US History › Section M · Depression and New Deal › Topic M.2
President Hoover's response
Herbert Hoover did more to fight an economic slump than any president before him, yet his faith in voluntary action and limited federal power kept him from giving direct aid to the jobless. Understanding both halves of that record explains why Americans turned so sharply against him.
More active than any predecessor, but not enough
Earlier presidents had treated depressions, such as those of the 1870s and 1890s, as natural storms that government should wait out. Hoover rejected that view and acted early, but within firm limits. Historians once portrayed him as a do-nothing president; most now describe a hard-working leader who expanded federal action step by step while refusing, until very late, to give federal money directly to the hungry and unemployed. The debate is less about whether he acted than about whether his tools fitted the scale of the crisis.
Hoover's philosophy
In a 1928 campaign speech Hoover praised what he called the American system of "rugged individualism". He believed that prosperity came from individual effort and from voluntary cooperation among businesses, farmers, workers and local communities, with the federal government acting as an organiser rather than a director. He feared that federal handouts, which critics of relief called "the dole", would weaken self-reliance and shift power from states and localities to Washington. Like most leaders of his day, he also valued a balanced budget and the gold standard, which he saw as foundations of public confidence.
First steps: asking business to hold the line
In November 1929, within weeks of the crash, Hoover called business leaders to the White House. They promised to keep wages steady and continue investment, while union leaders agreed not to press for raises. He asked governors and mayors to speed up public works, increased federal construction, and won a small cut in income tax. For about a year many large firms kept wage rates steady, but they cut hours and jobs instead, and by 1931 the wage pledges were breaking down across industry.
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff
In June 1930 Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which raised duties on thousands of imported goods to protect American farmers and manufacturers. More than a thousand economists had urged him to veto it. Canada and several European countries retaliated with tariffs of their own. World trade shrank by about two-thirds in value between 1929 and 1933. Most economists think falling prices and output caused most of that shrinkage and rank the tariff's direct effect below banking and monetary failures, but agree it soured international relations.
Relief through private and local channels
Hoover set up the President's Emergency Committee for Employment (PECE) in October 1930 and its successor, the President's Organization on Unemployment Relief (POUR), in August 1931. Both coordinated and encouraged local efforts, charities such as the Red Cross and Community Chests, and fundraising drives, but gave no federal money to individuals. When drought struck the South and Midwest in 1930 and 1931, Hoover backed federal loans for seed, feed and fertiliser while resisting federal money for food. Meanwhile city and state budgets were collapsing as tax revenues fell, so local relief shrank just as need soared.
The crisis of 1931 and the turn to federal action
In 1931 a banking crisis swept Europe. Hoover proposed a one-year moratorium, or pause, on payments of war debts and German reparations, which took effect that summer but brought little lasting relief. When Britain left the gold standard in September 1931, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates to defend the dollar, and American bank failures surged. Hoover first asked large banks to form a voluntary lending pool, the National Credit Corporation, which did little. In January 1932 he signed a law creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), a federal agency empowered to lend up to about $2 billion to banks, railways and insurance companies.
Relief, construction and taxes in 1932
In July 1932, after vetoing a broader Democratic bill, Hoover signed the Emergency Relief and Construction Act. It let the RFC lend $300 million to states for relief and up to $1.5 billion for public works, but only for self-liquidating projects, such as toll bridges, that would repay their costs, so little was spent before he left office. Earlier that year he had also signed the Revenue Act of 1932, a large tax increase meant to balance the budget, which raised the top income tax rate from 25 to 63 percent. Many economists now argue that raising taxes in a depression deepened the slump.
Worked example: why the RFC disappointed
A cause-and-effect analysis. 1. Aim: Hoover believed that if banks and railways were kept solvent, credit would flow to businesses, which would rehire workers. 2. Design: the RFC lent only to institutions with good security, so much of its early money went to large banks and railways. 3. Reaction: in June 1932 a Chicago bank linked to Charles Dawes, who had just resigned as RFC president, received a loan of about $90 million, and critics called the agency relief for bankers. 4. Limit: frightened banks often held the money rather than lending it. 5. Conclusion: the RFC helped steady some institutions, but families without jobs saw little benefit.
Anger and protest
As conditions worsened, protest spread. Shantytowns of the homeless were mocked as Hoovervilles. In March 1932, police and Ford Motor Company guards fired on unemployed workers marching to Ford's River Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan, killing four marchers; a fifth died later. In the Midwest, the Farm Holiday Association, led by Milo Reno, called on farmers to withhold produce until prices rose; some members blocked roads, and others used penny auctions, bidding tiny sums at foreclosure sales and scaring off rivals so the land could be returned to its owners. Many Americans did not blame Hoover for causing the Depression, but they increasingly blamed him for refusing direct help.
Worked example: the Bonus Army
A cause-and-effect analysis of the summer of 1932. 1. Cause: a 1924 law had given First World War veterans bonus certificates payable in 1945. 2. Demand: from May, an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 or more veterans and their families camped in Washington, many at Anacostia Flats, asking for early payment. 3. Decision: the House passed a payment bill, but in June the Senate rejected it. 4. Escalation: on 28 July police shot and killed two veterans; Hoover then ordered the army to clear the area. 5. Action: General Douglas MacArthur used troops, tanks and tear gas, and the Anacostia camp burned; accounts suggest he went further than Hoover's orders allowed. 6. Effect: images of soldiers routing veterans badly damaged Hoover months before the election.
Common mistakes to avoid
First, calling Hoover a do-nothing president; he acted early and created the RFC. Second, thinking the RFC gave money to individuals; it lent to banks, railways and other institutions, and later to states. Third, blaming the tariff alone for the Depression; most economists rank banking and monetary failures as more important. Fourth, saying Congress paid the veterans' bonus in 1932; the Senate rejected early payment. Fifth, assuming Hoover ignored suffering; his objection was to direct federal relief, not to helping people through local and private channels.
Key takeaways
Hoover believed in rugged individualism, voluntary cooperation, balanced budgets and limited federal power. He asked business to maintain wages, signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930 and channelled relief through private and local bodies. After the crisis of 1931 he proposed a debt moratorium and created the RFC in 1932 to lend to banks and railways, then signed limited relief loans to states and a large tax increase. Protests, from the Ford Hunger March to the Bonus Army, showed growing anger at his refusal of direct federal aid.
Flashcards
Flashcard
Hoover's phrase for an American system built on individual effort, not government direction
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 5
What was Hoover's main objection to federal relief for the unemployed?
Question 2 of 5
What did the Reconstruction Finance Corporation do when it was created in 1932?
Question 3 of 5
Which statement about the Smoot-Hawley Tariff reflects the view of most economists today?
Question 4 of 5
Why did the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 produce little help before Hoover left office?
Question 5 of 5
What happened to the Bonus Army in the summer of 1932?
