrid theories reply that goods benefit you only when you also engage with them. Perfectionists, from Aristotle to Spinoza, tie well-being to developing one's capacities.
Eudaimonia across traditions
Aristotle called the highest human good eudaimonia, usually translated as flourishing: a whole life of activity in accordance with virtue, supported by external goods such as friends and enough resources. The Stoics replied that virtue alone suffices, so misfortune cannot destroy a good life. The Buddha taught that suffering arises from craving and ceases when craving ceases, which challenges desire theories: on this view well-being comes from transforming desires rather than satisfying them. The Nguni saying "umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu", roughly "one becomes a person through others", expresses the ubuntu idea that flourishing is relational. In Japan, ikigai names a reason for living, a sense of purpose distinct from pleasant feelings.
Worked example: three theories, one life
Ines grew up poor, now works a dull, safe job, says she wants nothing more, and is content most days. 1. Hedonism: she has much pleasure and little pain, so she is doing well. 2. Simple desire theory: her desires are satisfied, so she is doing well. 3. Elster's warning: her modest desires may be adaptive, shaped by deprivation, so their satisfaction may not show well-being. 4. Informed desire theory: ask what she would want with full knowledge of her options, perhaps education or travel. 5. Objective list: count her friendships, health and knowledge, whatever she feels. 6. Result: the theories agree on many cases but divide over adapted contentment.
Meaning in life
A meaningful life is not quite the same as a happy or a moral one: a life might be pleasant but trivial, or dutiful but empty. Thaddeus Metz and others sort theories of meaning into three groups. Supernaturalists hold that meaning comes from a relation to God or a spiritual order; critics ask whether a purpose assigned by another, even by God, would make a life meaningful for its owner. Subjectivists hold that a life is meaningful when the person cares about and is fulfilled by their activities; critics point to the grass-counter again. Objectivists hold that some activities, such as creating, discovering and caring for others, confer meaning whatever one feels.
Wolf, the absurd and Frankl
Susan Wolf defends a hybrid view: meaning arises when a person is actively engaged with projects that are genuinely worthwhile, so both subjective love and objective value are needed. Albert Camus, in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), described the absurd: the clash between our demand for meaning and a universe that offers none. He rejected both suicide and the leap to religious hope, recommending lucid revolt, and ended by asking us to picture Sisyphus, rolling his rock forever, as happy. Thomas Nagel (1971) answered that absurdity comes from our ability to view our own concerns from outside, and called for irony, not despair. Viktor Frankl, in Man's Search for Meaning (1946), drew on his survival of Nazi camps to argue that people can choose their attitude even to suffering.
Worked example: two lives
Marta is a volunteer firefighter who finds the work gruelling but believes it matters. Leo spends every spare hour memorising old train timetables and loves it. 1. Subjectivist: both lives are meaningful, since each is fulfilled by what he or she cares about. 2. Objectivist: Marta's life is more meaningful, because protecting others is valuable, whatever she feels. 3. Wolf's hybrid: Marta's life is meaningful if she is also engaged with her work, not merely dutiful; Leo's gains meaning only so far as his hobby involves real goods, such as preserving history for others. 4. Lesson: the hybrid view explains why each life seems partly meaningful.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, equating philosophical hedonism with indulgence; Epicurus prized calm and simplicity. Second, assuming that rejecting the experience machine refutes all forms of hedonism; hedonists offer replies, and evidence about people's choices is mixed. Third, treating any satisfied desire as a sign of well-being; adaptive preferences can mislead. Fourth, confusing meaning with happiness: a meaningful life can involve great hardship. Fifth, reading Camus as recommending despair; he recommended revolt and lucid engagement.
Key takeaways
Well-being is what makes a life good for its owner. Hedonism faces Nozick's experience machine; desire theories face the grass-counter and adaptive preferences; objective lists risk alienation. Aristotle's eudaimonia, Stoic virtue, Buddhist release from craving, ubuntu and ikigai offer further accounts of flourishing. Meaning differs from happiness and morality; supernaturalist, subjectivist, objectivist and Wolf's hybrid views compete. Camus answered the absurd with revolt, Nagel with irony, and Frankl with the freedom to choose one's attitude.
Flashcards
Flashcard
What makes a life good for the person living it
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
Nozick's experience machine is mainly an objection to which theory of well-being?
Question 2 of 5
A woman raised in poverty has learned to want very little and says she is satisfied. Which idea warns that her satisfied desires may not show that her life goes well?
Question 3 of 5
On Susan Wolf's view, what makes a life meaningful?
Question 4 of 5
Which statement fits Camus's response to the absurd in The Myth of Sisyphus?
Question 5 of 5
How does the Buddhist teaching about craving challenge desire-satisfaction theories?
